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The Australian superannuation system seeks to ensure that individuals have 
income in retirement.  The government implemented the superannuation 
contributions splitting scheme to allow spouses to share their superannuation with 
each other.  The scheme was intended to provide low-income and non-working 
spouses with superannuation assets under their control.  This was expected to 
benefit women in particular.  
 
However, there is a risk that the scheme will operate to the detriment of spouses 
and jeopardise their financial position in retirement.  There is a lack of safeguards 
to protect spouses from applying to split their contributions where their decision is 
not free, informed or independent.  Further, imposing the scheme’s application 
process into the superannuation system’s trust structure has caused a dissociation 
between the legal and practical decision maker under the scheme.  These issues 
are particularly detrimental in light of the heightened risk of vitiated consent 
between spouses for financial decisions. 
 
This thesis seeks to examine these issues and their impact and propose potential 
solutions to prevent the scheme operating to spouses’ detriment and remedy the 
situation where it occurs.  It is argued that the scheme does not sufficiently protect 
spouses’ interests.  It is also argued that the dissociation between the legal and 
practical decision maker exposes trustees to potential liability and leaves spouses 
without a clear avenue of recourse where their contributions are transferred in 
circumstances of impaired consent.  Thus, both the trustees and spouses are left in 
a difficult position under the scheme.  As a result, despite the government’s 
intentions, the contributions splitting scheme may disadvantage, rather than 































































The superannuation contributions splitting scheme allows spouses to ‘split’ or 
share their superannuation contributions with each other.1  In 2011, the Australian 
Law Reform Commission identified a risk that spouses subjected to domestic 
violence could be coerced into splitting their superannuation contributions.2  It is 
well known that spouses may confer financial benefits due to vitiated consent and 
the feeling that they have no choice.  This is an issue that has arisen before the 
courts time and time again.3  However, coercion occurring in the context of the 
superannuation contributions splitting scheme creates a unique and serious 
problem.  There are currently no reported cases of coercion occurring in the 
contributions splitting scheme.  However, this is not surprising given the scheme’s 
relative youth.  The scheme came into effect on 1 January 2006 with the first 
transfer permitted on 1 July 2006.4  Given the long-term nature of superannuation, 
it is possible that issues concerning coercion and other forms of vitiated consent 
have already occurred in the scheme but has yet to be realised or reported. 
 
The possibility that spouses may be coerced into splitting their superannuation 
contributions is complicated by the fact that spouses do not confer the financial 
benefits themselves.  The superannuation system uses a trust mechanism, so that it 
is the superannuation trustees who are responsible for administering and 
managing the superannuation contributions.5  Under the contributions splitting 
scheme, it is the trustee who determines whether to confer the financial benefits 
(ie the superannuation contributions) to the other spouse.6  Yet, in practice, 
                                                
1 Explanatory Memorandum, Tax Laws Amendment (Superannuation Contributions Splitting) Bill 
2005 (Cth) 3; Leslie Nielson, Parliament of Australia, Tax Laws Amendment (Superannuation 
Contribution Splitting) Bill 2005, No 68 of 2005-06, 28 November 2005, 3. 
2 Australian Law Reform Commission, Family Violence and Commonwealth Laws – Improving 
Legal Frameworks, Report No 117 (2011) 464. 
3 See, eg, Garcia v National Bank of Australia Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395; Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 
CLR 649; Saintclaire v Saintclaire [2015] FamCAFC 245 (21 December 2015). 
4 Leslie Nielson, above n 1, 1; Mal Brough, ‘Splitting of Superannuation Contributions Between 
Couples’ (Media Release, No. 27, 10 May 2005) 
<http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2005/027.htm&pageID=00
3&min=mtb&Year=2005&DocType=0>. 
5 See Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 52(3)-(6) (‘SIS Act’).  See also 
Scott Donald, The Role of Trust Law in the Superannuation System, Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority, 3 
<http://www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/WorkingAtAPRA/Documents/Scott-Donald_What-contrib
ution-does-trust-law-make-to-the-regulatory-scheme-shaping-superannuation-in-Australia.pdf>. 
6 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 5.45 (‘SIS Regulations’). 
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trustees appear simply to be following the spouses’ instructions.  This results in a 
dissociation between the legal and practical decision maker in the contributions 
splitting scheme.7  Spouses and trustees are both left in a difficult position 
pursuant to which trustees may be exposed to liability for breaches of trust, while 
spouses potentially have no clear and direct right to recourse.  This situation is 
exacerbated by the absence of safeguards in the contributions splitting scheme.   
 
This thesis examines the legal issues arising from the risks associated with 
vitiated consent to applications made under the contributions splitting scheme. 
 
A The Australian Superannuation System 
Fundamental to this thesis is the structure and importance of the Australian 
superannuation system.  Issues concerning the superannuation contributions 
splitting scheme can only be understood in the context of the superannuation 
system and its purpose.  In Australia, superannuation forms part of the retirement 
income system 8  and is vital for supporting the economy and the ageing 
population.9  Superannuation enables individuals to save for their retirement and 
reduces reliance on the age pension.10   
The Australian superannuation system is complex and is governed by statute, 
contract and general law.  The superannuation funds examined in this thesis are 
largely governed by the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) 
(‘SIS Act’) and Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) 
(‘SIS Regulations’).  Employers are required to pay a percentage of employees’ 
                                                
7 This dissociation will be discussed in Ch IV. 
8 Australia’s retirement income system comprises of three pillars: the age pension, mandatory 
superannuation contributions and voluntary savings.  This thesis focuses on the second pillar and 
will not discuss the other two pillars.  The age pension is a social security payment that citizens 
aged 65 and older can be eligible to receive based on a means test of their income and assets.  The 
third pillar comprises of individuals’ other assets, such as housing and shares.  See Senate 
Economics References Committee, A Husband is Not a Retirement Plan: Achieving Economic 
Security for Women in Retirement (2016) 5-6; Panha Heng, Scott Niblock and Jennifer Harrison, 
‘Retirement Policy: A Review of the Role, Characteristics, and Contribution of the Australian 
Superannuation System’ (2015) 29 Asian-Pacific Economic Literature 1, 2-3 for a further 
discussion on the pillars of the Australian superannuation system.  
9 Senate Economics References Committee, above n 8, 5-6; Tony Daly, ‘Work, Care, Retirement 
and Health: Ageing ‘Agendas’’ (October 2014) University of South Australia Hawke Research 
Institute, 4-5 
<https://unisa.edu.au/Global/EASS/HRI/CWL/publications/AA%20lit%20review%20Final.pdf>. 




remuneration into the employee’s superannuation account, which is within a 
superannuation fund.11  This money is referred to as superannuation contributions.  
Currently, these mandatory employer contributions are set at 9.5% minimum.12  
Employees cannot access their superannuation contributions until they reach their 
preservation age, which is the age when an individual can retire and access their 
superannuation savings without restrictions.13 
 
The superannuation system employs the trust as a vehicle for the management of 
superannuation funds during the period between contribution and preservation 
age.14  Like discretionary family trusts, each superannuation trust has its own trust 
deed,15 which is the main source of the trustees’ powers and duties.16  The 
employee, also referred to as a member of the trust, is a beneficiary of the 
superannuation trust.  However, unlike discretionary family trusts, the 
beneficiaries are not volunteers in superannuation trusts because the 
superannuation contributions form part of their remuneration.17  This difference 
has led to the trustees’ duties being modified in the superannuation context.18  
                                                
11 Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth) s 16. 
12 Ibid s 19(2). 
13 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Getting Your Super, MoneySmart (17 
October 2016) 
<https://www.moneysmart.gov.au/superannuation-and-retirement/how-super-works/getting-your-s




14 SIS Act s 52; Australian Law Reform Commission, Grey Area – Age Barriers to Work in 
Commonwealth Laws, Discussion Paper 78 (2012) 158-9; Scott Donald, The Role of Trust Law in 
the Superannuation System, above n 5, 3. 
15 See Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority, Trust Deeds/Governing Rules 
<http://www.apra.gov.au/Super/Pages/super-licensing-faq-trust-deeds-governing-rules.aspx>.  
See, eg, Maritime Super, Deed of Amendment (27 August 2015) 
<http://www.maritimesuper.com.au/Assets/Documents/other/trust-deed-and-amendments.pdf>; 
Clough Superannuation Fund, Deed of Variation (30 June 2005) 
<http://www.cloughsuper.com.au/TrustDeed.pdf>; Telstra Super, The Trust Deed (16 July 2013) 
<http://www.telstrasuper.com.au/About_us/About_Telstra_Super/The_Trust_Deed>. 
16 See Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns [1996] 1 AC 421, 434 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); Youyang 
Pty Ltd v Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher (2003) 212 CLR 484, 498 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, 
Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); Harold Ford et al, Thomson Reuters, Ford and Lees: The Law of 
Trusts (at 12 August 2015) 9 Trustees’ Duties, ‘The Duty: General and Specific’ [9.2010]. 
17 Finch v Telstra Super Pty Ltd (2010) 242 CLR 254, 271 [33] (French CJ, Gummow, Heydon, 
Crennan and Bell JJ); Commonwealth Bank Officers Superannuation Corporation Pty Ltd v Beck 
(2016) 334 ALR 992, 711 (Bathurst CJ). 
18 See, eg, Finch v Telstra Super Pty Ltd (2010) 242 CLR 254, 280 [66] (French CJ, Gummow, 
Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ) where the Court held that superannuation trustees have a ‘more 
intense’ duty to properly inform themselves. 
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However, the extent to which traditional trust law applies or is modified in the 
superannuation system remains unclear.19 
 
There are different types of superannuation funds, which are regulated by 
different bodies.  This thesis will focus on accumulation funds that are regulated 
by the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (‘APRA’).  This is because the 
contributions splitting scheme only applies to accumulation funds. 20   In 
accumulation funds, members’ superannuation contributions ‘accumulate’ or 
grow due to additional contributions, the effect of compound interest21 and the 
fund’s investment strategy until the members can access their superannuation 
savings.22  APRA regulates most accumulation funds.  The main exception to this 
is self-managed super funds (‘SMSFs’),23 which are largely regulated by the 
Australian Taxation Office.24  This thesis will focus on APRA-regulated funds 
because the issues examined in this thesis are more pertinent to these funds.  In 
SMSFs, the trustees are also the beneficiaries and as such, there is no dissociation 
between the legal and practical decision makers.25  Further, SMSFs can only 
                                                
19 The Court in Finch v Telstra Super Pty Ltd (2010) 242 CLR 254, 280 [65] ultimately chose not 
to answer the extent to which the principles in Karger v Paul [1984] VR 161 (which provides the 
grounds on when trustees’ exercise of discretion can be reviewed) applies in the superannuation 
system.  See also Scott Donald, ‘What’s in a Name? Examining the Consequences of Inter-legality 
in Australia’s Superannuation System’ (2011) 33 Sydney Law Review 295 for a further discussion 
on how the application of different areas of law results in inconsistencies and challenges in the 
superannuation system. 
20 Australian Taxation Office, Contributions Splitting for Members (8 September 2015) 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/Super/APRA-regulated-funds/Managing-member-benefits/Contributions-
splitting-for-members/>. 
21 For more details about the impact of compound interest see: Debra Cleveland, ‘Salary Sacrifice 
Early and Let Compound Interest do the Hard Work to Build your Super’, Australian Financial 
Review (online), 1 May 2015 
<http://www.afr.com/personal-finance/budgeting/salary-sacrifice-early-and-let-compound-interest
-do-the-hard-work-to-build-your-super-20150423-1mrznx>; UniSuper, See the Difference Interest 
Can Make 
<https://www.unisuper.com.au/learning-centre/understanding-super/see-the-difference-interest-can
-make>; Australian Investors Association, Power of Compounding 
<http://www.investors.asn.au/education/investment-basics/power-of-compounding/>. 




23 Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority, Superannuation 
<http://www.apra.gov.au/super/pages/default.aspx>. 
24 Australian Taxation Office, How Your SMSF is Regulated (16 June 2015) 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/Super/Self-managed-super-funds/Administering-and-reporting/How-we-
help-and-regulate-SMSFs/How-your-SMSF-is-regulated/>. 
25 SIS Act s 17A.  Trustees of SMSFs are also exempt from the prohibition on being subject to 
direction: SIS Act s 58(1). 
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consist of up to five members.26  Their small size means that SMSF trustees are 
more likely to be aware of circumstances of vitiated consent unlike trustees in 
APRA-regulated funds. 
 
B A Gendered Issue 
While issues under the contributions splitting scheme can affect both men and 
women, there is a gender aspect to the problem.  The Australian Law Reform 
Commission identified the risk of coercion in the domestic violence setting, where 
women are more likely to be the victims.27  Further, the courts have recognised 
that in a spousal relationship, wives in particular have an increased risk of having 
their consent vitiated.28  This is because women are more likely to make decisions 
based on emotional dependence and in order to maintain the relationship.29  
Spouses also repose trust and confidence in each other.30  Further, it is a reality 
that many wives are still responsible for domestic matters while their husbands 
are responsible for the financial decisions in the household.31  These factors in 
conjunction mean that women have a greater risk of having their consent vitiated 
under the scheme. 
 
This gendered aspect to the issues underlying the contributions splitting scheme is 
particularly detrimental given that women are already retiring with insufficient 
superannuation savings compared to men.32  This retirement savings gap is well 
                                                
26 Ibid s 17A(1)(a).  SMSFs must also contain more than one member. 
27 Australian Law Reform Commission, Family Violence and Commonwealth Laws – Improving 
Legal Frameworks, above n 2, 79, 464. 
28 Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, 190-1 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); Yerkey v Jones 
(1939) 63 CLR 649, 675, 685 (Dixon J). 
29 Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649, 675, 685 (Dixon J); Nicola Howell, ‘“Sexually Transmitted 
Debt”: Feminist Analysis of Laws Regulating Guarantors and Co-Borrowers’ (1995) 4 Australian 
Feminist Law Journal 93, 107. 
30 Garcia v National Bank of Australia Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395, 404 [21] (Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow, Hayne JJ). 
31 Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1993] QB 109, 139 (Scott LJ); Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien 
[1994] 1 AC 180, 188 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
32 Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia, ‘Sixty Minute Super Incentive’ (Media 
Release, 7 March 2013) 
<http://www.superannuation.asn.au/media/media-releases/2013/media-release-7-march-2013>; 
Laura De Zwaan, Mark Brimble and Jenny Stewart, ‘Engagement with Superannuation: Is There 
Really a Gender Gap?’ (2015) 4 Finsia Journal of Applied Finance 12, 12; Erica Thompson, 
‘Most Baby Boomers Today Have Insufficient Superannuation Savings - Those Golden Years’, 
The Courier – Mail (Brisbane), 30 October 2006, 33.  
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documented and has sparked a government inquiry.33  The contributions splitting 
scheme was implemented to help women in particular grow their superannuation 
savings when they take time off work to care for family.34  However, the manner 
in which the scheme has been implemented has created a danger that it will 
frequently be used to the detriment of women – making those affected less 
financially secure in retirement. 
 
C The Need for a Solution 
It will be argued that this problem requires a legislative solution because existing 
mechanisms do not offer sufficient protection to vulnerable spouses.  Under the 
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), spouses’ superannuation contributions can be divided 
when they divorce or separate.35  It is likely that the Family Court will take into 
account any contributions split between the parties when determining how to 
divide the contributions.36  On its face, this may appear sufficient to address any 
issues arising from coercion or vitiated consent in the contributions splitting 
scheme.  However, the courts have recognised that ‘prevention is better than cure’ 
in some instances.37  It is important to prevent issues of vitiated consent from 
arising under the scheme rather than remedy it at the divorce stage.  Requiring 
parties to wait for a formal divorce proceeding to take place before they can 
recover their superannuation savings can add uncertainty and can exacerbate 
financial dependency issues.  Additionally, requiring parties to wait until divorce 
to recover lost superannuation contributions would be contrary to the scheme’s 
                                                
33 Senate Economics References Committee, above n 8, 9-10. 
34 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 12 October 2005, 1 
(Malcolm Brough); Explanatory Memorandum, Tax Laws Amendment (Superannuation 
Contributions Splitting) Bill 2005 (Cth) 8 [1.3]; Treasury, Australian Government, Splitting of 
Superannuation Contributions Between Couples, Consultation Paper (2002) 1; John Howard, 
Prime Minister of Australia, ‘Superannuation and Savings Policy Launch’ (Speech delivered at the 
Superannuation and Savings Policy Launch, Brisbane, 5 November 2001). 
35 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 75(2), 79(4), 90MA. 
36 The Family Court considers parties’ contributions to assets when determining how to divide the 
assets between the parties: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 79(4). 
37 Re Anderson-Berry [1928] Ch 290, 307 (Sargant LJ); Friend v Brooker (2009) 239 CLR 129, 
152 [52] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Bell JJ); Butler v Communications, Electrical, 
Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia [2012] 
FCA 790 (29 June 2012) [34] (Jagot J). 
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objective of providing low-income and non-working spouses with superannuation 
assets under their control.38   
 
Further, the dissociation between the legal and practical decision maker arises 
because the trustees’ role under the contributions splitting scheme is unclear.  As 
will be discussed, this results in trustees being exposed to potential liability for 
breach of trust.  Clarifying the trustees’ role and the extent to which traditional 
trust laws apply to the contributions splitting scheme, and the superannuation 
system in general, can prevent trustees from being exposed to liability for 
following the contributions splitting scheme.   
 
Lastly, in the absence of protection or a clear avenue of legal recourse, it is likely 
that parties will settle disputes about superannuation contributions splitting 
between themselves.39  Women have been noted to sacrifice a share of their 
spouse’s superannuation contributions in order to secure housing for themselves 
and their children in property settlements.40  As a result, lost superannuation 
contributions that were split under the scheme may not be recovered and women 
affected may be left financially disadvantaged in retirement.  
 
D Structure of this Thesis 
This thesis will examine the risk of spouses making decisions that are not free, 
informed or independent under the contributions splitting scheme and how the 
implementation of an application process within the superannuation’s trust 
mechanism exacerbates this issue.  Chapter II provides an overview of the 
superannuation contributions splitting scheme and describes in detail how it 
creates a new situation of risk for vulnerable spouses.  Chapter III explores the 
special risks entailed when spouses make financial decisions in relation to one 
                                                
38 See Explanatory Memorandum, Tax Laws Amendment (Superannuation Contributions 
Splitting) Bill 2005 (Cth) 13; Treasury, Splitting of Superannuation Contributions Between 
Couples, above n 34, 3. 
39 Parties are able to reach a property settlement between themselves after they divorce or separate: 
Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) r 10.06; Legal Aid Western Australia, Dividing Property - Married 
Couples (1 October 2015) 
<http://www.legalaid.wa.gov.au/informationaboutthelaw/familyrelationshipschildren/financialmatt
ers/pages/dividingpropertymarriedcouples.aspx>. 
40 Juliet Behrens, ‘Women and Family Law’ in Patricia Easteal (ed), Women and the Law in 
Australia, (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010) 211-2. 
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another.  It considers the avenues of legal recourse provided to spouses to 
alleviate them from responsibility for undertakings made in circumstances where 
their consent was vitiated.  Chapter IV analyses the dissociation between the legal 
and practical decision making under the contributions splitting scheme arising 
from the application process being imposed in a trust mechanism.  It will be 
submitted that this dissociation exposes superannuation trustees to liability and 
diminishes (and possibly obstructs) a spouse’s right to recover contributions lost 
pursuant to an application made in circumstances of impaired consent.  Finally, 
Chapter V proposes possible solutions to ameliorate the operation of the 
superannuation contributions splitting scheme, so as to minimise the risk of harm 
to vulnerable spouses and to provide a remedial mechanism for the recovery of 
contributions that were improperly split. 
SUPERANNUATION CONTRIBUTIONS SPLITTING SCHEME  
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II THE SUPERANNUATION CONTRIBUTIONS SPLITTING SCHEME 
The superannuation contributions splitting scheme creates a risk that spouses may 
make uninformed or unbeneficial decisions and will be financially disadvantaged 
in retirement.  This risk has arisen by virtue of a failure to ensure that 
superannuation contributions cannot be transferred by low-income or 
non-working spouses and also because of an absence of safeguards to protect 
spouses.  As a result, contrary to the government’s intentions, the scheme can 
operate to the detriment of the splitting spouse and jeopardise their financial 
position in retirement.  This chapter provides an overview of the contributions 
splitting scheme and its objectives.  It will outline the practical and legal 
requirements for splitting contributions under the scheme.  Finally, this chapter 
will describe the risks created by the scheme in light of the scheme’s deficiencies.   
 
A Overview of the Contributions Splitting Scheme 
The superannuation contributions splitting scheme allows spouses to ‘split’ or 
share the superannuation contributions they received in the previous financial year 
with each other.  This was previously not possible unless spouses divorced.41  The 
contributions splitting scheme was introduced as part of measures aimed to 
promote a ‘strong savings and investment culture’ and to increase access to 
superannuation beyond the traditional workforce.42  The government also wanted 
to assist families and spouses who have a single income or significant disparity 
between their incomes.43   
 
The scheme has two objectives – first, to provide single income spouses with the 
same tax advantages as dual income families and secondly, to provide low income 
or non-working spouses with superannuation assets under their control and 
income in retirement.44  It was envisaged that a spouse who works full-time or has 
a higher income would split their superannuation contributions with their 
                                                
41 Explanatory Memorandum, Tax Laws Amendment (Superannuation Contributions Splitting) 
Bill 2005 (Cth) 3; Leslie Nielson, above n 1, 3.  
42 John Howard, above n 34; Leslie Nielson, above n 1, 2. 
43  Ibid. 
44 Explanatory Memorandum, Tax Laws Amendment (Superannuation Contributions Splitting) 
Bill 2005 (Cth) 13; Treasury, Splitting of Superannuation Contributions Between Couples, above n 
34, 3. 
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low-income or non-working spouse and receive tax advantages for doing so.45  
This would allow spouses to continue to grow their superannuation even during 
non-working periods.46  The scheme was expected to benefit women in particular 
because they are more likely to earn a lower income or take time away from 
full-time work to raise a family.47 
 
B The Contributions Splitting Scheme’s Practical and Legal Framework  
1 Practical Requirements to Split Contributions 
Under the scheme, the spouse splitting their superannuation contributions is 
referred to as the ‘splitting spouse’ while the spouse who receives the split 
contributions is the ‘receiving spouse’.  In practice, a splitting spouse must 
undertake two steps to apply for their contributions to be split.  First, they must 
ensure that their superannuation provider offers contributions splitting.48  If the 
superannuation provider does offer this service, then the splitting spouse must 
complete a superannuation contributions splitting application and give it to their 
provider.49  The Australian Taxation Office’s contributions splitting application 
can be found in Appendix A.50  The application form requires the personal details 
of the splitting and receiving spouse (eg name, address and date of birth), their 
superannuation accounts details and the amount of contributions to be split.51  The 
receiving spouse must also declare that they satisfy the spouse and age 
                                                
45 Senate Economics References Committee, above n 8, 88 [6.79]. 
46 Women’s Action Alliance, Submission No 10 to Senate Standing Economics Legislation 
Committee, Inquiry into Taxation Laws Amendment (Superannuation Contributions Splitting) Bill 
2003, October 2003, 1. 
47 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 12 October 2005, 1 
(Malcolm Brough); Explanatory Memorandum, Tax Laws Amendment (Superannuation 
Contributions Splitting) Bill 2005 (Cth) 8 [1.3]; Treasury, Splitting of Superannuation 
Contributions Between Couples, above n 34, 1; John Howard, above n 34. 
48 SIS Regulations reg 6.45. See, eg, Australian Taxation Office, Contributions Splitting 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/uploadedFiles/Content/SPR/downloads/SPR19312n15237.pdf> 1 for the 
government’s contributions splitting form. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Contributions splitting application forms vary across superannuation providers.  They all 
however, require the same information (eg, personal details and superannuation funds’ details).  
See, eg, SuperSA, Application to Split Eligible Contributions 
<http://www.supersa.sa.gov.au/files/import960-442_tsfm22.pdf>; Asteron, Contributions Splitting 
Application Form (30 June 2008) 
<http://www.asteronlife.com.au/sites/default/files/find-a-form/OPT839_Contributions_Splitting.p
df>. 
51 SIS Regulations reg 6.44(4).  
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requirements discussed below.52  The splitting spouse is also generally required to 
sign the form to request the split and declare that the information provided on the 
form is true and correct.53  
 
Notably the splitting spouse does not have to seek financial advice to ensure that 
splitting contributions will provide the splitting and receiving spouse with the 
intended tax advantages.  Further, the splitting spouse does not have to provide 
any reasons to split their contributions or prove that the receiving spouse is a 
low-income or non-working spouse.  Spouses also do not need to confirm that 
they understand the practical implications of contributions splitting.  These factors 
create issues that will be discussed further below.   
 
2 Legal Requirements to Split Contributions  
Once the splitting spouse applies for their superannuation contributions to be split, 
the trustee must decide whether to accept or reject the application.54  Trustees’ 
duties in considering contributions splitting applications will be discussed in 
Chapter IV.  Employers do not play an active role in the contributions splitting 
scheme.  This is because the government did not want to place any administrative 
burden on employers under the scheme.55  As the contributions splitting scheme 
only allows contributions that were received in the previous financial year to be 
split, the contributions split already belong to the splitting spouse.  
 
Trustees can only accept valid superannuation contributions splitting 
applications.56  Regulation 6.44 of the SIS Regulations provides the requirements 
for a valid application.  Each of these requirements will be discussed before 
outlining the consequences in practice by reference to a fictional scenario.  In 
                                                
52 Ibid reg 6.45.  See, eg, Australian Taxation Office, Contributions Splitting, above n 48; 
AustralianSuper, Split Your Super Contributions with Your Spouse 
<https://www.australiansuper.com/~/media/Files/Forms/Split%20your%20super%20contributions
%20with%20your%20spouse.ashx>; UniSuper, Super Contribution Splitting with Your Spouse 
<https://www.unisuper.com.au/~/media/files/forms%20and%20downloads/forms%20and%20broc
hures/contributing%20to%20super/unis000f34_contribution_splitting_fact_sheet_and_form.pdf>. 
53 See, eg, Australian Taxation Office, Contributions Splitting, above n 48; AustralianSuper, Split 
Your Super Contributions with Your Spouse, above n 52; UniSuper, above n 52.  
54 SIS Regulations reg 5.45.  The trustee’s role when given a valid contributions splitting 
application will be further discussed in Ch IV.A.  
55 Treasury, Splitting of Superannuation Contributions Between Couples, above n 34, 6. 
56 SIS Regulations reg 6.45(1)(a). 
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examining the requirements imposed, it is evident that the government was 
concerned with ensuring that spouses do not use the scheme to avoid fees or 
access their superannuation savings immediately.  These requirements that the 
government imposed stand in contrast to the absence of regulations in respect of 
other risks created by the contributions splitting scheme, as will be discussed in 
Part C of this chapter.   
 
(a) Frequency and Magnitude of Contributions Splitting 
Applicants can make one application in each financial year to split the 
superannuation contributions they received in the previous financial year.57  The 
maximum amount of contributions that can be split is 85% for taxed 
contributions 58  or 100% for untaxed contributions or the concessional 
contributions cap for the financial year, whichever is lesser.59  Currently, the 
concessional contributions cap for the 2016/17 financial year is $30,000 for 
individuals under 50 years old and $35,000 for individuals who are at least 50 
years old on 30 June 2015.60  Spouses are thus, able to transfer a significant 
proportion of their superannuation contributions and can potentially keep only 
0-15% of their superannuation contributions for a given financial year.   
 
                                                
57 Ibid reg 6.44(2)(a). 
58 Taxed splittable contributions include contributions made by an employer, salary sacrifice 
contributions and personal contributions that a tax deduction can be claimed for, which generally 
applies to contributions made by self-employed members: Australian Taxation Office, Claiming 
Deductions for Personal Super Contributions (1 September 2016) 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/Individuals/Super/In-detail/Growing/Claiming-deductions-for-personal-s
uper-contributions/>; Australian Taxation Office, Contribution Caps (16 June 2015) 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/Super/Self-managed-super-funds/Contributions-and-rollovers/Contributi
on-caps/>; Trish Power, Super Concessional (Before-tax) Contributions: 2016/2017 Survival 
Guide (19 July 2016) SuperGuide 
<http://www.superguide.com.au/boost-your-superannuation/super-concessional-contributions-surv
ival-guide>. 
59 SIS Regulations reg 6.40.  See also Australian Taxation Office, Contributions Splitting, above n 
48, 2; Vision Super, How Super Works – Additional Guide (7 April 2016) 
<https://www.visionsuper.com.au/images/pds/2-How-super-works-Vision-Super-Saver.pdf> 4. 
60 Australian Taxation Office, Concessional Contributions Cap (7 September 2016) 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/Rates/Key-superannuation-rates-and-thresholds/?anchor=Concessionalco
ntributionscap#Concessionalcontributionscap>.  See Treasury, Australian Government, 
Superannuation Reform: Reforming the Taxation of Concessional Contributions (9 November 
2016) 
<http://www.budget.gov.au/2016-17/content/glossies/tax_super/downloads/FS-Super/03-SFS-Ref
orm_of_concessional_contributions-161109.pdf> 1 for the government’s planned reduction of the 
concessional contributions cap to $25,000. 
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Some superannuation providers have also imposed requirements about the 
minimum amount that can be split and a minimum account balance that must 
remain after splitting contributions.  These minimum amounts differ between 
providers.61  These limitations on the proportion of contributions that can be split 
were imposed to reduce the risk of the splitting spouse having insufficient funds 
to cover their surcharge liability62 after splitting.63  The government also wanted 
to encourage spouses to split contributions early rather than splitting a large 
proportion near retirement.64  Thus, these limitations do not seek to protect 
splitting spouses from depleting their superannuation savings against their 
interests. 
 
(b) Age Requirement 
Regulation 6.44(2)(c) of the SIS Regulations provides that the receiving spouse 
must be under their preservation age or over their preservation age but less than 
65 years old and not retired.  As mentioned, preservation age is the age when an 
individual can retire and access their superannuation benefits without 
restrictions.65  The preservation age ranges from 55 to 60 years and is dependent 
on when an individual was born.66  The trustee can rely on the receiving spouse’s 
statement about their preservation age when considering an application.67  This 
age restriction was imposed to prevent receiving spouses from accessing split 
                                                
61 See, eg, SunSuper, Contribution Splitting: Is it Right for You and Your Partner? (July 2016) 
<https://www.sunsuper.com.au/documents/factsheets/sunsuper-contribution-splitting-factsheet.pdf
> 2, which requires a minimum splitting amount of $5,000 and a minimum remaining account 
balance of $5,000.  Cf SuperSA, above n 50, 1, which requires a minimum splitting amount of $50 
and a minimum remaining account balance of $1,000. 
62 The superannuation surcharge is an additional charge imposed on contributions where the 
individual's taxable income is over a particular threshold.  The superannuation surcharge has since 
been abolished and no longer applies to any superannuation contributions made from 1 July 2005: 
Australian Taxation Office, Superannuation Contributions Surcharge - Information for Super 
Funds and Professionals (25 May 2015) 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/Super/APRA-regulated-funds/In-detail/APRA-resources/Fact-sheets/Sup
erannuation-contributions-surcharge/>; GESB Superannuation, Superannuation Contributions 
Surcharge <http://www.gesb.com.au/gesb_media/surcharge_fact_sheet.pdf>.  However, the 
surcharge liability is still the reason for the limitations imposed on the proportion of contributions 
that can be split. 
63 Treasury, Splitting of Superannuation Contributions Between Couples, above n 34,11. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Getting Your Super, above n 13; Kelly Cox, 
above n 13. 
66 SIS Regulations reg 6.01. 
67 Ibid reg 6.44(3). 
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contributions immediately. 68   The government wanted to ensure that the 
contributions splitting scheme is used to accumulate superannuation savings and 
assist them in saving for their retirement.69  
 
(c) Spouse Requirement  
Contributions splitting can only occur between spouses.  Under the scheme, 
spouses include legally married spouses, de facto spouses and registered couples, 
whether of the same or different sex.70   
 
(d) Consequences in Practice 
The legal requirements discussed above are best illustrated using a fictional 
scenario to demonstrate the practical consequences of contributions splitting: 
 
Jane works full-time and earns the 2016 before tax average total earnings of 
$81,920.80 annually. 71   She received $7,782.48 of superannuation 
contributions in the 2015/16 financial year as a result. 72   Jane’s 
superannuation fund allows members to split their superannuation 
contributions.  The fund does not impose any additional requirements, such as 
a minimum amount that must be left in superannuation accounts after 
splitting.  Jane is 40 years old while her husband, Bob, is 46 years old.  Bob 
satisfies the preservation age requirement for contributions splitting.  Jane can 
transfer $6,615.04, being 85% of the superannuation contributions she 
received for the previous financial year, to Bob.  This would leave Jane with 
$1,167.44 of superannuation contributions for the previous financial year.  As 
Jane meets the contributions splitting scheme’s legal requirements, her 
application will be valid.  Jane’s superannuation fund accepts her application 
                                                
68 Treasury, Splitting of Superannuation Contributions Between Couples, above n 34,11. 
69 Ibid. 
70 SIS Act s 10. 




72 This is 9.5% of the worker’s annual salary, the compulsory contributions rate imposed on 
employers.  See Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Employer Contributions 
Calculator (1 September 2016) MoneySmart 
<https://www.moneysmart.gov.au/tools-and-resources/calculators-and-apps/employer-contribution
s-calculator>. 
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and transfers her contributions to Bob’s superannuation account within 30 
days.  Those superannuation contributions now belong to Bob.  
 
In the above scenario, the contributions Jane transferred to Bob will be invested 
by his superannuation fund and will accumulate over time.  Jane will not feel the 
impact of her transfer until she reaches preservation age, which will not occur for 
decades after the transfer.  At that stage, it will be too late for Jane to recover 
financially and her retirement position will be negatively impacted as a result. 
 
C Risks Created by the Contributions Splitting Scheme 
There is a risk that low-income or non-working spouses’ retirement positions may 
be worsened under the superannuation contributions splitting scheme.  While the 
government intended to benefit low-income and non-working spouses, the 
government was largely focused on the scheme’s financial aspects, such as the 
costs of implementing the scheme and ensuring that spouses do not avoid any 
surcharge liabilities.  In contrast to the requirements discussed above, there are no 
regulations that implement safeguards to prevent the scheme from operating to the 
detriment of low-income and non-working spouses.  The scheme’s failure to 
implement such safeguards has created a risk that superannuation contributions 
will be transferred away from low-income and non-working spouses and 
additionally, a risk that spouses may make decisions that are not free, informed or 
independent under the scheme.  As a result, spouses are at risk of negative 
outcomes in retirement.  The absence of regulations to address these risks reveals 
a lack of consideration for the interests of vulnerable individuals under the 
scheme.   
 
1 The Government’s Focus on the Scheme’s Financial Aspects Instead of 
Safeguards 
When implementing the scheme, the government was largely concerned with the 
scheme’s financial aspects and administrative concerns for superannuation 
providers.  In focusing on these factors, the legislators ignored other important 
considerations, such as the need to implement safeguards to protect splitting 
spouses.  As a result, the legislators failed to consult important stakeholders, such 
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as women and parties involved in protecting the financial interests of vulnerable 
individuals.  The legislators’ focus on the financial aspects of the scheme is 
evident from the following factors.  First, the Treasury conducted the scheme’s 
2002 consultation.73  The Treasury is a department that focuses on analysing 
policies from an economic perspective.74  No other department appears to have 
been involved.  Secondly, the submissions made to the 2002 consultation largely 
focused on the practical financial and administrative costs and issues involved in 
implementing the scheme.75  The submissions made unfortunately could not be 
obtained because they are confidential.76  However, the Treasury provided a 
de-identified summary of the submissions made to the 2002 consultation, which 
outlines the key points made by each commenting entity in their submission.77  As 
the document was de-identified, it cannot be ascertained whether parties 
representing women’s rights and interests made a submission.  However, the 
submissions did not mention the possibility that contributions could be transferred 
to a high-income spouse contrary to the second objective.   
 
Lastly, the scheme was later referred to the Senate Economics Legislation 
Committee for an inquiry.78  The Committee noted that there was a ‘potential for 
fraud in annual splitting arrangements’ but did not discuss this issue further. 79  
The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia raised this concern and 
stated: 
 
Some thought should be given as well to the potential for both increased 
administrative risk and exposure to possible fraud that naturally arises from  
                                                
73 See Treasury, Splitting of Superannuation Contributions Between Couples, above n 34, iii, 2. 
74 Treasury, Our Department <http://www.treasury.gov.au/About-Treasury/OurDepartment>. 
75 See Appendix B where only 6 of the 30 Commenting Entities (Commenting Entities 1, 6, 10, 12, 
19 and 30) did not mention the financial and administrative costs and issues of the scheme.  
76 A Freedom of Information request was sent to the Treasury to obtain the relevant submissions.  
However, the request was rejected due to the number of documents involved: see Appendix C.  In 
a follow-up email however, the Treasury noted that the relevant documents were confidential and 
therefore could not be provided: Email from The Treasury Retirement Income Policy Division to 
Collin Ong, 18 October 2016; see Appendix D. 
77 Ibid.  
78 Senate Selection of Bills Committee, Parliament of Australia, Report No 11 of 2003 (2003) [2]. 
79 Economics Legislation Committee, Senate, Provisions of the Taxation Laws Amendment 
(Superannuation Contributions Splitting) Bill 2003 and Associated Regulations (2003) 12. 
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increased transaction volumes within the scheme.80  
 
While the risk of fraud was mentioned, the Committee and government did not 
consider it further or implement any safeguards to address the issue.  The 
government was thus, aware of the potential risks to splitting spouses but appears 
to have disregarded them.  No other parties, including the Women’s Action 
Alliance who aims to encourage and promote women’s rights,81 raised any similar 
concerns or considered the possibility of the scheme being used contrary to the 
second objective.82 
 
These factors in conjunction indicate that the legislators were focused on the 
financial aspects of the scheme when implementing it.  As a result, other 
considerations such as potential safeguards to protect spouses were not 
considered.  This created the risks that the scheme may operate to splitting 
spouses’ detriment.   
 
2 Risk of Contributions Being Transferred Away from Low-income or 
Non-working Spouses 
The way the contributions splitting scheme is implemented creates a risk that the 
scheme will operate to the low-income or non-working spouse’s detriment 
because superannuation contributions can be transferred away from them.  The 
government intended high-income spouses to transfer their superannuation 
contributions to their low-income or non-working spouses, and thus provide them 
with superannuation assets under their control as per the scheme’s second 
objective.  Despite this intention, there is no statutory requirement to ensure that 
superannuation contributions will flow from a high-income spouse to a 
low-income or non-working spouse.   
                                                
80 Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia, Submission No 6 to Standing Senate 
Economics Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Taxation Laws 
Amendment (Superannuation Contributions Splitting) Bill 2003, October 2003, 8.   
81 Ibid.  See Women’s Action Alliance, above n 46, 1. 
82 See Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Taxation Laws Amendment (Superannuation 
Contributions Splitting) Bill 2003 (14 November 2003) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Completed%20i
nquiries/2002-04/super_splitting/submissions/sublist> for the 17 submissions made to the Senate 
Inquiry.  See Ch II.A for a discussion on the scheme’s objectives. 
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Instead, the government appears to assume that contributions will be transferred 
in this direction due to the taxation incentives provided.  The government did not 
discuss specifically how the second objective would be achieved.  When 
considering the scheme’s impact on spouses, the government only considered 
whether spouses would receive the intended taxation incentives and benefits and 
the financial costs of splitting which spouses would incur.83  Thus, beyond these 
taxation incentives, there are no safeguards implemented to prevent contributions 
from being transferred away from low-income or non-working spouses.  
 
(a) Taxation Incentives to Encourage Contributions Being Transferred to 
Low-income or Non-working Spouses 
The contributions splitting scheme provides taxation incentives to encourage 
higher income earners to split their superannuation contributions with their 
low-income or non-working spouse.  Specifically, splitting contributions in this 
manner will provide spouses with access to two low-rate thresholds, as is the case 
with dual income families.84  The scheme also originally provided spouses with 
access to two reasonable benefit limits (RBL) 85  but this has since been 
abolished.86  As RBL is no longer an incentive to split contributions, it will not be 
discussed in this thesis.  These taxation incentives only apply at retirement and as 
such, there is a possibility that spouses will not receive the taxation benefits 
intended.87   
 
The low-rate threshold is the amount of superannuation contributions that parties 
can withdraw tax-free after reaching their preservation age but before turning 60 
years old.  Parties generally must pay tax on any amounts withdrawn above the 
low-rate threshold unless they withdraw their savings after turning 60 years old.88  
                                                
83 Treasury, Splitting of Superannuation Contributions Between Couples, above n 34, 7-10.  
84 Ibid 3. 
85 RBL refers to the maximum amount of retirement and termination of employment benefits that 
can be received over an individual’s lifetime at a concessional tax rate.  Amounts in excess of the 
RBL were subjected to a higher tax rate.  See House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Economics, Finance and Public Administration, Parliament of Australia, Improving the 
Superannuation Savings of People under 40 (2006) 71, [4.47] for more information on RBL. 
86 Explanatory Memorandum, Tax Laws Amendment (Simplified Superannuation) Bill 2006 (Cth) 
10 [1.11]. 
87 See Appendix B, Commenting Entity 15.  
88 See Australian Taxation Office, How Tax Applies to Your Super (1 September 2016) 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/individuals/super/in-detail/withdrawing-and-paying-tax/withdrawing-you
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For example, if a high-income spouse splits contributions with a non-working 
spouse, they will both be able to withdraw $195,000, being the low-rate threshold 
for the 2016/17 financial year, as a tax-free lump sum.  This will allow them to 
withdraw $390,000 superannuation savings for their family in total.  If the 
high-income spouse did not split their contributions, only the high-income spouse 
would have contributions to withdraw.  That spouse would be limited to 
withdrawing $195,000 tax-free.  This potential benefit forms the incentive to split 
superannuation contributions to a low-income or non-working spouse.  Certainly 
this is one of the uses of the scheme envisaged by financial advisers, as evident 
from their articles about the scheme to their members.89   
 
(b) Lack of Safeguards to Prevent Contributions Being Transferred Away 
From Low-income or Non-working Spouses  
The issue lies in the fact that, notwithstanding these taxation incentives, it is 
possible for a low-income spouse to transfer their superannuation contributions to 
their high-income spouse.90  Indeed, financial advisers have noted that it may be 
beneficial to transfer superannuation contributions to an older spouse in order to 
access the superannuation savings earlier – regardless of which of them is the 
higher earner.91  This incentive for splitting is not dependent on the income gap 
between the spouses but focuses instead on the spouses’ age.  In its submission to 
the 2002 consultation, Commenting Entity 15 suggested that the government 
should implement means testing to prevent spouses from splitting their 
                                                                                                                                 
r-super-and-paying-tax/?page=3> for a more detailed explanation on how superannuation savings 
are taxed.  See also Trish Power, Retiring Before the Age of 60: The Tax Deal (23 August 2016) 
SuperGuide 
<http://www.superguide.com.au/accessing-superannuation/retiring-before-the-age-of-60-the-tax-d
eal>; Macquarie, Superannuation Technical Information Booklet (1 October 2016), 9 
<http://www.macquarie.com.au/dafiles/Internet/mgl/au/docs/yourwrap/supertech.pdf>. 
89 See, eg, Rosanne Joyce, Why It Pays to Split Up: The Benefit of a Contributions Splitting 
Strategy (30 September 2015) The Private Practice 
<http://theprivatepractice.com.au/_blog/Articles/post/why-it-pays-to-split-up-the-benefits-of-a-con
tributions-splitting-strategy/>; Dixon Advisory, Spouse Splitting Contributions May Have Benefits 
(1 January 2014) 
<https://www.dixon.com.au/news/news-article/01-01-14/spouse-splitting-contributions-may-have-
benefits>. 
90 See, eg, Cavendish Superannuation, ‘Splitting Under the Knife’ [2006] (April) Cavendish 
Superannuation: Technical Updates, 1, 10 where it was noted that contributions can be transferred 
either way between two eligible spouses and is not limited to low-income or non-working spouses.  
91 See, eg, Clough Superannuation Fund, Contribution Splitting 
<http://www.cloughsuper.com.au/contribution_splitting.pdf>; NKH Knight, Super Contributions 
Splitting <https://www.nkhknight.com.au/blog/super-contributions-splitting/>. 
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contributions where they earn less than a specific amount, such as three times the 
average weekly earnings.92  This safeguard would help prevent superannuation 
contributions from being transferred away from low-income or non-working 
spouses.  However, the government did not implement this safeguard.  
 
Thus, in the previous fictional scenario involving Jane and Bob, Bob’s income is 
irrelevant.  Jane will be able to transfer her superannuation contributions to Bob 
even if he earns more than she does.  As a result, the manner in which the 
contributions splitting scheme was implemented means that there is a risk that it 
will not operate as intended.  Insofar as superannuation contributions can be 
transferred to higher income spouses, the scheme’s operation is contrary to its 
second objective.  It may result in some low-income spouses becoming more 
financially dependent on their partner in retirement.  This risk falls 
disproportionately upon women because wives usually have a lower income.  
Thus, there is an opportunity for low-income or non-working spouses’ retirement 
positions to be worsened under the contributions splitting scheme.   
 
3 Risk of Spouses Making Decisions that are Not Free, Informed or 
Independent 
Furthermore, this risk is exacerbated by the fact that legislators failed to build into 
the scheme safeguards to protect splitting spouses.  As we have seen, the 
regulations provide criteria that must be met for an individual to be eligible to 
split contributions.93  However, instead of considering protective factors, the 
government appeared to have largely focused on the financial aspects of the 
scheme.  It does not provide or suggest that the criteria that trustees should 
consider includes the fact that splitting would be in the splitting spouse’s financial 
interest.  Nor is it a requirement that the application has been made as a result of a 
free, informed or independent decision.  Indeed, there are no safeguards to prevent 
spouses from applying to split their contributions as a result of coercion, undue 
influence or misrepresentation by the receiving spouse.  There is thus a real risk 
                                                
92 Appendix B, Commenting Entity 15. 
93 SIS Regulations reg 6.45. 
SUPERANNUATION CONTRIBUTIONS SPLITTING SCHEME  
 21 
that spouses may split their contributions to their detriment or without 
understanding the implications involved.   
 
(a) Lack of Safeguards to Prevent Uninformed Decisions 
The scheme does not implement safeguards to protect spouses from making 
uninformed decisions.  Trustees are not required to ensure that splitting spouses 
have received financial advice or understand the practical implications of 
contributions splitting.  Trustees have only to ensure that applications are valid.94  
While some application forms recommend that spouses obtain financial advice,95 
this is not a requirement for making an application.  Nor does the absence of 
advice present a bar to contributions splitting.  The superannuation system and the 
scheme’s end benefit taxation rules are complex.  This is why submissions during 
the scheme’s implementation process highlighted the need to educate splitting 
spouses about the scheme.96  Yet, spouses are able to apply to split their 
contributions without actually understanding its implications or being sure that 
splitting will benefit them.   
 
Thus, in the above fictional scenario, Jane did not need to obtain financial advice 
in order to apply to split her contributions.  It is possible that splitting 
contributions will not result in any additional benefits to Jane and Bob.  Further, 
Jane does not have to actually understand the practical implications of splitting.  
For example, she may not understand that the contributions will belong to Bob 
after the transfer and she will not be able to get it back.  Therefore, the lack of 
these safeguards in the contributions splitting scheme means that there is a risk 
                                                
94 Ibid reg 6.45(1)(a).  
95 See, eg, Catholic Super, Splitting Super Contributions, 1 
<http://csf.com.au/documents/forms/ContributionsSplittingApplication.pdf>; Media Super, 
Splitting Super Contributions, 1 
<https://www.mediasuper.com.au/sites/mediasuper.com.au/files/splitting_super_contributions_jul
_16.pdf>; First Super, Contribution Splitting 
<http://www.firstsuper.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/75_fir003-contribution-splittingv2-ed
5413d4-6db6-42db-95f1-814b7ef3fa0f-0_4ea266.pdf >. 
96 Appendix B, Commenting Entity 13, Commenting Entity 15; Association of Superannuation 
Funds of Australia, Submission No 6, above n 80, 8; Women’s Action Alliance, above n 46, 4; 
Financial Planning Association of Australia, Submission No 16 to Senate Standing Economics 
Legislation Committee, Inquiry into Taxation Laws Amendment (Superannuation Contributions 
Splitting) Bill 2003, 2003, 4. 
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that splitting spouses will make uninformed decisions or will make decisions that 
are not in their best interests financially.97 
 
(b) Lack of Safeguards to Prevent Decisions that are Not Free or Independent 
The scheme also does not implement safeguards to ensure that spouses are 
making free and independent decisions.  Trustees are not required to check that 
the splitting spouse consents to contributions splitting.  The splitting spouse’s 
consent appears instead to be assumed from the signature on the application form.  
A signature does indicate at law that the signor has read, understood and consents 
to the document’s contents.98  Nonetheless there are situations where the signor’s 
signature was improperly obtained and their decision was not free or 
independent.99  As will be discussed in Chapter III, the law recognises that there is 
a heightened risk of a spouse’s consent being improperly obtained, particularly for 
financial transactions.  The government’s failure to implement safeguards to 
protect against vitiated consent is particularly problematic given that the scheme 
only applies to spouses. 
 
While it is likely that consent will not be vitiated and the scheme will not be 
abused in most circumstances, the risk should nonetheless be considered.  
Certainly the possibility of misconduct is considered in other legal frameworks 
despite an underlying assumption of lawful conduct.  For example, it is assumed 
that most businesses will comply with the Australian consumer law.100  However, 
penalties and offences are nonetheless imposed in order to deter misconduct and 
                                                
97 See Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, Submission No 4 to Standing Senate 
Economics Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Taxation Laws 
Amendment (Superannuation Contributions Splitting) Bill 2003, 17 October 2003, 2; Cbus, 
Submission No 9 to Standing Senate Economics Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, 
Inquiry into Taxation Laws Amendment (Superannuation Contributions Splitting) Bill 2003, 2003, 
3. 
98 McLaughlin v Daily Telegraph Newspaper Co Ltd (1904) 1 CLR 243, 274 (Griffith CJ, Barton 
and O'Connor JJ); Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165, 186-93, 
(Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
99 McLaughlin v Daily Telegraph Newspaper Co Ltd (1904) 1 CLR 243, 274 (Griffith CJ, Barton 
and O'Connor JJ); Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165, 186-93, 
(Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
100 See Christine Parker and Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, ‘How Much Does It Hurt? How Australian 
Businesses Think about the Costs of Compliance with the Trade Practices Act’ (2008) 32(2) 
Melbourne University Law Review 554, 555; Australian Government, Australian Consumer 
Survey (2011), viii 
<http://consumerlaw.gov.au/files/2015/09/Australian_Consumer_Survey_Report.pdf>. 
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protect consumers. 101   The superannuation contributions splitting scheme 
however, lacks such safeguards.  
 
D Concluding Remarks  
It is clear that the government implemented the contributions splitting scheme 
with the intention to benefit single income families and women in particular.  
However, the government was largely concerned with the financial costs and 
benefits of implementing the scheme.  In doing so, the government failed to 
consider the risks involved and the need to protect spouses from these risks.  The 
government failed to implement safeguards to prevent the contributions splitting 
scheme from being used in a manner contrary to its intentions.  The government 
also failed to implement safeguards to ensure that parties seeking to split their 
contributions have received financial advice, understand the practical implications 
of contributions splitting and truly consent to splitting their contributions.   
 
These failures are particularly problematic in light of the complexities of the 
superannuation system, its importance in retirement and the heightened risk of 
vitiated consent between spouses, to whom the scheme applies.  By creating the 
contributions splitting scheme with these failures, there is a real risk that 
low-income or non-working spouses’ retirement position will be worsened by the 
scheme.  It also creates the risk of spouses splitting their superannuation 
contributions to their detriment or without understanding the implications 
involved.  These failures also mean that women, whom the scheme was 
specifically expected to benefit, may be worse off as a result.  Thus, the 
government has created a new situation where spouses are at risk of making 
financially unbeneficial decisions that are not free, informed or independent.  The 
impact of these risks will not be felt for many years and may be disastrous in that 
it becomes apparent at a time when it will be too late for victims to make a 
financial recovery due to their age. 
 
                                                
101 See Australian Consumer Law, Compliance and Enforcement: How Regulators Enforce the 
Australian Consumer Law (2010), 7 
<http://consumerlaw.gov.au/files/2015/06/compliance_enforcement_guide.pdf>; Jing Jian Xiao, 
Consumer Economic Wellbeing (Springer, 2015) 67.  
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III RECOGNISED RISKS OF VITIATED CONSENT IN SPOUSAL RELATIONSHIPS 
The lack of safeguards in the superannuation contributions splitting scheme 
creates a risk that splitting spouses may apply to split their contributions without 
making a free, informed or independent decision.  There are currently no cases 
involving this issue in the scheme.  However, it is well recognised in society and 
at law that spouses, by virtue of their relationship, may make decisions, 
particularly financial decisions, that are not free, informed or independent (ie their 
consent is vitiated).  This possibility of vitiated consent is problematic given that 
parties should only be bound to obligations that they voluntarily assume.102  This 
chapter will discuss the societal and legal recognition of the real risk of vitiated 
consent between spouses.  It will first discuss society’s recognition that spouses’ 
consent may be vitiated in domestic violence relationships.  This chapter will then 
discuss the legal recognition of this issue by outlining the protection offered to 
innocent parties and then spouses specifically when their consent is vitiated.   
 
A Society’s Recognition of the Risk of Vitiated Consent 
Consent may be vitiated between spouses in domestic violence relationships.103  
This was the context in which the Australian Law Reform Commission identified 
the risk of coercion in the contributions splitting scheme.104  Studies show that 
majority of domestic violence victims are women though victims can be male or 
female. 105   Domestic violence may involve physical, sexual, financial or 
psychological abuse.106  In Australia, one in three women have experienced 
                                                
102 Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1, 36 [84] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne 
JJ); Australian Woollen Mills Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1954) 92 CLR 424, 457 (Dixon CJ, 
Williams, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ).  
103 See, eg, Emma Smallwood, Stepping Stones: Legal Barriers to Economic Equality after Family 
Violence (September 2015) Women’s Legal Service Victoria, 16 
<http://www.womenslegal.org.au/files/file/Stepping%20Stones%20Report.pdf> where women 
were left with debt that was accrued without their consent. 
104 Australian Law Reform Commission, Family Violence and Commonwealth Laws – Improving 
Legal Frameworks, above n 2, 464 [19.24]. 
105 Angela Taft, Kelsey Hegarty and Michael Flood, ‘Are Men and Women Equally Violent to 
Intimate Partners?’ (2001) 25 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 498, 500; 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Personal Safety, Australia, 2012 (11 December 2013) 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/4906.0>; Emma Smallwood, above n 103, 6.  This 
may be due in part to the fact that domestic violence against men is often unreported.  For a more 
detailed discussion on this see One in Three, Male Victims of Family Violence: Barriers to 
Disclosing <http://www.oneinthree.com.au/malevictims>. 
106 K D O’Leary, ‘Psychological Abuse: A Variable Deserving Critical Attention in Domestic 
Violence’ (1999) 14(1) Violence and Victims 3, 14; Clare Murphy, Domestic Violence is Much 
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physical abuse and one in four women have experienced psychological abuse 
since the age of 15.107  The different forms of abuse can occur concurrently.108  
This thesis will specifically focus on psychological and financial abuse due to 
their relevance to the risk of vitiated consent for financial decisions. 
 
Psychological abuse is the systematic destruction of the victim’s self-esteem or 
sense of safety in order to exert control over the victim.109  It can include 
behaviour that intimidates, harasses or torments the victim.110  This can involve 
criticising, belittling or degrading the victim, terrorising the victim through threats 
and telling the victim that they are useless or inferior.111  Psychological abuse is 
equally, if not more, detrimental to a victim’s mental health than physical 
abuse.112  To cope with psychological abuse, victims often change their behaviour 
and comply with the abuser’s demands to avoid provoking the abuser.113  Thus, 
psychologically abused victims may not make free or independent decisions and 
instead, will behave according to the abuser’s demands.  
 
                                                                                                                                 
More than Physical Violence (27 January 2009) Speak Out Loud 
<https://speakoutloud.net/helping-victims-survivors/physical-violence/coercive-control-3>. 
107 Janet Phillips and Malcolm Park, ‘Measuring Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault Against 
Women: A Review of the Literature and Statistics’, (E-Brief, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of 
Australia, 2006); Australia’s National Research Organisation for Women’s Safety, Violence 
Against Women: Key Statistics, 1 
<http://anrows.org.au/sites/default/files/Violence-Against-Australian-Women-Key-Statistics.pdf>; 
Our Watch, Understanding Violence: Facts and Figures 
<http://www.ourwatch.org.au/Understanding-Violence/Facts-and-figures>.   
108 Anthony Morgan and Hannah Chadwick, ‘Key Issues in Domestic Violence’ (Research in 
Practice No 07, Australian Institute of Criminology, Australian Government, 2009) 1-2;  
Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault Services, What is Domestic Violence 
<http://dvsas.org/get-informed/types-of-abuse/>. 
109 Deborah Doherty and Dorothy Berglund, Psychological Abuse: A Discussion Paper (26 July 
2012) Public Health Agency of Canada 
<http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/sfv-avf/sources/fv/fv-psych-abus/index-eng.php>; Diane R 
Follingstad and Dana D DeHart, ‘Defining Psychological Abuse of Husbands Toward Wives: 
Contexts, Behaviors, and Typologies’ (2000) 15 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 891, 895-6. 
110 Australian Law Reform Commission, Family Violence – A National Legal Response, Report 
No 114 (2010) 198 [5.37]; Follingstad and DeHart, above n 109, 895-6. 
111 Doherty and Berglund, above n 109; Follingstad and DeHart, above n 109, 895-6. 
112 Maria A Pico-Alfonso et al, ‘The Impact of Physical, Psychological, and Sexual Intimate Male 
Partner Violence on Women's Mental Health: Depressive Symptoms, Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder, State Anxiety, and Suicide’ (2006) 15 Journal of Women’s Health 599, 608; Amanda 
Robinson, ‘Domestic Violence’ in Fiona Brookman et al (eds), Handbook on Crime (Willan 
Publishing, 2010) 245, 250. 
113 Lisa Goodman et al, ‘The Intimate Partner Violence Strategies Index: Development and 
Application’ (2003) 9 Violence Against Women 163, 166-7; Mary Barnish, Domestic Violence: A 
Literature Review (September 2004) Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation, 58 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.justice.gov.uk/inspectorates/hmi-probati
on/docs/thematic-dv-literaturereview-rps.pdf>. 
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Financial abuse involves the abuser controlling or limiting the victim’s ability to 
obtain, use or maintain financial resources.114  Financial abuse serves to make the 
victim financially dependent on the abuser and diminishes the victim’s financial 
capability and security.115  The abuse can include behaviours such as denying the 
victim access to money, making the victim responsible for debt and preventing the 
victim from participating in financial decisions that affects the victim.116  For 
example, the abuser may accrue debt against the victim’s name without their 
knowledge or consent.117  The impact of financial abuse is particularly detrimental 
because it creates financial dependence, which is a key factor in preventing 
victims from leaving abusive relationships.118  Many women who do leave 
abusive relationships end up homeless or living in poverty due to financial 
abuse.119  Therefore, financially abused victims may be unable to consent to 
financial decisions. 
 
Thus, in domestic violence relationships, victims have a diminished ability to 
make free, informed and independent decisions, particularly in relation to 
financial decisions. 
 
B Legal Recognition of the Risk of Vitiated Consent 
There is legal recognition that the spousal relationship can affect a spouse's ability 
to make free, informed and independent decisions.  The law generally provides 
protection to parties where their consent is vitiated, regardless of the nature of 
their relationship.  Both the United Kingdom and Australia however, have 
specifically recognised that there is a heightened risk of vitiated consent between 
spouses.  The legal recognition of the risk of vitiated consent between parties in 
                                                
114 Australian Law Reform Commission, Family Violence – A National Legal Response, above n 
110, 196-7 [5.32]-[5.33]; Tanya Corrie and Magdalena McGuire, Searching for Solutions: A 
Spotlight on Economic Abuse Research Report (Good Shepherd Youth & Family Service and 
Kildonan UnitingCare, 2013) 7-8. 
115 Adrienne E Adams et al, ‘Development of the Scale of Economic Abuse’ (2008) 14 Violence 
Against Women 563, 564; Diddy Antai et al, ‘The Effect of Economic, Physical, and 
Psychological Abuse on Mental Health: A Population-Based Study of Women in the Philippines’ 
(2014) 2014 International Journal of Family Medicine 1, 2 [2.3]. 
116 Corrie and McGuire, above n 114, 7-8; Australian Law Reform Commission, Family Violence 
– A National Legal Response, above n 110, 196-7 [5.32]-[5.33].  
117 See, eg, Emma Smallwood, above n 103, 16 where this was the case for 25% of women who 
had debt after leaving a violent relationship.  
118 Corrie and McGuire, above n 114, 14, 36; Emma Smallwood, above n 103, 6.  
119 Adrienne E Adams et al, above n 115, 568; Diddy Antai et al, above n 115, 1 [1.1]. 
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general and between spouses specifically will be examined with reference to 
fictional scenarios to highlight an innocent party’s right to recourse.  
  
1 Legal Recognition of the Risk of Vitiated Consent in General Transactions  
Parties can seek to set aside transactions procured by vitiated consent.120  This is 
because freedom of contract is the cornerstone of contract law.121  Central to this 
notion is the fact that contractual obligations are voluntarily assumed, with 
individuals being able to choose whom they contract with, the terms they contract 
under and the rights and obligations that will be altered by the contract.122  
Therefore, the courts will allow a party to avoid legal obligations where they do 
not make a free, informed or independent decision when entering into a 
transaction.123  Such transactions can be contracts or gifts.124 
 
(a) What Happens When the Decision is Not Made Freely?  
Where parties did not freely assume legal obligations, they may rely on duress or 
actual undue influence to avoid the transaction. 
 
(i) Duress 
The doctrine of duress allows contracts to be set aside when a party’s consent was 
procured by illegitimate pressure.125  The pressure can be directed towards a 
                                                
120 See Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers’ Federation [1983] 
1 AC 366, 384 (Lord Diplock); Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614, 635 (Lord Scarman). 
121 G Dal Pont, ‘The Varying Shades of “Unconscionable” Conduct – Same Term, Different 
Meaning’ (2000) 19 Australian Bar Review 135, 135. 
122 Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1, 36 [84] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne 
JJ); Australian Woollen Mills Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1954) 92 CLR 424, 457 (Dixon CJ, 
Williams, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ).  See also Jeannie Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair 
Contract Terms Law: The Rise of Substantive Unfairness as a Ground for Review of Standard 
Form Consumer Contracts’ (2009) 33 Melbourne University Law Review 934, 937-8. 
123 See, eg, Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113, 119 (Latham CJ), 134 (Dixon J); Bank of New 
South Wales v Rogers (1941) 65 CLR 42, 54 (Starke J); Union Fidelity Trustee Co of Australia Ltd 
v Gibson [1971] VR 573, 575 (Gillard J); Hart v Burbidge [2013] EQHC 1628 (Ch) (12 June 
2013) [124] (Sir Blackburne). 
124 Union Fidelity Trustee Co of Australia Ltd v Gibson [1971] VR 573, 574 (Gillard J); Johnson v 
Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113, 119 (Latham CJ), 134 (Dixon J); Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 
621, 630 (Brennan J).  See also J W Carter, Carter on Contract (LexisNexis Butterworths, 6th ed, 
2012 [24-001]. 
125 Barton v Armstrong [1976] AC 104, 121 (Lord Wilberforce and Lord Simon); Universe 
Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers’ Federation [1983] 1 AC 366, 400 
(Lord Scarman); Westpac Banking Corporation v Cockerill (1998) 152 ALR 267, 288 (Kiefel J).  
RECOGNISED RISKS OF VITIATED CONSENT 
 28 
person or goods or be economic in nature.126  Illegitimate pressures include threats 
of physical violence.127  The illegitimate pressure must amount to a compulsion of 
the party’s will and coerce the party into entering the agreement.128  If the 
innocent party is able to show that the wrongdoer applied the illegitimate pressure 
to induce the innocent party into the contract, the onus shifts to the wrongdoer to 
show that the pressure did not contribute to the innocent party’s decision to enter 
the contract. 129   A party can apply to rescind the contract if duress is 
established.130  However, parties are not entitled to rescission as of right because it 
is a discretionary equitable remedy.131  
 
Consider the following scenario: 
 
Jane has been married to Bob for 20 years and they have two children 
together.  Jane inherits her parents’ house after they died.  Bob finds out 
about her inheritance and tells Jane to transfer the house into his name.  He 
repeatedly threatens to beat her.  Due to fear of Bob’s threats, Jane 
transfers ownership of the house to Bob.  
 
In this scenario, Jane’s decision to transfer the house was due to Bob’s threats and 
was not freely made.  Jane can seek recourse under duress by arguing that Bob 
illegitimately pressured her with threats of physical violence in order to procure 
the transfer.  As a result, Bob will bear the onus of proving that Jane did not 
                                                
126 Skeate v Beale (1841) 113 ER 688, 690 (Lord Denman CJ); Mason v New South Wales (1959) 
102 CLR 108, 144 (Windeyer J); Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation 
(1988) 19 NSWLR 40, 45-6 (McHugh JA).  See also LexisNexis, Halsbury’s Law of Australia (at 
6 October 2004) 110 Contract, ‘4 Vitiating Factors’ [110-5695]; Nelson Enonchong, Duress, 
Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed, 2012) 100-8. 
127 Skeate v Beale (1841) 113 ER 688, 690 (Lord Denman CJ); LexisNexis, Halsbury’s Law of 
Australia, above n 126, [110-5700].  
128 Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers’ Federation [1983] 1 
AC 366, 400 (Lord Scarman); Magnacrete Ltd v Douglas-Hill (1988) 48 SASR 565, 591 (Perry J).  
129 Barton v Armstrong [1976] AC 104, 120 (Lord Chelsea); Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v 
Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 19 NSWLR 40, 46 (McHugh JA); Peanut Marketing Board 
v Cuda (1984) 79 FLR 368, 378 (Campbell J).  
130 Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers’ Federation [1983] 1 
AC 366, 385 (Lord Diplock); Dimskal Shipping Co SA v International Transport Workers 
Federation (The Evia Luck) [1992] 2 AC 152, 165 (Lord Goff); Electricity Generation 
Corporation (t/as Verve Energy) v Woodside Energy Ltd [2013] WASCA 36 (20 February 2013) 
[201] (Murphy JA). 
131 Maguire v Makaronis (1997) 188 CLR 449, 493-4 (Kirby J); Kokos International Pty Ltd v 
Libra Motors Pty Ltd (No 3) [2007] WASC 301 (10 December 2007) [87] (Johnson J). 
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transfer him the house due to the threats he made.  If Bob cannot discharge this 
burden, the Court may allow Jane to rescind the transfer and get the house back.  
 
(ii) Actual Undue Influence 
Undue influence arises when a wrongdoer possesses influence over an innocent 
party and unconscientiously abuses this influence to procure a benefit.132  This 
impairs the innocent party’s will or freedom of judgment so that their decisions 
are not made freely.133  Undue influence focuses on the quality of the innocent 
party’s consent134 and can be actual or presumed.135  The law regarding presumed 
undue influence will be discussed further below.  To rely on actual undue 
influence, the innocent party must prove that the wrongdoer did influence them to 
the extent that the innocent party was unable to exercise their will freely.136  An 
innocent party can apply and seek rescission in such circumstances.137 
 
Consider this scenario: 
 
Bob and Jane have an abusive relationship where Bob often beats Jane 
when he is unhappy with her.  Bob tells Jane to transfer the house she 
inherited to him.  Jane transfers the house to Bob.   
 
In this scenario, Bob and Jane’s long-term abusive relationship provides Bob with 
influence over Jane.  If Jane can prove that she transferred the house to Bob 
                                                
132 Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113, 119 (Latham CJ), 134 (Dixon J); Bridgewater v Leahy 
(1998) 194 CLR 457, 478 (Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ); Lawbook, The Laws of Australia (at 
1 February 2014) 35 Unfair Dealing, ‘8 Undue Influence’ [35.8.10]. 
133 Union Bank of Australia v Whitelaw [1906] VLR 711, 720 (Hodges J); Royal Bank of Scotland 
plc v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 773, 794-5 [6]-[7] (Lord Nicholls); Farmers’ Co-operative 
Executors & Trustees Ltd v Perks (1989) 52 SASR 399, 417-8 (Duggan J). 
134 Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447, 474 (Deane J); Union Bank 
of Australia Ltd v Whitelaw [1906] VLR 711, 720 (Hodges J); Watkins v Combes (1922) 30 CLR 
180, 193-4 (Isaacs J).  
135 Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145, 171 (Cotton LJ); Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621, 
628-9 (Brennan J); Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113, 119 (Latham CJ); Royal Bank of 
Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 773, 797 [17] (Lord Nicholls); Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International SA v Aboody [1990] 1 QB 923, 953 (Slade LJ). 
136 Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621, 628 (Brennan J); National Westminster Bank plc v 
Morgan [1985] AC 686, 703-4 (Lord Scarman); Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145, 171-2 
(Cotton LJ). 
137 National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan [1985] AC 686, 705 (Lord Scarman); Cockburn v 
Gio Finance Ltd (No 2) (2001) 51 NSWLW 624, 634 (Mason J); Lawbook, The Laws of Australia, 
‘8 Undue Influence’, above n 132, [35.8.1090]. 
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because she felt that she had no choice and Bob would beat her otherwise, then 
she can rely on the doctrine of actual undue influence.  Jane can seek to have the 
transfer rescinded and have it deemed voidable in equity, even if the transfer is 
valid at law. 
 
(b) What Happens When the Decision is Not Informed? 
Where an innocent party makes a decision that is not informed, they may be able 
to rely on non est factum or misrepresentation to set the decision aside.  
 
(i) Non est Factum 
The doctrine of non est factum138 voids contracts when an innocent party shows 
that they did not intend to execute the document and was not careless in doing 
so.139  This may arise where the innocent party believed the document’s effect 
would be fundamentally different from its actual effect.140  The innocent party’s 
failure to read and understand the relevant document must not be due to 
negligence or carelessness.141  A plea of non est factum is available to:  
 
those who are permanently or temporarily unable through no fault of their own to 
have without explanation any real understanding of the purport of a particular 
document, whether that be from defective education, illness or innate incapacity.142 
 
In such circumstances, the innocent party will not be bound by the contract 
because ‘the mind of the signer did not accompany the signature’.143  At law, the 
contract will be void ab initio.144 
                                                
138 Meaning ‘it is not my deed’: Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Limited v Adrian Compton 
[2015] NSWSC 163 (6 March 2015) [58] (Hammerschlag J).  
139 Petelin v Cullen (1975) 132 CLR 355, 359-60 (Barwick CJ, McTiernan, Gibbs, Stephen and 
Mason JJ); Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 194 CLR 457, 475-6 (Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ); 
Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165, 182-3 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, 
Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
140 Petelin v Cullen (1975) 132 CLR 355, 359-60 (Barwick CJ, McTiernan, Gibbs, Stephen and 
Mason JJ); Saunders v Anglia Building Society [1971] AC 1004, 1017 (Lord Reid). 
141 Muskham Finance Ltd v Howard [1963] 1 QB 904, 912 (Donovan LJ); Ford v Perpetual 
Trustees Victoria Ltd (2009) 75 NSWLR 42, 53-4 [38] (Allsop P and Young JA).  This is because 
the two competing policy considerations of not holding people to bargains that they did not bring a 
consenting mind to and the necessity of holding people to the terms they signed must be balanced: 
Petelin v Cullen (1975) 132 CLR 355, 359-61 (Barwick CJ, McTiernan, Gibbs, Stephen and 
Mason JJ). 
142 Saunders v Anglia Building Society [1971] AC 1004, 1016 (Lord Reid). 
143 Foster v Mackinnon (1869) LR 4 CP 704, 711(Byle J).  
RECOGNISED RISKS OF VITIATED CONSENT 
 31 
 Consider the following scenario:  
 
Bob gives Jane a document to sign and tells her it is a lease agreement for 
the house she inherited from her parents.  They had previously discussed 
leasing that house to a couple for additional income.  Jane is illiterate and 
signed the document without reading it.  She later discovers that the 
document she signed was not a lease and instead, transferred the house to 
Bob.  
 
In this scenario, Jane was not aware that she was giving Bob the house.  Her 
decision to do so was not informed because she did not know the rights she was 
altering by signing the document.  The document she signed was fundamentally 
different in effect to the lease agreement she thought she was signing.  Jane did 
not read and understand the contract because she is illiterate and trusted Bob.  She 
was, therefore, not negligent or careless in signing the contract.  Thus, Jane is 
legally entitled to void the transfer on the basis of non est factum. 
 
(ii) Misrepresentation 
Misrepresentation occurs when the wrongdoer makes a false statement about a 
material fact in order to induce the innocent party into entering a contract.145  
Misrepresentation can occur when the wrongdoer made the statement knowing it 
was false or where the wrongdoer had reasonable grounds to believe the statement 
was true.146  Where misrepresentation is established, the contract will be voidable 
and the innocent party may apply for rescission.147 
 
                                                                                                                                 
144 Saunders v Anglia Building Society [1971] AC 1004, 1026 (Lord Wilberforce); Gibbons v 
Wright (1954) 91 CLR 423, 441 (Dixon CJ, Kitto and Taylor JJ). 
145 Gould v Vaggelas (1985) 157 CLR 215, 236 (Wilson J); Wardley Australia Ltd v Western 
Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514, 554 (Toohey J); Lawbook, The Laws of Australia (at 1 February 
2014) 35 Unfair Dealing, ‘2 Misrepresentation’ [35.2.10]. 
146 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465, 485-6 (Lord Reid); Arkwright 
v Newbold (1881) 17 Ch D 301, 317-8 (James LJ); Immer (No 145) Pty Ltd v Uniting Church in 
Australia Property Trust (NSW) (1993) 182 CLR 26, 39 (Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh 
JJ). 
147 Gould v Vaggelas (1985) 157 CLR 215, 236 (Wilson J); Sharpley v Louth (1876) 2 Ch D 663, 
685 (James LJ); Civil Service Co-operative Society of Victoria Ltd v Blyth (1914) 17 CLR 601, 
608 (Griffith CJ); Emhill Pty Ltd v Bonsoc Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] VSCA 108 (31 May 2007) [35] 
(Warren CJ). 
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Consider if in the previous scenario, Jane did sign the document intending to 
transfer ownership of the house to Bob.  However, she only intended to transfer 
50% of the house and was told that was what the contract provided.  The contract, 
however, transferred the house wholly to Bob.  Bob knowingly misled Jane as to 
the percentage of the house that was being transferred in order to get her to sign 
the contract.  Jane could, therefore, rely on misrepresentation and seek to rescind 
the contract.   
 
(c) What Happens When the Decision is Not Made Independently? 
Where a decision is not made independently, the innocent party may be able to 
rely on presumed undue influence.  Similar to actual undue influence, presumed 
undue influence involves the wrongdoer improperly using their influence over the 
innocent party to gain a benefit.148  However, unlike actual undue influence, the 
innocent party can rely on a presumption that there was undue influence.149  The 
wrongdoer will bear the burden of rebutting this presumption by showing that the 
innocent party made the decision independently.150  The courts will automatically 
presume that a benefit was procured by undue influence in certain relationships, 
such as doctors and patients, and solicitors and clients.151  These relationships are 
characterised by trust and confidence and involve a heightened risk of abuse.152   
 
The spousal relationship does not give rise to this automatic presumption.153  
However, ‘undue influence may be more easily proved in the case of husband and 
                                                
148 Watkins v Combes (1922) 30 CLR 180, 194 (Isaacs J); Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113, 
119 (Latham CJ), 134 (Dixon J); Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 194 CLR 457, 478 (Gaudron, 
Gummow and Kirby JJ). 
149 Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Aboody [1990] 1 QB 923, 953 (Slade LJ); 
Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621, 628-9 (Brennan J); Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113, 
119 (Latham CJ). 
150 Winefield v Clarke [2008] NSWSC 882 (29 August 2008) [27] (Barrett J); Louth v Diprose 
(1992) 175 CLR 621, 628 (Brennan J); Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113, 119 (Latham CJ). 
151 Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113, 119 (Latham CJ).  Other established relationships that 
attracts the presumption of undue influence includes solicitors and clients: Haywood v Roadknight 
[1927] VLR 512; parent and child: West v Public Trustee [1942] SASR 109; Brown v The NSW 
Trustee [2011] NSWSC 1203 (23 September 2011); and religious leader and follower: Allcard v 
Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145; Khan v Khan (2004) 62 NSWLR 229.  
152 Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621, 628 (Brennan J); Bester v Perpetual Trustee Company 
Ltd [1970] 3 NSWR 30, 34 (Street J); Saintclaire v Saintclaire [2015] FamCAFC 245 (21 
December 2015) [16] (Strickland, Murphy & Kent JJ). 
153 Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649, 675 (Dixon J); Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
SA v Aboody [1990] 1 QB 923, 953 (Slade LJ); National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan [1985] 
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wife than in cases where no special relationship exists between the parties’.154  
This is because ‘there is nothing unusual or strange in a wife from motives of 
affection or even prudence conferring a large proprietary or pecuniary benefit 
upon her husband’.155   
 
Relationships that do not attract an automatic presumption can nonetheless rely on 
the presumption by showing the de facto existence of a relationship where the 
innocent party reposed trust and confidence in the wrongdoer. 156   In such 
relationships, the innocent party may be so dependent on the wrongdoer that the 
innocent party is incapable of protecting their own interests.157  This commonly 
occurs in the spousal relationship despite recent social developments.  As noted 
by Scott LJ: 
 
the tendency in households for business decisions to be left to the husband and 
for the wife, whether or not she is a joint owner of the matrimonial home and 
whether or not she has a separate job, to have the main domestic responsibilities 
still persists.  And in the culturally and ethnically mixed community in which we 
live, the degree of emancipation of women is uneven.158 
 
Where a de facto relationship of trust and confidence is established, the 
wrongdoer will bear the onus of proving that the innocent party’s actions were 
based on their independent will.159  This is commonly done by showing that the 
innocent party received independent and informed advice before conferring the 
                                                                                                                                 
AC 686, 703 (Lord Scarman); Mavaddat v HSBC Bank Australia Ltd (No 2) [2016] WASCA 94 (9 
June 2016) [6] (McLure P).  
154 Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649, 659 (Latham CJ). 
155 Ibid 675 (Dixon J).  This lack of suspicion that confidence is being abused when gifts are made 
between parties is also the reason why parents are not presumed to be unduly influenced by their 
children: Permanent Mortgagees Pty Ltd v Vandenbergh (2010) 41 WAR 353, 389 [173] (Murphy 
JA).  
156 Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113, 119 (Latham CJ); Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 
1 AC 180, 189 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
157 Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113, 134-5 (Dixon J); Tulloch (deceased) v Braybon (No 2) 
[2010] NSWSC 650 (17 June 2010) [51] (Brereton J). 
158 Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1993] QB 109, 139 (Scott LJ).  See also Barclays Bank plc v 
O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, 188 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
159 Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 773, 822 [106]-[107] (Lord 
Hobhouse); Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, 189 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
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benefit.160  If the wrongdoer cannot rebut the presumption, the innocent party may 
be able to rescind the contract.161 
 
Therefore, referring back to the example on page 33, in the absence of a 
presumption of undue influence, Jane must prove on balance that her decision to 
transfer the house was caused by Bob’s influence and not as a result of her own 
free will.  This can be very difficult.  Her own evidence will appear to be 
self-serving.  However, the doctrine of presumed undue influence means that if 
Jane can prove that this was a relationship of influence (ie that she typically 
deferred to Bob’s judgment instead of exercising her own judgment), then the 
onus will pass to Bob to prove that that was not the case in this instance.  Jane will 
be able to seek to rescind the transfer unless Bob can prove that she made a free 
and independent decision to transfer the house. 
 
This presumption is particularly important where the circumstances are not as 
clear cut as the example used above.  Consider another scenario: 
 
Bob has a gambling problem and over time, has incurred a debt of 
$50,000.  Jane has sold the house she inherited for $400,000.  Bob tells 
Jane to give him $50,000 from the sale proceeds in order to pay off his 
debts.  He tells her that this would be better for their family because he 
would owe more money if he took out a bank loan.  Jane gives Bob the 
money to repay his debts.  
 
In this scenario, it might be very difficult for Jane to prove that she did not freely 
decide to give the money to Bob.  After all, it is plausible that she did so to avoid 
family embarrassment or because she believed that it was in the family’s best 
interest – especially if Bob is the ‘breadwinner’.   
 
                                                
160 Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113, 120 (Latham CJ); Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 
1 AC 180, 189 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2 
AC 773, 828 [119]-[122] (Lord Hobhouse); Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649, 684 (Dixon J). 
161 Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649, 659 (Latham CJ); National Westminster Bank plc v 
Morgan [1985] AC 686, 705 (Lord Scarman). 
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Jane and Bob’s relationship does not automatically attract the presumption.  
However, Jane will be able to rely on the presumption of undue influence if she 
shows that their relationship is a de facto relationship of trust and confidence.  For 
instance, if Bob has always made the financial decisions in their household and 
Jane typically defers to his judgment, then Jane might succeed in accessing the 
benefit of her presumption of undue influence.  In this situation, Jane could 
rescind the transfer and recover the money, on the basis that she did not give Bob 
the money based on an independent decision after considering her own interests.  
Instead, she gave Bob the money because she trusted Bob and simply ‘went 
along’ with his decision.  In this situation, whether Jane received independent 
advice will be an important consideration.  If she did receive advice, then Bob 
might be able to use this evidence to assist him to rebut the presumption.    
 
This trust and confidence present between spouses is well recognised and was 
highlighted in Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2) when Lord Hobhouse 
stated: 
 
I would assume in every case in which a wife and husband are living together 
that there is a reciprocal trust and confidence between them.  In the fairly 
common circumstance that the financial and business decisions of the family are 
primarily taken by the husband, I would assume that the wife would have trust 
and confidence in his ability to do so and would support his decisions.162 
 
If the presumption applies, Bob will have to show that Jane made the decision to 
give him the money out of her independent will.  If Bob is unable to rebut the 
presumption, then Jane may be able to rescind the transaction and get the money 
back from Bob.  
 
From the above scenarios, it is clear that parties will generally only be bound 
where they assumed the relevant obligations freely, independently and with 
informed consent.  Where this is not the case and a party’s consent is vitiated, the 
law will allow that party to avoid those obligations.  These situations of vitiated 
consent can arise between parties of any relationships and are not limited to 
                                                
162 [2002] 2 AC 773, 842 [159] (Lord Hobhouse). 
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spouses.  However, it is legally recognised that there are heightened risks of 
vitiated consent in transactions involving spouses specifically. 
 
2 Legal Recognition of the Risk of Vitiated Consent Specific to Spouses 
In addition to the above legal protections provided to parties when their consent is 
vitiated, the law has recognised the particular risk of vitiated consent that is 
created by the spousal relationship.163  This recognition is clearest in the context 
of third party guarantees.  In a third party guarantee situation, a third party secures 
a debtor’s loan from the creditor by a guarantee.164  Generally, this situation 
appears before the court where a wife guarantees her husband’s debt by using the 
family home.  The wife becomes liable for her husband’s debt if he defaults on 
the loan.165  Such transactions are known as sexually transmitted debt because the 
guarantor accepts legal responsibility for the debt based on the emotional 
dependence and ties between the parties rather than an appreciation of the legal 
reality of the contract.166   
 
Spouses may make decisions for the good of the family unit and for the purposes 
of maintaining the spousal relationship rather than because of their personal 
interests or an appreciation of the legal consequences involved. 167   When 
examining the reasons why women adopt sexually transmitted debt, Nicola 
Howell stated: 
                                                
163 See, eg, Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, 190-1 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); 
Garcia v National Bank of Australia Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395, 404 (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow 
and Hayne JJ). 
164 Citisecurities Limited v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1995] QCA 317 (28 July 1995) 
(Davies, Pincus JJA and Shepherdson J).  See also Claudio Bozzi, ‘Contracts of Guarantee’ in 
Dilan Thampapillai et al, Australian Commercial Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 239, 
275. 
165 See, eg, Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 773; Yerkey v Jones (1939) 
63 CLR 649; Garcia v National Bank of Australia Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395. 
166 Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, 190-1 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).  See also 
James Edelman and Elise Bant, ‘Setting Aside Contracts of Suretyship: The Theory and Practice 
of Both Limbs of Yerkey v Jones’ (2004) 15 Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice 5, 
9; Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality Before the Law: Women’s Equality, Report No 
69 (1994) pt 2, [13.4].  
167 Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, 190-1 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).  See, eg, 
Saintclaire v Saintclaire [2015] FamCAFC 245 (21 December 2015) [105] (Strickland, Murphy & 
Kent JJ).  See also James O’Donovan, ‘The Retreat from Yerkey v Jones: From Status Back to 
Contract’ (1996) 26 Western Australian Law Review 309, 326; Janine Pascoe, Women Directors 
who Guarantee Company Debts: Resolving the Conundrum of Protection Versus Liability 
(Lawbook, 2004) 112. 
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Women give their signatures to these contractual documents for a variety of 
reasons, some of which are recognised by law and some of which are not.  They 
sign because of emotional pressure.  They sign because they are expected to sign.  
They sign because the nature of the document is misrepresented to them.  They 
sign because they believe that their relationship with their partner obliges them to 
do all they can to help him.  They sign because they have been educated to 
believe that they, and therefore their signatures, do not count for much.  They 
sign because they value their relationship with their partner and do not want to 
create a situation that may adversely affect that relationship.168 
 
This statement is further supported by Millbank and Lovric’s study, which found 
that 75% of guarantors, who were mostly wives, guaranteed a loan because they 
trusted the borrower.169  The guarantors did not assess the risk of the guarantee 
due to their trust in the borrower.170  This heightened risk of spouses’ consent 
being vitiated when signing a guarantee has been recognised in both the United 
Kingdom and Australia with the two jurisdictions adopting different approaches 
to address the issue.171 
 
(a) The United Kingdom’s Approach 
The courts in the United Kingdom have accepted spouses’ vulnerability to each 
other and the risk of vitiated consent that may arise due to their relationship.172  
The courts have held that wives who implicitly rely on their husband should be 
protected when the husband abuses the trust and confidence reposed in them.173  
In relation to this underlying vulnerability, Lord Browne-Wilkinson noted that: 
 
                                                
168 Nicola Howell, above n 29, 107. 
169 Jenny Millbank and Jenny Lovric, ‘Darling, Please Sign This Form: Relationship Debt and 
Guarantees’ (2003) 28 Alternative Law Journal 282, 283. 
170 Ibid. 
171 See Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 773 for the English position.  Cf 
Garcia v National Bank of Australia Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395 for the Australian position. 
172 Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, 191 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).  See also 
Padden v Bevan Ashford Solicitors [2012] 1 WLR 1759, 1767 [29] (Lord Neuberger MR); Peter 
Goodrich, ‘Gender and Contracts’ in Anne Bottomley (ed) Feminist Perspectives on The 
Foundational Subjects of Law (Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1996) 17, 42. 
173 Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, 188 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).  Certainly 
protecting parties when their trust and confidence is abused forms the underlying basis for the 
doctrine of undue influence: Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113, 119 (Latham CJ), 134 (Dixon 
J); Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 194 CLR 457, 478 (Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ). 
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the sexual and emotional ties between the parties provide a ready weapon for 
undue influence: a wife's true wishes can easily be overborne because of her fear 
of destroying or damaging the wider relationship between her and her husband if 
she opposes his wishes.  …the risk of undue influence affecting a voluntary 
disposition by a wife in favour of a husband is greater than in the ordinary run of 
cases where no sexual or emotional ties affect the free exercise of the individual's 
will.174 
 
In relation to third party guarantees, the need to protect spouses has to be balanced 
against the public interest of ensuring that family homes can be used as security 
for loans.175  Creditors are placed on constructive notice if a wife176 guarantees 
her husband’s debt in a transaction that is not advantageous to her and there is a 
substantial risk that her consent was procured by a legal or equitable wrong.177  
Creditors who seek to rely on the guarantee should take reasonable steps to satisfy 
itself that the wife understands the practical implications of the transaction.178  In 
Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2), the Court allowed creditors to 
discharge this obligation by obtaining a solicitor’s certificate stating that the wife 
has been advised about the implications of the transaction.179  This shifted the 
burden of ensuring that the wife was adequately advised to solicitors.180   
 
Consider the following: 
 
Bob and Jane have equal ownership of the house they currently live in.  
Bob is seeking to borrow money from the bank in order to start a business 
                                                
174 Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, 190-1 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
175 Ibid 188 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).  See also Niersmans v Pesticcio [2004] EWCA Civ 372 (1 
April 2004) [4] (Mummery LJ).  
176 Note however that the English position applies to other relationships where there is an 
emotional relationship between the parties.  See Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, 
198 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); Padden v Bevan Ashford Solicitors [2012] 1 WLR 1759, 1767 [30] 
(Lord Neuberger MR); HSBC Bank plc v Brown [2015] EWHC 359 (Ch) (17 February 2015) [40] 
(Barker QC).  
177 Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, 196 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); Macklin v 
Dowsett [2004] EWCA Civ 904 (14 June 2004) (Auld LJ); HSBC Bank plc v Brown [2015] 
EWHC 359 (Ch) (17 February 2015) [45] (Barker QC). 
178 Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, 196-8 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); Darjan Estate 
Co plc v Hurley [2012] 1 WLR 1782, 1790 [30] (Andrews QC).  
179 [2002] 2 AC 773, 828-9 [119]-[122] (Lord Hobhouse).  See also Padden v Bevan Ashford 
Solicitors [2012] 1 WLR 1759, 1766-67 [28]-[29] (Lord Neuberger MR); Randall v Randall 
[2004] EWHC 2258 (Ch) (30 July 2004) [35], [38] (Jones QC).  
180 See John Phillips, ‘Setting Aside Guarantees: Another Approach’ (2002) 2 Oxford University 
Commonwealth Law Journal 47, 60; James O’Donovan, above n 167, 328. 
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venture in the technology industry.  The bank tells Bob that they will only 
provide him with the loan for his business venture if he and his wife 
secure the loan using the house.  At home, Bob tells Jane about this and 
assures her that his business venture will definitely succeed.  He tells her 
that they will earn the money back within six months.  Jane agrees to 
guarantee Bob’s loan.  Bob defaults on the loan and the bank is now 
seeking to enforce the guarantee.    
 
In this scenario, because Bob and Jane are in a ‘non-commercial relationship’ and 
Jane is a volunteer, the bank is fixed with constructive notice of any legal or 
equitable wrong (eg duress, undue influence or misrepresentation) that was 
employed to procure her consent.  The bank will only be able to enforce the 
guarantee if it took reasonable steps to ensure that Jane appreciated the legal 
consequences of signing the guarantee.  The bank could discharge this burden by 
insisting on receipt of a solicitor’s certificate stating that Jane has received 
independent legal advice.  If the bank takes this step, then Jane will not be able to 
argue that the guarantee should not be enforced even if Bob did coerce, unduly 
influence or deceive her into signing the guarantee. 
 
(b) Australia’s Approach 
In Australia, the courts have recognised that a husband, by virtue of his position, 
has the opportunity to abuse the confidence his wife may place in him.181  The 
doctrine of wife’s special equity is premised on this recognised issue with the 
High Court stating that: 
 
The marriage relationship is such that one, often the woman, may well leave 
many, perhaps all, business judgments to the other spouse.  In that kind of 
relationship, business decisions may be made with little consultation between the 
parties and with only the most abbreviated explanation of their purport or effect.  
Sometimes, with not the slightest hint of bad faith, the explanation of a particular 
transaction given by one to the other will be imperfect and incomplete, if not 
                                                
181 Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649, 675, 685 (Dixon J); Schultz v Bank of Queensland Ltd 
[2015] QCA 208 (27 October 2015) [9] (Boddice J).  See also Angela Stavrianou, ‘Expanding the 
Equitable Doctrine of Wife’s Special Equity’ (2007) 18 Journal of Banking and Finance Law and 
Practice 105, 108.  
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simply wrong.  That that is so is not always attributable to intended deception, to 
any imbalance of power between the parties, or, even, the vulnerability of one to 
exploitation because of emotional involvement.  It is, at its core, often a reflection 
of no more or less than the trust and confidence each has in the other.182 
 
The doctrine of wife’s special equity invalidates guarantees made by volunteer 
wives183 who did not understand the transaction or was unduly influenced into 
signing the guarantee.184  The doctrine consists of two limbs.  The first limb deals 
with the situation where the wife’s decision to sign the guarantee is not free or 
independent.  Where a wife’s consent is procured by her husband’s undue 
influence, she is entitled to have the guarantee set aside.185  The wife does not 
need to prove that the creditor had actual or constructive knowledge of undue 
influence.186  The creditor will only be able to rely on the guarantee where it can 
show that the wife received independent legal advice.187 
 
The second limb of the doctrine deals with situations where the wife’s decision to 
sign the guarantee is not informed.  It applies where the husband does not unduly 
influence the wife but the wife does not understand the effect and legal 
                                                
182 Garcia v National Bank of Australia Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395, 404 [21] (Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow, Hayne JJ).  
183 It remains debated whether this doctrine applies to spousal relationships other than legal 
marriage and heterosexual spousal relationships.  This issue was left open by the majority in 
Garcia v National Bank of Australia Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395, 404 [22] (Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow, Hayne JJ).  See Garcia v National Bank of Australia Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395, 435 [83] 
(Kirby J); Agripay Pty Limited v Byrne [2011] QCA 85 (3 May 2011) [4] (McMurdo P) where it 
was proposed that the doctrine should apply to all vulnerable parties in personal relationships, not 
just wives.  See, eg, State Bank of New South Wales Ltd v Lanyoun [2001] NSWSC 113 (9 March 
2001) where the doctrine was applied to parents who mortgaged their house under the influence of 
their son.  Cf Garcia v National Bank of Australia Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395, 442 [109] (Callinan 
J); State Bank of New South Wales v Hibbert [2000] NSWSC 628 (6 July 2000) [60] (Bryson J) 
where an expansion of the doctrine to other relationships was not supported.  
184 Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649, 683 (Dixon J); Garcia v National Bank of Australia Ltd 
(1998) 194 CLR 395, 408-9 (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne JJ).  See also Schultz v Bank of 
Queensland Ltd [2015] QCA 208 (27 October 2015) [37] (Boddice J); McIvor v Westpac Banking 
Corporation [2012] QSC 404 (14 December 2012) [13] (Applegarth J). 
185 Garcia v National Bank of Australia Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395, 408 (Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow, Hayne JJ); McIvor v Westpac Banking Corporation [2012] QSC 404 (14 December 
2012) [12] (Applegarth J). 
186 See ANZ Banking Group Ltd v Alirezai [2004] QCA 6 (6 February 2004) [37]-[40] (McMurdo 
P); McIvor v Westpac Banking Corporation [2012] QSC 404 (14 December 2012) [21] 
(Applegarth J).  See also Angela Stavrianou, above n 181, 106.  
187 Garcia v National Bank of Australia Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395, 406-7 (Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow, Hayne JJ); State Bank of New South Wales v Hibbert [2000] NSWSC 628 (6 July 2000) 
[55] (Bryson J); McIvor v Westpac Banking Corporation [2012] QSC 404 (14 December 2012) 
[21] (Applegarth J). 
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implications of the guarantee.188  This limb recognises that the wife may not 
question her husband or assess the transaction due to her trust in him.189  In this 
situation, the creditor will be able to rely on the guarantee if it takes steps to 
inform the wife of the transaction and reasonably supposes that she sufficiently 
understands its nature and effect.190  This is because it would be unconscionable 
for the creditor to enforce the guarantee without taking steps to explain the 
transaction when it knows that the wife is a volunteer and may repose trust and 
confidence in her husband.191  
 
Under the Australian approach in the previous fictional scenario, because Jane 
and Bob are a married couple, if Jane can establish that Bob unduly influenced her 
into the transaction, then she can rely on the first limb of wife’s special equity.  
Jane will be able to seek to set the guarantee aside unless the bank can show that it 
took steps to alleviate Jane from Bob’s ascendancy – such as by ensuring that she 
received independent legal advice before signing the guarantee.  Even if Jane 
simply did not understand the effect and implications of signing the guarantee, the 
bank will be able to enforce it as long as it took steps to explain the transaction to 
Jane or reasonably believed that she understood it.   
 
If however, Jane simply did not understand the guarantee’s effect and practical 
implications, then the bank will be able to enforce it as long as the bank took steps 
to explain the transaction to Jane.  The important thing to note is that this special 
equity exists because equity recognised the risk inherent to spousal relationships, 
being that spouses will make business decisions with little consultation with each 
other, and based on incomplete or incorrect explanation.192  In light of this 
                                                
188 Garcia v National Bank of Australia Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395, 409 [31] (Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow, Hayne JJ); McIvor v Westpac Banking Corporation [2012] QSC 404 (14 December 
2012) [13] (Applegarth J); State Bank of New South Wales v Hibbert [2000] NSWSC 628 (6 July 
2000) [56] (Bryson J). 
189 Garcia v National Bank of Australia Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395, 409 [31] (Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow, Hayne JJ).  See also Charles Chew, ‘Rethinking the Special Equity Rule for Wives: 
Post Garcia, Quo Vadis, Where to From Here?’ (2007) 19 Bond Law Review 61, 69. 
190 Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649, 684 (Dixon J); ANZ Banking Group Ltd v Alirezai [2004] 
QCA 6 (6 February 2004) [42] (McMurdo P). 
191 Garcia v National Bank of Australia Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395, 409 [31] (Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow, Hayne JJ).  
192 Garcia v National Bank of Australia Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395, 404 [21] (Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow, Hayne JJ). 
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obvious risk, it would be unconscionable for the creditor to enforce its rights 
having lent without taking steps to neutralise the risk to the wife.193   
 
C Concluding Remarks 
The law generally allows parties to avoid legal obligations where the decision to 
enter a transaction was not free, informed or independent (ie their consent was 
vitiated).  Legal doctrines have been developed to protect parties in such 
situations.  Where spouses are involved, it is well recognised in society and at law 
that there is a heightened risk of consent being vitiated, particularly in relation to 
financial decisions.  This is because of the trust and confidence reposed in a 
spouse and the potential for undue influence and financial abuse to occur.  
 
This heightened risk of vitiated consent between spouses when making financial 
decisions is particularly problematic in light of the danger created by the 
superannuation contributions splitting scheme as discussed in Chapter II.  Given 
that issues involving vitiated consent are occurring between spouses in other 
financial contexts, it is possible that such issues will be present in the 
contributions splitting scheme.  However, there is no mechanism currently in 
place to deal with these potential problems despite the scheme applying 
specifically to spouses, who have a greater risk of vitiated consent than other 
relationships.  Unlike the situation with third party guarantees, there is no 
requirement for a spouse to obtain independent advice and for trustees to ensure 
the spouse understands the legal implications of splitting contributions.  This risk 
is exacerbated by the implementation of an application process in the 
contributions splitting scheme in the superannuation system’s trust mechanism.  
As will be discussed in the next chapter, the application process means that the 
trustees are the decision makers under the scheme.  This complicates a spouse’s 
right to recourse where their consent was vitiated.  
                                                
193 Ibid 408-9 [31] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne JJ). 
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IV DISSOCIATION BETWEEN THE LEGAL AND PRACTICAL DECISION MAKER IN 
THE SUPERANNUATION CONTRIBUTIONS SPLITTING SCHEME 
The contributions splitting scheme creates a dissociation between the legal and 
practical decision maker by implementing an application process into the 
superannuation system’s trust structure.  This exacerbates the risks arising from 
the lack of safeguards in the scheme discussed in Chapter II.  This chapter will 
discuss this issue and its effect on beneficiaries’ right to recourse as well as 
trustees’ liability.  
 
A Dissociation Between the Legal and Practical Decision Making 
Who decides that superannuation contributions will be split?  Is it the splitting 
spouse (ie the beneficiary of the superannuation trust)?  Or is it the 
superannuation trustee?  This is important because legal doctrines that relieve a 
person from responsibility for undertakings made in circumstances of impaired 
consent, as discussed in Chapter III, are not directly apposite unless the decision 
to split is made by the spouse who relinquishes her superannuation contributions.  
However, the manner in which the scheme was implemented creates a disjoin 
between the practical decision to split and the legal means by which the decision 
to split takes place.  In other words, there is a dissociation in the contributions 
splitting scheme between who the decision maker is at law and in practice.  This 
is evident from the trustee’s role and duties in considering contributions splitting 
applications.  As discussed previously, the superannuation system uses a trust 
mechanism and each superannuation fund has their own trust deed.194  Thus, 
superannuation trustees are subject to duties under statute, contract and general 
law when performing their functions under the contributions splitting scheme.   
 
A trustee’s most fundamental duty is to obey the express duties in the trust deed, 
which may modify a trustee’s other duties.195  The SIS Act provides covenants 
that are taken to be included in the trust deed.196  Inter alia, these covenants 
require the superannuation trustee to act honestly, perform their duties and 
                                                
194 See Ch I.A for a discussion on the superannuation system. 
195 Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71, 137 (Gummow J); Youyang Pty Ltd v Minter Ellison 
Morris Fletcher (2003) 212 CLR 484, 498 [32] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and 
Hayne JJ). 
196 SIS Act s 52(1). 
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exercise their powers in the best interest of the beneficiaries and exercise the same 
degree of care, skill and diligence as a prudent superannuation trustee.197  The SIS 
Act does not expand the trustees’ duties under general law,198 except for the 
higher standard of care imposed on superannuation trustees.199  In discussing the 
dissociation between the legal and practical decision maker in the contributions 
splitting scheme, it is relevant to discuss the trustees’ duties to exercise discretion, 
exercise the requisite standard of care and act in the beneficiaries’ best interests.  
 
1 Superannuation Trustees’ Position at Law 
Under the SIS Act, superannuation trustees are the legal decision makers under 
the scheme.  Trustees have the discretion to accept or reject a valid contributions 
splitting application. 200   This is evident from regulation 5.45 of the SIS 
Regulations, which provides that trustees ‘may’ accept contributions splitting 
applications.  Where an Act or regulation201 states that ‘a person, court or body 
may do a particular act or thing, and the word may is used, the act or thing may be 
done at the discretion of the person, court or body’.202  This interpretation is 
supported by the fact that applicants ‘request’ for their contributions to be split.203  
This position is not altered by contract.  Trust deeds usually state that the trustee 
may accept an application to split contributions ‘in its absolute discretion’.204  
Therefore, under the contributions splitting scheme, superannuation trustees must 
exercise their discretion and do so with the same degree of care, skill and 
                                                
197 Ibid s 52(2)(a)-(c). 
198 Manglicmot v Commonwealth Bank Officers Superannuation Corporation Pty Ltd (2011) 282 
ALR 167, 191 [119]-[120] (Giles JA); Commonwealth Bank Officers Superannuation Corporation 
Pty Ltd v Beck (2016) 334 ALR 692, 719 [136] (Bathurst CJ). 
199 Under general law the necessary standard of care is that of a reasonably prudent 
businessperson: Speight v Grant (1883) 9 App Cas 1, 19 (Lord Blackburn); Austin v Austin (1906) 
3 CLR 516, 525 (Griffith CJ, Barton and O’Connor JJ).  This increased standard of care under the 
SIS Act is in line with state legislations concerning professional trustees’ standard of care: 
Explanatory Memorandum, Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Trustee Obligations and 
Prudential Standards) Bill 2012 (Cth) 20 [1.62]. 
200 SIS Regulations reg 6.45(1). 
201 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 46(1); see also Legislation Act 2003 (Cth) s 13(1). 
202 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 33(2A). 
203 See, eg, Australian Taxation Office, Contributions Splitting, above n 48, 9. 
204See, eg, AustralianSuper, AustralianSuper Trust Deed, cl 22.3 
<https://www.australiansuper.com/~/media/Files/BoardGovernance/201111/AustralianSuper%20T
rust%20Deed.ashx>; UniSuper, Consolidated Trust Deed (1 November 2016), cl 22 
<https://www.unisuper.com.au/~/media/FEBF4351CBA54329963C429D50EFD1CE.pdf>; Intrust 
Super, Intrust Super Fund Deed of Variation (22 September 2016), cl 10.31 
<http://www.intrustsuper.com.au/wp-content/uploads/Trust-Deed-2016.pdf>. 
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diligence as a prudent superannuation trustee and in the best interests of the 
beneficiary.   
 
(a) Trustees Must Exercise Discretion 
Under general law, trustees must use their own judgment in exercising their 
discretion.205  Trustees must not delegate their authority unless permitted by the 
trust deed, statute or where delegation is necessary and relates to ministerial 
acts.206  The duty to exercise discretion requires trustees to not act under dictation 
and to make genuine considerations.207 
 
(i) Duty to not act under dictation 
Under general law, trustees must not act under dictation.208  This means that 
trustees must not blindly follow instructions of others or rubber-stamp their 
decisions.209  This includes acting under the beneficiaries’ instructions because ‘a 
trustee is not the pawn of a beneficiary’.210  In Re Brockbank,211 it was held that 
beneficiaries (even if they all concur) cannot control and direct the trustee’s 
exercise of discretionary powers.212  Trustees who breach the duty to not act under 
dictation may be liable to compensate for the loss arising from the breach.213  
 
                                                
205 McMillan v McMillan (1891) 17 VLR 33, 38-9 (Hodges J); Rose v Piscopo [2010] FMCA 948 
(14 December 2010) [62] (Lloyd-Jones FM).  
206 Trustees of the Kean Memorial Trust Fund v Attorney-General (SA) (2003) 86 SASR 449, 471 
[96] (Besanko J).  See also Harold Ford et al, Thomson Reuters, Ford and Lees: The Law of Trusts 
(at 12 August 2015) 9 Trustees’ Duties, ‘Duty to Act Personally’ [9.11010]; Peter Radan and 
Cameron Stewart, Principles of Australian Equity and Trusts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2nd ed, 
2013) 501. 
207 Partridge v Equity Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd (1947) 75 CLR 149, 164 (Starke, 
Dixon and Williams JJ); Hartigan Nominees Pty Ltd v Rydge (1992) 29 NSWLR 405, 428 
(Mahoney JA).  
208 Quinton v Proctor [1998] 4 VR 469 (25 May 1998) 471 (Kellam J); Walker v Willis [1969] VR 
778 (1 January 1969) 782 (Lush J). 
209 Avery v Saree Holdings Ltd [2012] NSWSC 938 (10 August 2012) [26] (Slattery J); 
Application of Scali [2010] NSWSC 1254 (6 October 2010) [14] (Brereton J).  
210 Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (No 3) [2009] FCA 53 (5 February 
2009) [83] (Finn J). 
211 [1948] Ch 206.  
212 Ibid 208-9 (Vaisey J).  
213 Wickstead v Browne (1992) 30 NSWLR 1, 14 (Handley and Cripps JJA); Carruthers v 
Carruthers [1896] AC 659, 665-6 (Lord Herschell).  
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Trustees may act under the beneficiaries’ instructions when the trust deed permits 
it.214  The SIS Act prohibits trustees from acting under dictation unless an express 
exception applies.215  Any terms in a superannuation trust deed that enables 
trustees to be subject to direction in the exercise of their powers outside these 
exceptions will be invalid.216  Importantly, there are no exceptions that permit 
trustees to be subject to the beneficiary’s directions for contributions splitting.  
Additionally, the wording of the scheme indicates that trustees have discretion 
and are not acting as the beneficiary’s agent under the contributions splitting 
scheme.217  Therefore, it seems that, as a matter of law, it is the trustee who 
decides whether or not to split a beneficiary’s superannuation contributions.  The 
splitting spouse may make the decision to submit an application to split their 
superannuation contributions, but it is the trustee who decides whether to accept 
or reject that application.  Trustees are not obliged to split contributions simply 
because the beneficiaries instruct them to do so.  Superannuation trustees may not 
simply ‘process’ applications; they may not simply accept validly made 
applications as a matter of course without applying their independent judgment.  
Indeed, doing so may breach their duty to not act under dictation. 
 
(ii) Duty to make genuine considerations 
The principles of trust law require that the trustee does more than merely 
determine whether the contributions splitting application was validly made (ie 
whether it complies with the statutory requirements outlined in Chapter II).  The 
trustee must consider what is in the beneficiary’s best interests and exercise its 
discretion accordingly.  Under general law, trustees must genuinely consider an 
issue in exercising their discretion by considering the options available before 
making a decision.218  As stated in Jacobs Law of Trusts in Australia:  
                                                
214 Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (No 3) [2009] FCA 53 (5 February 
2009) [83] (Finn J); Harb v Harb [2010] NSWSC 1251 (5 October 2010) [13] (Brereton J).  
215 SIS Act s 58(2).  Permitted directions by beneficiaries relate to benefits payable to those 
beneficiaries, allocating amounts to particular investment options and debt surcharge payments to 
the Commissioner of Taxation: SIS Act s 58(2)(c)-(da), (g).  See also Superannuation 
Contributions Tax (Members of Constitutionally Protected Superannuation Funds) Assessment 
and Collection Act 1997 (Cth) s15(8B). 
216 SIS Act s 58(3).  However, this does not apply to SMSFs: SIS Act s 58(1). 
217 See SIS Regulations reg 6.45(1).  See also the above discussion at Ch IV.A.1. 
218 Kennon v Spry (2008) 238 CLR 366, 394 [77]-[78] (French CJ), 408 [125] (Gummow and 
Hayne JJ); Curwen v Vanbreck Pty Ltd (2009) 26 VR 335, 350-1 [34] (Redlich, Bongiorno JJA 
and Hansen AJA).  
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Trustees commit a breach of trust if they neglect to give any consideration to the 
question whether they should make a payment to A, if they refrain from making a 
payment because of some improper motive, or if they make the payment to A as 
of course, without considering whether they should do so or not.219 
 
Trustees may need to make inquiries to properly inform themselves rather than 
only relying on the information provided to them.220  A consideration will not be 
genuine if it is not properly informed.221  The SIS Act and the SIS Regulations do 
not address trustees’ duty to inquire or make a genuine consideration for the 
superannuation contributions splitting scheme.  Examples of trust deeds also do 
not address these duties and importantly, do not exclude trustees from having to 
make inquiries unlike with other application processes.222   
 
The duty to make genuine considerations does not require trustees to endlessly 
pursue ‘perfect information in order to make a perfect decision’.223  Instead, 
trustees must make further inquiries where the material before them is insufficient 
to give an application proper consideration.224  This may arise where there are 
conflicting materials that must be resolved or a lack of material before the 
trustee.225  When determining whether the trustees have properly considered the 
                                                
219 J D Heydon and M J Leeming, Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
8th ed, 2016) 326 [16-06].  See also Fay v Moramba Services Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1428 (16 
December 2009) [33] (Brereton J); Karger v Paul [1984] VR 161, 163-4 (McGarvie J).  
220 Finch v Telstra Super Pty Ltd (2010) 242 CLR 254, 280 [66] (French CJ, Gummow, Heydon, 
Crennan and Bell JJ); Karger v Paul [1984] VR 161, 163-4 (McGarvie J); Asea Brown Boveri 
Superannuation Fund No 1 Pty Ltd v Asea Brown Boveri Pty Ltd [1999] 1 VR 144, 157 [42]-[43] 
(Beach J); Sayseng v Kellogg Superannuation Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 945 (13 November 2003) 
[59]-[60] (Bryson J). 
221 Finch v Telstra Super Pty Ltd (2010) 242 CLR 254, 280 [66] (French CJ, Gummow, Heydon, 
Crennan and Bell JJ); Alcoa of Australia Retirement Plan Pty Ltd v Frost (2012) 36 VR 618, 633 
[59] (Nettle JA). 
222 See, eg, AustralianSuper, AustralianSuper Trust Deed, above n 204, cl 22 cf cl 30.7 which 
excludes the duty to inquire for applications to transfer retirement credit to an approved benefit 
arrangement.  See generally HOSTPLUS, Trust Deed for the HOSTPLUS Superannuation Fund (5 
April 2013) 
<https://hostplus.com.au/-/media/Files/Hostplus/Documents/About-Us/hostplus-trust-deed.pdf>; 
UniSuper, Consolidated Trust Deed, above n 204. 
223 Alcoa of Australia Retirement Plan Pty Ltd v Frost (2012) 36 VR 618, 633 [60] (Nettle JA). 
224 Finch v Telstra Super Pty Ltd (2010) 242 CLR 254, 280-1 [66] (French CJ, Gummow, Heydon, 
Crennan and Bell JJ); Attorney-General v Kowalski [2015] SASC 123 (19 August 2015) [84] 
(Blue J).  
225 Finch v Telstra Super Pty Ltd (2010) 242 CLR 254, 280 [66] (French CJ, Gummow, Heydon, 
Crennan and Bell JJ); Alcoa of Australia Retirement Plan Pty Ltd v Frost (2012) 36 VR 618, 
629-30 [47] (Nettle JA); Folan v United Super Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 343 (27 March 2014) [73] 
(Nicholas AJ).  
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exercise of their power, ‘it is relevant to look at evidence of the inquiries which 
were made by the trustees, the information they had and the reasons for, and 
manner of, their exercising their discretion’.226   In Finch v Telstra Super Pty Ltd, 
the High Court unanimously held that the trustees’ duty to inform themselves 
properly is more intense in superannuation trusts than discretionary family 
trusts.227  This is because of the public and social significance of superannuation 
and the fact that beneficiaries are not volunteers.228   
 
There have been no cases about the application of the duty to make a genuine 
consideration in the context of the contributions splitting scheme.  Cases on this 
duty in the superannuation context have focused on trustees’ duties when 
considering an application for a death or total and permanent disablement 
benefit. 229   When considering such applications, trustees must analyse the 
information before them against the criteria outlined in the trust deed and decide 
whether there are missing information or unresolved issues in the application.  
Trustees should make inquiries where there is insufficient or conflicting 
information.230  Trustees who breach their duty to make genuine considerations 
may be liable to pay compensation.231   
                                                
226 Karger v Paul [1984] VR 161, 163-4 (McGarvie J).  Whether the principles in Karger v Paul 
apply in the superannuation context remains debated.  The High Court chose to not deal with this 
question but stated that the duty to make a properly informed consideration applies in the 
superannuation context: Finch v Telstra Super Pty Ltd (2010) 242 CLR 254, 280 [65] (French CJ, 
Gummow, Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ).  See Rhys Bower, ‘Finch v Telstra Super: The High 
Court declines to move on from Karger v Paul’ (2011) 5 Journal of Equity 151 for a further 
discussion on this. 
227 Finch v Telstra Super Pty Ltd (2010) 242 CLR 254, 280 [66] (French CJ, Gummow, Heydon, 
Crennan and Bell JJ).  See also Alcoa of Australia Retirement Plan Pty Ltd v Frost (2012) 36 VR 
618, 632 [57] (Nettle JA); Birdsall v Motor Trades Association of Australia Superannuation Fund 
Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 104 (22 April 2015) [8] (Basten JA).  
228 Finch v Telstra Super Pty Ltd (2010) 242 CLR 254, 271 [33] (French CJ, Gummow, Heydon, 
Crennan and Bell JJ); Commonwealth Bank Officers Superannuation Corporation Pty Ltd v Beck 
(2016) 334 ALR 992, 711 (Bathurst CJ); Alcoa of Australia Retirement Plan Pty Ltd v Frost 
(2012) 36 VR 618, 633 [59] (Nettle JA).  
229 See, eg, Finch v Telstra Super Pty Ltd (2010) 242 CLR 254; Sharp v Maritime Super Pty Ltd 
[2012] NSWSC 1350 (7 November 2012); Miljevic v Holden Employee Superannuation Fund Pty 
Ltd [2016] FCA 718 (17 June 2016); Edington v Board of Trustees of the State Public Sector 
Superannuation Scheme [2015] QSC 245 (21 August 2015). 
230 Alcoa of Australia Retirement Plan Pty Ltd v Frost (2012) 36 VR 618, 633 [60] (Nettle JA); 
Attorney-General v Kowalski [2015] SASC 123 (19 August 2015) [84] (Blue J).  See also Scott 
Charaneka and Stanley Drummond, Superannuation Trustees’ Proactive Duty to Investigate TPD 
Claims (December 2011) Norton Rose Fulbright 
<http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/61021/superannuation-trustees-pro
active-duty-to-investigate-tpd-claims>.  Note however, that the High Court has provided that 
beneficiaries are entitled to such benefits when they satisfy the relevant criteria.  As such, trustees 
are forming an opinion on whether the criteria have been met and not exercising a discretionary 
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Therefore, trustees do not have specific factors that they must consider when 
exercising their discretion, such as the beneficiary’s reason for splitting 
contributions or whether contributions are being split to a low-income or 
non-working spouse.  No such factors are provided by the SIS Act or SIS 
Regulations.  Nor do the trust deeds themselves indicate what factors, if any, that 
trustees will consider on contributions splitting application forms.  
 
(b) Trustees Must Act with the Requisite Standard of Care 
The SIS Act requires superannuation trustees to exercise the same degree of care, 
skill and diligence as a prudent superannuation trustee.232  This requires trustees to 
act as a careful and cautious superannuation trustee would when exercising their 
discretionary powers.  Industry practice can indicate what is reasonable conduct in 
a particular activity.233 
 
In the contributions splitting context, it appears to be industry practice that 
trustees do not investigate whether beneficiaries were pressured into applying to 
split their superannuation contributions.  In their submission to the Australian 
Law Reform Commission, the Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia, 
the peak research and advocacy body for the Australian superannuation 
industry234 stated:  
 
As requests for contribution splits are made in writing, a trustee has no capacity 
to know whether or not the spouse is being coerced into making the request 
                                                                                                                                 
power: Finch v Telstra Super Pty Ltd (2010) 242 CLR 254, 270 [29]-[30] (French CJ, Gummow, 
Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ).  In contrast, beneficiaries do not appear to be entitled to split their 
contributions under the contributions splitting scheme.  
231 Wickstead v Browne (1992) 30 NSWLR 1, 14 (Handley and Cripps JJA).  The courts may also 
set aside the trustee’s decision made where appropriate: Finch v Telstra Super Pty Ltd (2010) 242 
CLR 254, 269 [28] (French CJ, Gummow, Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ).   
232 SIS Act s 52(2)(b). 
233 Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460, 482 [73] (McHugh J).  See 
Maelor Jones Investments (Noarlunga) Pty Ltd v Heywood-Smith (1989) 54 SASR 285, 295 
(Olssen J); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Edwards [2006] NSWSC 376 (5 
May 2006) [10] (Barrett J). 
234 Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia, About ASFA 
<http://www.superannuation.asn.au/about-asfa/who-is-asfa>. 
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ASFA does not consider it practical to expect the trustee to make enquiries about 
family violence before actioning a split.235 
 
As the scheme does not require trustees to take any particular factors into account 
when considering contributions splitting applications, it is arguable that trustees 
do exercise the requisite standard of care when they follow the industry practice 
and act as the scheme seems to have intended them to do. 
 
(c) Trustees Must Act in Beneficiaries’ Best Interests 
Under the SIS Act, superannuation trustees must perform their duties and exercise 
their powers in the best interests of the beneficiaries.236  This does not extend the 
general law duty to act in the beneficiaries’ best interests.237  This duty underlies 
and qualifies trustees’ other duties so that trustees must perform their other duties 
in the beneficiaries’ best interests.238  The SIS Act provides that the interests of 
the beneficiaries are to be given priority over the interests of other persons where 
there is a conflict.239   
 
In construing the best interests duty in the superannuation context, the courts have 
taken a process-focused approach – requiring only that trustees make the best 
effort to pursue what they reasonably believe to be the best outcome in their 
decision making process.240  The courts will look objectively at the trustee’s 
effort, diligence and process in making its decision and the reasonableness of the 
                                                
235 Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia, Submission No 24 to Australian Law 
Reform Commission, Family Violence and Commonwealth Laws – Improving Legal Frameworks, 
7 April 2011, 2. 
236 SIS Act s 52(2)(c). 
237 Manglicmot v Commonwealth Bank Officers Superannuation Corporation Pty Ltd (2011) 282 
ALR 167, 191 [121] (Giles JA); Mercer Superannuation (Australia) Limited v Billinghurst [2016] 
FCA 1274 (28 October 2016) [78] (Moshinsky J).  
238 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Australian Property Custodian Holdings 
Limited (rec and mgr apptd) (in liq) (Controllers apptd) (No 3) [2013] FCA 1342 (12 December 
2013) [481] (Murphy J); Heydon and Leeming, above n 219, 326 [16-06]; Geraint W Thomas, 
‘The Duty of Trustees to Act in the ‘Best Interests’ of their Beneficiaries’ (2008) 2 Journal of 
Equity 177, 194. 
239 SIS Act s 52(2)(d). 
240 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Australian Property Custodian Holdings 
Limited (rec and mgr apptd) (in liq) (Controllers apptd) (No 3) [2013] FCA 1342 (12 December 
2013) [465]-[475] (Murphy J); Scott Donald, ‘“Best” Interests?’ (2008) 2 Journal of Equity 245, 
246; Michelle Levy, Unravelled: The Best Interests Duties – Process or Outcome? (5 February 
2015) Allens <http://www.allens.com.au/pubs/fsr/150205-unravelled-02.htm>. 
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trustees’ judgment.241  This is because an outcome-focused approach, which 
would require trustees to further or fulfil the purpose of the trust by maximising 
retirement income for beneficiaries,242 would be impractical.  Certainly, trustees 
are not held liable for decisions simply because they were unbeneficial in 
retrospect given that they do not have the benefit of hindsight.243 
 
In the contributions splitting context, superannuation trustees must exercise their 
discretion to accept or reject a splitting application in the beneficiaries’ best 
interests.  At first blush, the best interests duty appears to conflict with the 
contributions splitting scheme.  Given that the scheme involves transferring 
ownership over what can be a significant portion of contributions received in a 
financial year to a spouse,244 the decision to accept an application would likely be 
contrary to the member’s best interests as an individual.  The scheme’s tax 
incentives may not negate the loss arising from the transfer.  This is particularly as 
trustees are not required to ensure that members have received financial advice 
and will likely benefit from splitting their contributions as discussed above.  The 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia raised this concern in their 
submission to the Senate Inquiry, stating that the scheme: 
 
assumes members understand the end benefit taxation rules as well as having the 
skills to compare the costs of splitting with the tax benefit available.  Those 
couples that find this too hard may choose to either split contributions just in case 
or not split at all.  Each situation could result in a negative outcome.245 
 
Further, Commenting Entity 3 to the 2002 consultation also noted the discrepancy 
between the scheme and the beneficiaries’ best interests: 
                                                
241 See VBN v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2006) 92 ALD 259, 343-5 (Forgie DP 
and Senior Member Pascoe); Cowan v Scargill [1985] Ch 270, 295 (Megarry VC); Invensys 
Australia Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd v Austrac Investments Ltd (2006) 198 FLR 302, 324 [107] 
(Byrne J).  See also Geraint W Thomas, above n 238, 202.  
242 This is the purpose of superannuation trusts: Charter Group, Parliament of Australia, A Super 
Charter: Fewer Changes, Better Outcomes (2013) 21. 
243 AMP, Submission to Treasury, Exposure Draft of the Superannuation Legislation Amendment 
(Trustee Obligations and Prudential Standards) Bill 2012, January 2012, [1.3]; Paul Collins, ‘The 
Best Interests Duty and the Standard of Care for Superannuation Trustees’ (2014) 88 Australian 
Law Journal 632, 634. 
244 Beneficiaries are able to split up to 85% of the concessional contributions they received or the 
contributions cap for the previous financial year: SIS Regulations reg 6.40. 
245 Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, above n 97, 2.  See also Cbus, above n 97, 3. 
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It [is] convinced that Government lost sight [of] the major reason for having 
superannuation, that is to provide the highest level of superannuation entitlements 
for the member of the fund.  This policy is [being] pursu[ed] because there was an 
election commitment.246 
 
Certainly, the scheme focuses on benefiting the receiving spouse as part of a 
couple rather than the individual beneficiary who is seeking to split their 
contributions.  Some submissions during the implementation process 
acknowledged this. 247   For example, Commenting Entity 13 noted that the 
‘[p]olicy intent of the splitting of super accounts is to treat the individual as part 
of the family unit for taxation purpose’.248  The scheme’s focus on the receiving 
spouse’s interests may explain why trustees do consider factors such as whether 
there should be a minimum contributions amount transferred249 but not factors 
that go to the beneficiary’s best interests, such as whether the beneficiary has 
received financial advice.  This position raises the question of whether trustees 
who accept splitting applications are breaching their duties, given that it is the 
beneficiaries’ best interests, and not the couple or receiving spouses’ best 
interests, that trustees must consider when exercising their discretion.  This could 
potentially expose trustees to allegations of breach of duties for following the 
scheme.  Unfortunately, when implementing the scheme, the government did not 
consider the difficult position in which trustees are placed due to the mismatch 
between the objectives of the scheme and the objectives of trust laws.  
 
2 Superannuation Trustees’ Position in Practice 
It is clear that trustees are legally the decision makers and have the discretion to 
accept or reject a valid contributions splitting application.250  However, despite 
this, in practice trustees do not appear to undertake processes to exercise their 
                                                
246 Appendix B, Commenting Entity 3. 
247 Appendix B, Commenting Entity 13; Mercer Human Resource Consulting, Submission No 2 to 
Standing Senate Economics Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Taxation 
Laws Amendment (Superannuation Contributions Splitting) Bill 2003, 16 October 2003, 1; CPA 
Australia, Submission No 8 to Standing Senate Economics Legislation Committee, Parliament of 
Australia, Inquiry into Taxation Laws Amendment (Superannuation Contributions Splitting) Bill 
2003, 17 October 2003, 3; Women’s Action Alliance, above n 46, 1. 
248 Appendix B, Commenting Entity 13. 
249 See, eg, SuperSA, above n 50, 1, which imposes a minimum splitting amount of $50 and a 
minimum remaining account balance of $1,000. 
250 See Ch IV.A.1 for the discussion on the trustees’ discretion. 
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discretion.  In practice, it appears to be the beneficiaries who are the decision 
makers in this process.  The splitting spouse makes the decision to split 
contributions by submitting an application.  Nothing in the scheme’s 
implementation legislation or in its operation indicates that the trustee has any 
role in deciding whether a valid application ought to be accepted. 
 
First, the legislation does not provide any process that a trustee must undertake 
when considering a valid application.  It does not require or provide any 
opportunity for the trustee to meet personally or correspond with an applicant 
beneficiary in order to determine whether the beneficiary has received financial 
advice, understands the nature and legal implications of the scheme and consents 
to the transfer.  There is also no obligation or opportunity for the trustee to 
ascertain that the contributions are to be transferred from a higher earning spouse 
to a lower earning or non-earning spouse as the legislators envisaged.  This is 
significant because transfers from a low-income earner to a higher income earner 
would ostensibly raise questions about whether splitting is in the applicant’s best 
interest.  Nor do the application forms or trust deeds provide any process by 
which the trustee might evaluate, assess or otherwise exercise judgment in 
relation to a valid application.251   
 
If it is truly the trustee who exercises a discretion in deciding to accept or reject an 
application to split contributions, then one would expect that these factors would 
be considered in order to ascertain whether contributions splitting would be in the 
beneficiary’s best interests.  This is particularly as the Australian superannuation 
system is complex and beneficiaries may not make informed decisions because 
they do not understand the taxation rules involved in the scheme.252  Furthermore, 
the heightened risks of vitiated consent in dealings between spouses means that 
there is a real risk that the splitting spouse made the application without informed 
consent.  Yet, neither the legislation nor the manner in which the scheme is 
implemented provides any mechanism by which the information necessary to 
make such a decision can be gathered.   
                                                
251 See, eg, Australian Taxation Office, Contributions Splitting, above n 48; UniSuper, 
Consolidated Trust Deed, above n 204, cl 22 which do not provide any processes that the trustee 
must undertake before accepting or rejecting a contributions splitting application.   
252 Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, above n 97, 2; Cbus, above n 97, 3. 
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Indeed, contributions splitting application forms require beneficiaries to provide 
information sufficient only to establish that the application is valid253 and to 
enable the practical transfer of contributions to the receiving spouse’s 
superannuation account.  Furthermore, notwithstanding the risks inherent in 
financial dealings between spouses, the scheme appears to impose on trustees a 
low level of obligation to inquire.  For example, regulation 6.44(3) of the SIS 
Regulations states that in assessing the validity of an application, the trustee is 
permitted to rely on the information provided about the receiving spouse without 
investigating whether it is true.254   
 
No superannuation trustees were interviewed for this thesis.  Therefore, it must be 
stated that further empirical research is required to determine whether any 
superannuation trustees do in fact undertake a process of inquiry.  However, 
public statements made by stakeholders would seem to suggest that they do not.  
The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia has stated that trustees do 
not inquire about vitiated consent arising from duress when considering an 
application.  In their submission to the Australian Law Reform Commission on 
the issue of splitting applications made under duress, they stated: 
 
As requests for contribution splits are made in writing, a trustee has no capacity 
to know whether or not the spouse is being coerced into making the request.  
ASFA does not consider it practical to expect the trustee to make enquiries about 
family violence before actioning a split…  ASFA considers that the fund trustee 
should not be expected or required to consider competing arguments between the 
spouses.  This is not their role, and investigating the bone fides of both arguments 
raises the significant question of who should meet the cost of such enquiries.255 
 
They also stated that trustees would only consider the issue of duress if the 
beneficiaries told the trustees about it.256  This seems to indicate that beneficiaries 
are the practical decision makers under the scheme.  Beneficiaries who tell the 
                                                
253 In that it meets the legislative requirements.  See Ch II.B.2 for a discussion on the legislative 
requirements of contributions splitting. 
254 SIS Regulations reg 6.44(3). 
255 Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia, Submission No 24 to Australian Law 
Reform Commission, above n 235, 2. 
256 Ibid. 
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trustees that their consent was vitiated are essentially telling the trustees that they 
did not want to split their contributions.  Beneficiaries in that circumstance could 
be said to be telling the trustees to reject the application. 
 
Additionally, the comments made to the 2002 consultation indicate that the 
trustees consider that the decision to split contributions is a matter for the 
beneficiary.  For example, Commenting Entity 1 stated that ‘all of the splitting 
options should be available with spouses choosing the most appropriate one for 
them’.257  Commenting Entity 15 also suggested that beneficiaries should only 
need to make one application and ‘splitting should proceed until the member 
notifies otherwise’.258  These comments indicate that it is the beneficiaries’ choice 
to split contributions, rather than a matter for the trustees’ discretion.   
 
In conjunction, these factors indicate that, in practice, trustees do not use their 
own judgment to consider a contributions splitting application.  Instead, the 
trustees’ role is simply to ensure that the contributions splitting application is 
valid and to transfer the contributions as requested.  It is the beneficiary who, by 
submitting an application, makes the decision to split the contributions.  This view 
of the facts is consistent with the tenor of superannuation contributions splitting 
forms, such as the one used by CareSuper, which provides: ‘If you are eligible to 
split your contributions, please allow up to 3 business days for the transfer to take 
place’.259  This indicates that CareSuper’s trustees accept valid applications as a 
matter of course and do not exercise any discretion in relation to contributions 
splitting.  
 
The dissociation between the legal and practical decision making under the 
contributions splitting scheme has arisen because of the scheme’s implementation 
without consideration of traditional trust laws.  The mismatch of the two areas in 
some respects results in difficulties in determining the extent to which 
superannuation trustees’ duties are modified.  The uncertainties and ambiguities 
                                                
257 Appendix B, Commenting Entity One.  
258 Ibid Commenting Entity 13, 12.  
259 CARE Super Pty Ltd, Contribution Splitting Form, 3 
<https://www.caresuper.com.au/download.php?node=1970>. 
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arising from this mismatch in the superannuation context were discussed in Retail 
Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd v Pain.260  Justice Blue stated: 
 
given the contractual or quasi-contractual nature of the relationship between a 
trustee and members, there will be many provisions of governing rules of 
regulated superannuation entities that enable members to give instructions to the 
trustee exercisable as of right which it cannot have been the intention of sections 
58 and 59 to preclude.  Examples are instructions by a member to change from 
REST Super to REST Select, to rollover his or her interest to another 
superannuation fund or, if he or she has reached retirement age, to cash his or her 
benefit.  Literally, these instructions are directions by a person to the trustee in 
contravention of subsection 58(1).  It cannot have been the legislature’s intention 
that subsections 58(1) or 59(1) would apply to such instructions.  …sections 58 
and 59 should be interpreted such that they do not apply when the governing 
rules give to a member a right and impose on the trustee a corresponding duty 
such that the trustee has no power or discretion not to give effect to the right.261 
 
His Honour noted that legislative reform in this area would be desirable to resolve 
these uncertainties and ambiguities.262 
 
While his observations were obiter, it would be interesting to see how his 
Honour’s remarks would apply to the superannuation contributions splitting 
scheme.  Importantly, beneficiaries do not have a right to split their contributions 
under the scheme.  As discussed above, the SIS Regulations provide trustees with 
the discretion to accept or reject valid contributions splitting applications.263  As 
such, it cannot be said that trustees do not have any power or discretion under the 
contributions splitting scheme.  Accordingly, his Honour’s observations are 
unlikely to apply to the superannuation contributions splitting scheme.  However, 
this position is difficult to reconcile with the legislators’ intention and trustees’ 
actions in practice.  This highlights the difficulties and uncertainties that arise 
from how the contributions splitting scheme has been implemented.  
                                                
260 [2016] SASC 121 (8 August 2016). 
261 Ibid [488] (Blue J). 
262 Ibid [512]-[515] (Blue J). 
263 See Ch IV.A.1 for a further discussion on this point. 
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B The Effect of the Dissociation on Beneficiaries’ Right to Recourse  
The dissociation between the legal and practical decision maker in the 
contributions splitting scheme affects beneficiaries’ right to recourse against the 
wrongdoers and trustees.  Trustees’ liability may also be affected as a result.  
 
1 Beneficiaries’ Right to Recourse Against the Wrongdoer 
The fact that the superannuation trustees are the legal decision makers removes 
the beneficiaries’ right to recourse against the wrongdoer.  As discussed in 
Chapter III, innocent parties generally have a right to recourse against wrongdoers 
when their consent is vitiated through the doctrines of duress, undue influence, 
misrepresentation and non est factum.  However, these doctrines serve to void 
transactions between the innocent party and the wrongdoer where the innocent 
party’s consent to the transaction was vitiated.264  As highlighted by Chapter III, 
this occurs when the innocent party decides to give the wrongdoer a benefit 
because of the wrongdoer’s actions.  This direct relationship between the 
improper act and the benefit obtained is depicted in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Direct relationship between the wrongdoer’s act and the benefit 
obtained in a general transaction. 
 
However, this is not the case with contributions splitting.  The scheme’s 
application process means that the wrongdoer’s actions only vitiated the innocent 
party’s decision to make an application and request for their contributions to be 
split.  As the superannuation trustee is the legal decision maker, it is the trustee’s 
decision, not the innocent party’s decision, to transfer the benefit to the 
                                                
264 See Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers’ Federation [1983] 
1 AC 366, 384 (Lord Diplock); Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614, 635 (Lord Scarman). 
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wrongdoer.  This non-direct relationship between the improper act and the benefit 
obtained is depicted in Figure 2.265   
 
Figure 2. Non-direct relationship between the wrongdoer’s act and the benefit 
obtained in the contributions splitting context. 
 
The non-direct relationship arising from the scheme’s application process 
imposed into the superannuation system’s trust structure may cause difficulties 
when seeking recourse.  Take for example the fictional duress scenario discussed 
in Chapter III but in the contributions splitting context: 
 
Jane received $7,782.48 of superannuation contributions over the 2015/16 
financial year.  Bob discovers that contributions can be split between 
spouses.  He tells Jane to transfer 85% of the contributions she received, 
being the maximum amount that she can split, to him.  Bob threatens to 
beat Jane unless she makes the application to transfer her superannuation 
contributions.  Due to fear of Bob’s threats, Jane submits an application 
electronically to her superannuation fund in accordance with the 
application form’s instructions.  The trustee of her superannuation account 
receives the application, checks that it is valid against the statutory criteria 
                                                
265 This is not merely the absence of a direct relationship.  It is clear that there is a relationship 
between an improper act and the benefit causally derived from it.  However, legally, that 
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and decides to accept the application.  The trustee transfers $6,615.04 of 
Jane’s superannuation contributions to Bob’s superannuation account.  
 
In this scenario, Jane’s decision to submit the contributions splitting application 
was not freely made.  However, it is the trustee who made the decision to accept 
the application and transfer the contributions to Bob.  As Jane did not legally 
make the decision to transfer her contributions to Bob, Jane is unlikely to be able 
to rely on the doctrine of duress to seek rescission.  The trustee also cannot seek 
recourse against Bob for vitiated consent because Bob did not threaten the trustee.  
This same issue applies to the doctrines of undue influence, misrepresentation and 
non est factum.  Therefore, as a result of the scheme’s application process being 
imposed into the superannuation system’s trust mechanism, the legal protections 
provided in situations of vitiated consent in other transactions would not apply to 
protect innocent parties in the contributions splitting context.  Therefore, innocent 
parties who request to split their superannuation contributions due to vitiated 
consent will struggle in seeking recourse against the wrongdoer.   
 
It might be argued that, in accepting the application and transferring Jane’s 
superannuation contributions to Bob, the trustee was acting as Jane’s agent.  It 
might then be argued that insofar as the decision to split contributions was really 
made by Jane, the transfer ought to be reversed if it can be proven that her 
decision was made under duress.  However, this argument is not consistent with 
the relationship of trustee and beneficiary because a trustee is not an agent. 266  It 
is sufficient here to say that Jane has no clear and direct avenue of recourse.   
 
This inability to seek recourse against the wrongdoer lies in conflict to the 
principles of fairness and justice underlying the legal system.267  Certainly, ‘to 
protect people from being forced, tricked or misled in any way by others into 
                                                
266 Re Brockbank [1948] 2 Ch 206, 208-9 (Vaisey J).  See Ch IV.C.1 for a discussion on trustees’ 
duty to not act under dictation. 
267 Andrew Robertson, ‘Constraints on Policy-Based Reasoning in Private Law’ in Andrew 
Robertson and Tang Hang Wu (eds), The Goals of Private Law (Hart Publishing, 2009) 261, 
265-6.  See, eg, Henville v Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459, 470 (Gleeson CJ); National Commercial 
Banking Corporation of Australia Ltd v Batty (1986) 160 CLR 251, 268 (Gibbs CJ); Roads and 
Traffic Authority v Royal [2008] HCA 19 (14 May 2008) [92] (Kirby J); Readymix Holdings 
International Pte Ltd v Wieland Process Equipment Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCA 1480 (3 October 
2008) [122] (Flick J) where the courts considered what would be required by justice and equity. 
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parting with their property is one of the most legitimate objects of all laws’.268  
Liability deters wrongful acts.269  If wrongdoers are not held liable under the 
scheme, a spouse will be able to coerce their spouse into splitting their 
superannuation contributions without fear of any consequences.  This would be 
unfair for the beneficiary whose consent was impaired when making the 
application.  This is particularly unjust and unfair to the beneficiary who would 
have a right to recourse against the wrongdoer if the financial benefit was 
conferred outside the superannuation context.   
 
2 Beneficiaries’ Right to Recourse Against the Trustees 
If beneficiaries are unable to seek recourse against the wrongdoers, they are likely 
to seek to hold trustees liable for their loss.  It was highlighted above that trustees, 
in accepting valid contributions splitting applications, are likely to be acting under 
the beneficiaries’ instructions without truly exercising their discretion or making a 
genuine consideration.  Beneficiaries can seek recourse against trustees where 
they can establish that the trustees breached their duties. 270  However, the 
beneficiary bears the onus of proving that the trustee breached its duty.271  
Although trustees’ actions in merely processing valid applications do appear to be 
contrary to their duty to exercise their discretion, not to act under dictation and to 
act in the beneficiary’s best interest, these actions are in accordance with the 
notion that trustees are not the practical decision maker under the contributions 
splitting scheme. 
 
A beneficiary will likely face difficulties in establishing that the trustee breached 
its duties to exercise their discretion by accepting a contributions splitting 
application.  The court ‘will not control trustees in the exercise of their purely 
discretionary powers unless they are acting mala fide, or have misconceived the 
                                                
268 Allcard v Skinner (1887) LR 36 Ch D 145, 183 (Lindley LJ). 
269 See Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 21, [53]; New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 
CLR 511, 534 [36] (Gleeson CJ); Andrew Robertson, above n 267, 275. 
270 SIS Act s 55.  
271 Papadopoulos v Hristoforidis [2001] NSWCA 368 (12 October 2001) [32] (Hodgson JA); 
Nestle v National Westminster Bank plc [1993] 1 WLR 1260, 1269 (Dillon LJ); Schreuders v 
Grandiflora Nominees Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 310 (27 June 2014) [24] (Garde J).  
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nature of their discretion and acted on that misconception’.272  Where trustees 
have absolute discretion in exercising their powers under the scheme, 273 
beneficiaries may need to establish that the trustees acted in bad faith to establish 
a breach.274  This hurdle is difficult to overcome given that trustees are not 
required to provide reasons for their decisions.275  There are also no indications 
that trustees are acting in bad faith under the contributions splitting scheme.   
 
Even if beneficiaries can establish a breach of duty, the Court can relieve trustees 
of liability where trustees acted honestly, reasonably and ought fairly to be 
excused.276  This requires a broad evaluative judgment taking into account all the 
circumstances of the case.277  The relevant question is whether the trustee has 
‘acted honourably, fairly, in good faith and in a common sense manner as judged 
by the standards of others of a similar professional background’. 278   The 
seriousness of the breach and whether the trustees’ conduct met the statutory 
standard of care are also relevant.279  In determining whether a party should be 
relieved from liability, ‘each case will very much depend on its own 
                                                
272 Heydon and Leeming, above n 219, 325, [16-06].  See also Attorney-General (Cth) v Breckler 
(1999)!197 CLR 83, 115 [58] (Kirby J); Cohen v Amberley Corporation Australia Pty Ltd [2016] 
VSC 140 (7 April 2016) [26] (Derham AsJ); Kain v Hutton [2000] BCL 200 (3 December 2004) 
[226] (Panckhurst J). 
273 See, eg, AustralianSuper, AustralianSuper Trust Deed, above n 204, cl 22.3; UniSuper, 
Consolidated Trust Deed, above n 204 , cl 22; Intrust Super, above n 204, cl 10.31. 
274 Attorney-General (Cth) v Breckler (1999) 197 CLR 83, 99 [7] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ), 115 [58] (Kirby J); Wilkinson v Clerical Administrative & 
Related Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd (1998) 79 FCR 469, 480 (Heerey J), quoting Gisborne 
v Gisborne (1877) 2 App Cas 300, 305 (Northrop J). 
275 Curwen v Vanbreck Pty Ltd (2009) 26 VR 335, 349 [25] (Redlich, Bongiorno JJA and Hansen 
AJA); Mandie v Memart Nominees Pty Ltd (2014) 42 VR 325, [93]-[94] (Macaulay J); Cohen v 
Amberley Corporation Australia Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 140 (8 April 2016) [27]. 
276 Trustee Act 1958 (Vic) s 67; Trustee Act 1936 (SA) s 56; Trustee Act 1925 (ACT) s 85; Trustee 
Act (NT) s 49A; Trustee Act 1898 (Tas) s 50; Trustee Act 1925 (NSW) s 85; Trustees Act 1962 
(WA) s 75.  Similar provisions are also found in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1317JA, 
1318.  See Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Vines (2005) 224 ALR 499, 510-4 
(Austin J) for a discussion on this. 
277 Morley v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (No 2) (2011) 83 ACSR 620, 630 
[50] (Spigelman CJ, Beazley and Giles JJA). 
278 Maelor Jones Investments (Noarlunga) Pty Ltd v Heywood-Smith (1989) 54 SASR 285, 295 
(Olssen J); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Edwards [2006] NSWSC 376 (5 
May 2006) [10] (Barrett J). 
279 Clarke v Great Southern Finance Pty Ltd (rec and mgr apptd) (in liq) [2014] VSC 516 (11 
December 2014) [1962] (Croft J); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey 
(No 2) (2011) 196 FCR 430, 441 [89] (Middleton J). 
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circumstances’.280  The courts have previously expressed reluctance to excuse 
professional trustees from liability.281 
 
In the contributions splitting context, it is clear that the superannuation trustees 
are acting honestly when accepting contributions splitting application.  The 
contentious aspect is whether the superannuation trustees have acted reasonably 
and ought fairly to be excused.  The rights of the beneficiaries will need to be 
balanced against the rights of the trustees in this respect.282  As discussed above, 
the trustees appear to be acting in accordance with industry practice and as the 
scheme intended by accepting valid applications without undertaking further 
processes.  Further, the government created the contributions splitting scheme to 
benefit the receiving spouse and the family unit rather than considering the 
splitting spouse’s best interests as an individual.283   
 
Additionally, the government did not impose any safeguards that trustees must 
take into account when considering an application or require trustees to ensure 
that beneficiaries obtain independent advice or are voluntarily seeking to split 
their contributions.  It also appears to be industry practice and the government’s 
intentions that the process of applying for contributions to be split to not occur in 
person. 284   This may be due to the administrative costs to superannuation 
providers otherwise, which was a major concern when implementing the 
scheme.285  In conjunction, these factors indicate that trustees are following the 
scheme as the legislators intended.  As such, it is difficult to see how trustees 
should be held liable for any losses arising in such circumstances.  It would be 
                                                
280 Maelor Jones Investment v Heywood-Smith (1989) 54 SASR 285, 292 (Olsson J).  See also 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Vines (2005) 224 ALR 499, 510 [46] (Austin 
J). 
281 Partridge v Equity Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd (1947) 75 CLR 149, 165 (Starke, 
Dixon, Williams JJ); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Vines (2005) 224 ALR 
499, 513 [58] (Austin J). 
282 Maelor Jones Investment v Heywood-Smith (1989) 54 SASR 285, 295 (Olsson J). 
283 Appendix B, Commenting Entity 13; Mercer Human Resource Consulting, above n 247, 1; 
CPA Australia, above n 247, 3; Women’s Action Alliance, above n 46, 1. 
284 See, eg, Australian Taxation Office, Contributions Splitting, above n 48; CARE Super Pty Ltd, 
above n 259.  The contributions splitting application forms, including the Australian Taxation 
Office’s form, all require beneficiaries to complete the form and send it to their superannuation 
provider electronically or via mail.   
285 See Explanatory Memorandum, Tax Laws Amendment (Superannuation Contributions 
Splitting) Bill 2005 (Cth) 4; Treasury, Splitting of Superannuation Contributions Between 
Couples, above n 34, 1.   
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unjust and unfair to hold parties liable where they are not responsible.286  Despite 
the fact that superannuation trustees are professional trustees, it seems unlikely 
that they will be deemed to be breaching their duties under the scheme.   
 
Thus, in the above scenario, Jane does not have a clear right to recourse against 
Bob because she was not the legal decision maker of the contributions splitting 
scheme.  However, because she is the practical decision maker, she is also 
unlikely to have recourse against the trustee.  The trustee was acting as the 
government intended in relation to the scheme and was not required to check that 
Jane’s consent was not vitiated.  There are also no indications that the trustee was 
acting dishonestly, in bad faith or was not following industry practice.  Therefore, 
the trustee is likely to not have breached the trustees’ duties discussed above.  
Even if a breach did occur, the courts are likely to relieve the trustee of liability.  
In conjunction, these factors indicate that Jane will not be able to seek recourse 
against the trustee for breach of duty.  Relieving both the wrongdoers and trustees 
from liability means that beneficiaries are left without recourse under the 
contributions splitting scheme.  
 
C Concluding Remarks  
By imposing the application process of the contributions splitting scheme into the 
superannuation system’s trust structure, the government created a situation where 
trustees are the decision makers legally but not in practice.  This dissociation 
creates difficulties for beneficiaries seeking recourse where their decision to 
request for their contributions to be split was not free, informed or independent.  
As beneficiaries are not the decision makers at law, they are unable to seek 
recourse from wrongdoers where their decision to request a split was improperly 
obtained.  This places trustees in a difficult position and leaves them open to 
allegations that they breached their duties in allowing contributions splitting.  
However, the public policy reasons underlying the scheme creates practical 
difficulties for beneficiaries seeking recourse from trustees.  It is difficult to see 
how beneficiaries can prove that the trustees breached their duties and should be 
held liable when the trustees are acting as the government intended under the 
                                                
286 Andrew Robertson, above n 267, 266-7, 274.  See, eg, Roads and Traffic Authority v Royal 
[2008] HCA 19 (14 May 2008) [92] (Kirby J). 
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scheme.  These issues arising from the disjoin between the legal and practical 
decision makers under the scheme essentially means that beneficiaries are 
currently left without any clear access to recourse.  
 
This situation is exacerbated by the fact that trustees are not required, and do not 
appear to, undertake any processes when provided a valid contributions splitting 
application.  This lack of safeguards enables beneficiaries to apply to split their 
superannuation contributions without receiving any financial advice, without 
knowing the practical implications of contributions splitting and also where their 
decision to apply was not free or independent.  This issue is further exacerbated 
by the fact that spouses, by virtue of their relationship, have a heightened risk of 
vitiated consent in relation to financial decisions.   
 
Thus, beneficiaries are also placed in a difficult position where they are at risk of 
losing large portions of their superannuation contributions as a result of the 
contributions splitting scheme.  This is particularly detrimental to women, given 
that they are more likely to make financial decisions based on their emotional ties, 
which are not free, informed or independent.  Women already retire with 
insufficient superannuation compared to men.  This issue arising from the 
contributions splitting scheme may thus, worsen women’s position in retirement 
instead of benefiting them as the government intended.  While such issues have 
not yet arisen in the contributions splitting context, the relative youth of the 
scheme means that these issues may arise in the next 10 to 20 years.  However, 
there are currently no systems in place to prevent these issues from occurring and 
no right to recourse available for those affected.   
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V POTENTIAL PREVENTATIVE AND REMEDIAL MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT IN 
THE SUPERANNUATION CONTRIBUTIONS SPLITTING SCHEME 
The previous chapters highlighted that the contributions splitting scheme does not 
provide any safeguards to ensure that beneficiaries’ decision to apply for 
contributions splitting is not made in circumstances of impaired consent.  It was 
also noted that the scheme does not provide beneficiaries with a clear right to 
recourse in such situations.  It is important to prevent spouses from making 
decisions that are not free, informed or independent due to the potential detriment 
it may cause on a spouse’s welfare at retirement.  Further, due to the possibility 
that such situations have already occurred, it is important that spouses have a clear 
right to recourse against wrongdoers.  This chapter will discuss potential 
preventative and remedial measures that could be implemented to help protect 
beneficiaries from applying to split their contributions due to impaired consent 
and aid beneficiaries where it does occur.  
 
In seeking a workable means for protecting vulnerable spouses, multiple factors 
must be considered and balanced.  In order for measures to be practical, they must 
be both administratively workable and not unreasonably expensive.  The interests 
of the parties (being the splitting spouse, receiving spouse and trustee) must also 
be balanced to ensure that their interests are not unfairly affected.  Certainly, this 
would be consistent with the principle of fairness and justice. 287   Further, 
measures must respect individual autonomy and parties’ right to make decisions 
for themselves.288  Indeed, the courts have noted that the law should not be too 
paternalistic and people should have the right to manage their own affairs.289  
Further, underlying these factors is the need to maintain a strong superannuation 
system in order to support the economy and reduce reliance on the age pension.290  
Thus, the preventative and remedial measures suggested are proposed as practical 
                                                
287 Andrew Robertson, above n 267, 266-7.   
288 Garcia v National Bank of Australia Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395, 424-5 (Kirby J).  See also 
Matthew Thomas and Luke Buckmaster, ‘Paternalism in Social Policy – When is it Justifiable?’ 
(Research Paper No 8, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 2010) 1-2, 20.   
289 See Re C (TH) and the Protected Estates Act [1999] NSWSC 456 (3 May 1999) [10] (Young 
J); Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71, 114 (Gaudron and McHugh JJ); Johnson v Staniforth 
[2002] WASCA 97 (24 April 2002) [123], [142]-[143] (Robert-Smith J). 
290 See Ch I.A for a discussion on the role of the Australian superannuation system.   
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measures that balance the interests of the relevant parties without undermining the 
autonomy of the splitting spouse. 
   
A Preventative Measures  
1 Only Allow Contributions to be Transferred to Low-income or 
Non-working Spouses 
A potential safeguard would be to implement a statutory requirement that 
beneficiaries can only split contributions from a high-income spouse’s 
superannuation account to a low-income or non-working spouse’s account.  This 
requirement would ensure that the scheme operates as it was originally intended 
to do.291  It would also prevent the scheme from being used to the detriment of 
women in particular.  As discussed previously, women are more likely to be the 
low-income or non-working spouse and are also more likely to be the victim of 
family violence. 292   Therefore, it is reasonable to predict that restricting 
contributions splitting to higher earning spouses would diminish the number of 
vulnerable women at risk of being coerced or deceived into transferring their 
superannuation contributions away.   
 
This safeguard might be implemented by requiring beneficiaries to provide both 
spouses’ income statements from the previous financial year’s tax return.  This, 
rather than information concerning the spouses’ superannuation savings, will be 
necessary because the amount of superannuation contributions an individual 
receives in a financial year may not accurately reflect their income.293  Trustees 
could be statutorily allowed to rely on these statements in the same way that the 
scheme currently enables them to rely on information about the receiving spouse 
without investigating whether it is true.294  As such, this safeguard would impose 
minimal burden on trustees.  This statutory safeguard would also assist the 
scheme to operate as it was originally intended to do.  In preventing contribution 
                                                
291 See Explanatory Memorandum, Tax Laws Amendment (Superannuation Contributions 
Splitting) Bill 2005 (Cth) 3-4, 13; Treasury, Splitting of Superannuation Contributions Between 
Couples, above n 34, 3. 
292 See the discussion on why this is a gendered issue at Ch I.B and Ch III.A. 
293 This is because individuals can make voluntary contributions to their superannuation account.  
Further, individuals may receive more than the minimum compulsory employer superannuation 
contributions rate of 9.5%.  
294 See SIS Regulations reg 6.44(3). 
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from flowing away from low-income women, this safeguard would also assist the 
scheme to better address the problem that too many women are currently retiring 
with insufficient superannuation.295  
 
However, this safeguard does not address the specific risk of vitiated consent 
between spouses and would not prevent spouses from applying to split their 
contributions when their decision is not free, informed or independent.  Thus, 
situations involving duress, undue influence, misrepresentation and non est 
factum may still occur under the scheme. 
 
However, this safeguard could be argued to be too paternalistic and interferes too 
greatly with individuals’ autonomy.  This is particularly so as it is a recommended 
financial strategy for spouses to split their contributions based on age, and not 
income level, in order to have earlier access to superannuation savings.296  
However, the seriousness of the potential harm to victims where their application 
is made in circumstances of impaired consent must also be considered.  
Vulnerable spouses may be left less financially secure as a result of the 
contributions splitting scheme.  This will cause such spouses to become more 
dependent on the age pension, the costs of which will be assumed by the 
community.   
 
Ultimately, restricting individuals’ ability to split their contributions may be 
politically unpopular given that it is currently allowed.  However, given the risk 
that superannuation contributions will be transferred away from low-income or 
non-working spouses, paired with the seriousness of the potential impact on those 
affected and the community, it is submitted that this restriction should be 
imposed.  Indeed, the courts created and upheld the doctrine of wife's special 
equity, despite criticisms of it being overly paternalistic, and noted that the need 
to protect vulnerable wives warranted the need to impose an obligation on 
                                                
295 Senate Economics References Committee, above n 8, 13-4; Association of Superannuation 
Funds of Australia, ‘Sixty Minute Super Incentive’, above n 32; De Zwaan, Brimble and Stewart, 
above n 32, 12; Erica Thompson, above n 32, 33.  
296 See Ch II.C.2.b for a more detailed discussion on this financial strategy.  
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creditors in relation to third party guarantees.297  Thus, while this safeguard may 
be politically impractical, it is submitted that the protection it would provide to 
vulnerable spouses would outweigh the disadvantages. 
 
2 Trustees Must Meet Personally with Beneficiaries Before Accepting 
Applications 
Trustees could be required to personally meet with beneficiaries and explain the 
nature and effect of contributions splitting.  This would ensure that the beneficiary 
truly appreciates the effect and nature of the transaction.  Accordingly, it would 
prevent applications to split being made in circumstances where misrepresentation 
has occurred or would ordinarily justify a plea of non est factum.  This 
requirement is similar to that which was originally imposed in English third party 
guarantee cases.  In Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien, the House of Lords held that, 
due to the heightened risk of vitiated consent in financial dealings between 
spouses, a creditor would be precluded from enforcing a guarantee given by one 
spouse with respect to the debts of her partner, unless the creditor had taken 
reasonable steps to ensure that the guarantor’s consent had been properly 
procured.298  More specifically, Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that creditors were 
obliged to meet personally with the wife and explain the transaction and the risks 
involved and urge her to obtain independent legal advice.299  His Lordship 
considered that this would sufficiently balance the vulnerability of the wife 
against the interests of the creditors.300 
 
It must be noted that part of the reasoning behind imposing such an obligation on 
creditors in relation to third party guarantees is that creditors would be unjustly 
enriched if they were able to enforce the guarantee. 301   However, in the 
contributions splitting context, trustees do not benefit from splitting contributions.  
                                                
297 See Garcia v National Bank of Australia Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395, 424-5 (Kirby J); Stephen M 
Cretney, ‘The Little Woman and the Big Bad Bank’ (1992) 108 Law Quarterly Review 534, 536-8. 
298 Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, 196.  See also Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 
649. 
299 Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, 196 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).   
300 Ibid 197 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).   
301 Garcia v National Bank of Australia Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395, 409 [31] (Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow, Hayne JJ). 
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While trustees may charge a fee to split contributions,302 this fee covers the costs 
of services rendered rather than serving to enrich the trustee.  On the other hand, 
superannuation trustees already owe duties to beneficiaries, unlike the third party 
guarantees context where creditors did not owe any duties to the wives before the 
courts imposed such an obligation.  Furthermore, trustees, especially professional 
trustees, are generally held to a higher standard of care and thus, imposing such an 
obligation on them may be appropriate in principle. 
 
However, it is unlikely that this requirement would work in practice.  It should be 
noted that Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s approach was subsequently criticised by the 
House of Lords in Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2) and the 
requirement to meet and explain the transaction to guarantors was dropped in 
favour of a requirement to insist on receipt of a solicitor’s certificate.303  Lord 
Nicholls argued that a personal meeting would likely expose the creditor to 
greater risks and that such meetings would be ‘an intrusive, inconclusive and 
expensive exercise’.304  Ultimately, his Lordship assessed the requirement to meet 
to be a ‘disproportionate response to the need to protect those cases, presumably a 
small minority, where a wife is being wronged’.305   
 
In the contributions splitting context, it might be similarly argued that trustees 
ought not to be exposed to further liability by being obliged to meet beneficiaries 
because trustees derive no benefit from the beneficiaries’ decision to split their 
contributions.  Furthermore, such an obligation would arguably impose 
administrative burden and costs on superannuation trustees, such that it might be 
characterised as a disproportionate and expensive exercise.  Importantly, it might 
be practically impossible to comply with such an obligation, given the number of 
beneficiaries in a superannuation trust.  Trustees are unlikely to know individual 
beneficiaries and their circumstances.  Even if the requirement was for trustees to 
correspond with the splitting spouse, rather than to meet them, significant 
administrative difficulty and cost would be entailed. 
 
                                                
302 See, eg, SuperSA, above n 50; SunSuper, above n 61. 
303 Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 773, 805-6 (Lord Nicholls). 
304 Ibid. 
305 Ibid 805 [53] (Lord Nicholls). 
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Furthermore, the costs associated with the implementation of this safeguard may 
be counterproductive.  Given that beneficiaries who opt to split their contributions 
are already made to cover the costs of the scheme through payment of a fee, it is 
likely that these additional costs would be shifted to the beneficiaries and result in 
higher fees.  Such an increase in the fees charged to split contributions may 
discourage beneficiaries from splitting their contributions.  Furthermore, the 
potential liability and increased administrative burden might also discourage 
trustees from offering beneficiaries the option to split contributions. 306  
Discouraging parties from partaking in the scheme would be contrary to the 
government’s intentions.  More importantly, it would obstruct the achievement of 
the important public policy objectives that underpinned the scheme.  If the 
contributions splitting scheme fails altogether, low-earning and non-earning 
spouses are likely to have less access to superannuation.  Therefore, it is 
submitted that the practical disadvantages of this approach render it unviable.  
What is needed is a workable safeguard. 
 
3 Beneficiaries Must Obtain Independent Advice Before Applying to Split 
Contributions 
Another safeguard would be to require beneficiaries to obtain independent advice 
before applying to split their contributions.  Similar to the approach taken by the 
House of Lords in Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2), application forms 
could require beneficiaries to submit a certificate to confirm that the beneficiary 
has obtained advice from an independent party about the nature and implications 
of the decision to split.  This measure would prevent beneficiaries making 
uninformed decisions, without imposing too great a burden on trustees. 
 
Admittedly, independent advice does not protect against undue influence but does 
protect against misrepresentation and non est factum.307  However, this approach 
is similar to the current requirement imposed in England on creditors for third 
party guarantees.  Following this approach, it would not be necessary to ‘wholly 
                                                
306 Certainly, superannuation providers were against this idea in their submissions to the Australian 
Law Reform Commission due to the costs it would impose on them: Association of 
Superannuation Funds of Australia, Submission No 24 to Australian Law Reform Commission, 
above n 235, 2. 
307 See Credit Lyonnaise Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All ER 144, 156 (Millett LJ).  
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eliminate the risk of undue influence or misrepresentation’.308  It would be 
sufficient to ensure that the splitting spouse understands the practical implications 
of contribution splitting and makes the application with their eyes open.309   
 
Finally, it may be more appropriate to require beneficiaries to obtain independent 
financial advice rather than legal advice in the contributions splitting context.  The 
courts have previously recognised that circumstances may require guarantors to 
obtain independent financial advice, particularly where guarantors have limited 
understanding ‘about the obvious financial unwisdom of a transaction’.310  The 
complexities of the superannuation system and the end benefit taxation rules of 
the contributions splitting scheme may warrant beneficiaries to obtain 
independent advice to truly understand the practical implications of contributions 
splitting.   
 
It must be acknowledged that beneficiaries would still likely be facing increased 
costs for splitting contributions, as they will need to pay for independent advice.  
As such, the comments made earlier about the risk that beneficiaries might be 
discouraged from splitting their contributions – and the disadvantages of that 
outcome – apply here too.  The practical implications of imposing these 
requirements are difficult to predict because there are numerous variables in play.  
For instance, it is possible that some beneficiaries already receive independent 
advice before splitting their contributions due to the complexities of the 
superannuation system.311  Such individuals would not incur any additional costs.  
Another factor that would need to be considered is whether beneficiaries are 
required to obtain independent advice for every single contributions splitting 
application submitted.  Given that independent advice ensures that beneficiaries 
understand the basic elements of contributions splitting and these elements do not 
                                                
308 Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 773, 805 [54] (Lord Nicholls). 
309 See ibid.  See also Charles Y C Chew, above n 189, 48; Simone Wong, ‘Revisiting Barclays 
Bank v O’Brien and Independent Legal Advice for Vulnerable Sureties’ (2002) 7 Journal of 
Business Law 439, 456; Adrian Chandler, ‘Undue Influence and the Function of Independent 
Advice’ (1995) 111 Law Quarterly Review 51, 53. 
310 Beneficial Finance Corp v Karavas (1991) 21 NSWLR 256, 266 (Kirby P).  See also Amtel Pty 
Ltd v Ah Chee [2015] WASC 341 (11 September 2015) [264]-[265] (Pritchard J); ANZ Banking 
Group Ltd v Alirezai [2004] QCA 6 (6 Febrary 2004) [111] (Wilson J); Charles Y C Chew, above 
n 189, 46. 
311 Certainly this is what some superannuation providers recommend although it is not required: 
Catholic Super, above n 95, 1; Media Super, above n 95, 1; First Super, above n 95.  
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change, it may be appropriate for beneficiaries to only obtain independent advice 
once in a set period of time.  Doing so would decrease the costs involved in 
splitting contributions and may sufficiently balance the expenses involved against 
the level of protection required.   
 
All things considered, balancing the interests of the beneficiaries and trustees and 
the expenses involved, independent advice looks to be the more appropriate 
preventative measure to minimise the risk of applications to split superannuation 
contributions being made by vulnerable spouses in circumstances of impaired 
consent.  Adopted in conjunction with education programs about the scheme and 
the risks of making an uninformed decision to split superannuation 
contributions,312 this safeguard would go at least some way towards ameliorating 
the current situation. 
 
B Remedial Measures 
Preventing beneficiaries from seeking to split their superannuation contributions 
due to vitiated consent is essential in light of its detrimental effects and the 
importance of superannuation savings in retirement.  However, remedial measures 
are also required due to the possibility that some beneficiaries have already made 
an uninformed decision to split their superannuation contributions.  Further, 
notwithstanding that they may have been fully informed by an independent 
advisor, some spouses will be coerced or unduly influenced into transferring their 
benefits to their spouse.  The prevalence of domestic violence, which can manifest 
as psychological and financial abuse, requires lawmakers to factor this in as a 
reality, not just a possibility.   
 
                                                
312 Certainly, the need for splitting spouses to be educated about the scheme was highlighted by 
several parties during the scheme’s consultation process: Appendix B, Commenting Entity 13, 
Commenting Entity 15; Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia, Submission No 6, 
above n 80, 8; Women’s Action Alliance, above n 46, 4; Financial Planning Association of 
Australia, above n 96, 4. 
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1 Statutory Amendment to Allow Trustees to Act Under Dictation for the 
Contributions Splitting Scheme 
One improvement might be to amend the statutory framework to remove the 
existing disjoin between the legal and practical decision making by 
acknowledging that superannuation trustees do act under direction in relation to 
contributions splitting and by stipulating that they are permitted to do so.  This 
would prevent trustees from being exposed to potential liability for implementing 
the scheme in the manner that the government intended.  Furthermore, this would 
resolve some of the difficulty that beneficiaries may face in seeking recourse 
under the scheme.  This is because, in cases of duress, undue influence and 
misrepresentation, it would clarify the causal link between the receiving spouse’s 
wrongdoing in corrupting the beneficiary’s decision to direct that their 
superannuation contributions be split and the wrongdoer’s enrichment as a result 
of the split.  It might even facilitate the recovery of contributions in cases where 
there was no ‘wrongdoer’, such as in instances of non est factum. 
 
This outcome might be achieve in several ways.  Currently, trustees cannot act 
under dictation unless an exception applies.313  Contributions splitting could be 
added to the existing permitted exceptions.314  Alternatively, the scheme could be 
amended to remove trustees’ discretion when they receive a valid contributions 
splitting application.  Regulation 6.44 could permit trustees to impose additional 
requirements in their trust deeds that must be met, such as a minimum remaining 
balance to ensure that beneficiaries are able to meet their surcharge liabilities, 
before an application will be valid.315 
 
However, as trustees would have an obligation to follow the beneficiaries’ 
directions, the trustees would have no discretion.316  This would prevent trustees 
from being potentially liable for acting in breach of section 58(1), simply by 
virtue of implementing the contributions splitting scheme as the legislators 
intended.  This amendment would be consistent with the suggestions for 
                                                
313 SIS Act s 58. 
314 See ibid s 58(2). 
315 SIS Regulations reg 6.44. 
316 See LGSS v Egan [2002] NSWSC 1171 (4 December 2002) [87]-[89] (Austin J) where it was 
noted that trustees do not have discretion where they have an obligation to follow directions. 
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legislative reform made by Blue J in Retail Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd v 
Pain.317  In that case, his Honour opined that section 58 should be recast so as not 
to apply to circumstances where trustees ought to be permitted to follow 
beneficiaries’ instructions because the legislature could not have intended section 
58(1) to prohibit such dictation.318   
  
2 Statutory Claw-back Mechanism  
An alternative, or perhaps additional, remedial mechanism would be to implement 
a statutory provision enabling beneficiaries to ‘claw-back’ superannuation 
contributions split when their decision to apply was not free, informed or 
independent.  This mechanism would enable beneficiaries to bypass the issues 
concerning their ability to seek recourse arising from the fact that beneficiaries do 
not legally consent to transferring contributions to the receiving spouse.  Such 
mechanism would be akin to rescission, which is the usual remedy provided to 
innocent parties where their consent to a transaction was vitiated.319   
 
The Australian Law Reform Commission considered the idea of a statutory 
claw-back mechanism to address the possibility of spouses being coerced into 
splitting their superannuation contributions. 320   The Association of 
Superannuation Funds of Australia and the Australian Institute of Superannuation 
Trustees did not oppose this idea.321  
 
A statutory claw-back mechanism could provide that where beneficiaries can 
establish that they applied to split their contributions due to vitiated consent, 
trustees must transfer the split contributions back to the splitting spouse.  Such a 
                                                
317 [2016] SASC 121 (8 August 2016) (Blue J). 
318 Ibid [512] (Blue J). 
319 See, eg, Electricity Generation Corporation (t/as Verve Energy) v Woodside Energy Ltd [2013] 
WASCA 36 (20 February 2013) [201] (Murphy JA); National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan  
[1985] AC 686, 705 (Lord Scarman); Cockburn v Gio Finance Ltd (No 2) (2001) 51 NSWLW 
624, 634 (Mason J); Gould v Vaggelas (1985) 157 CLR 215, 236 (Wilson J); Sharpley v Louth 
(1876) 2 Ch D 663, 685 (James LJ).  
320 Australian Law Reform Commission, Family Violence and Commonwealth Laws – Improving 
Legal Frameworks, above n 2, 466. 
321 Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia, Submission No 24 to Australian Law 
Reform Commission, above n 235, 2; Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees, Submission 
No 146 to Australian Law Reform Commission, Family Violence and Commonwealth Laws – 
Improving Legal Frameworks, October 2011, 4. 
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mechanism should be limited to circumstances involving vitiated consent so that 
parties cannot seek to claw-back contributions transferred due to a change of 
mind.  This mechanism might also be available in cases of vitiated consent where 
there is no ‘wrongdoer’, such as in instances of non est factum.  To allow 
otherwise would prevent receiving spouses from having security and control over 
the contributions received in circumstances where no improper acts have 
occurred.  Certainly, the government intended that split contributions would be 
irrevocable once transferred.322   
 
This mechanism should be administered by the Court, which should determine the 
amount to be ‘clawed-back’, in order to shield superannuation trustees from 
liability to the splitting spouse for retransferring too little or to the receiving 
spouse for retransferring too much.  A statutory mechanism can also address 
issues concerning the lapse of time between the improper acts and returning the 
contributions to the splitting spouse.  Generally, there is a six years limitation 
period before parties are barred from bringing claims against wrongdoers or 
trustees.323  This can be problematic in the superannuation context because the 
innocent party may not be aware within six years of the improper act.  A 
claw-back mechanism can explicitly address the likelihood of delays in bringing 
claims and provide a more suitable limitation period. 
 
C Concluding Remarks 
There are currently no safeguards in place to ensure that applications to split 
superannuation contributions are made as the result of a free and informed 
decision.  Furthermore, the fact that the scheme is implemented using an 
application process within the superannuation system’s trust mechanism means 
that beneficiaries currently have no clear avenue of recourse to recover 
contributions improperly made from the receiving spouse.  Trustees may be 
exposed to liability as a result.  The importance of superannuation in ensuring that 
individuals have sufficient retirement income makes it necessary for the issues in 
the superannuation contributions splitting scheme to be resolved.   
                                                
322 Treasury, Splitting of Superannuation Contributions Between Couples, above n 34, 4. 
323 See, eg, Limitation Act 2005 (WA) s 13; Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 48; Limitation of Actions 
Act 1974 (Qld) s 27. 
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Preventative safeguards should be implemented to ensure that beneficiaries 
understand the practical implications of contributions splitting and are not forced 
or manipulated to split their contributions.  While the safeguards discussed will 
impose administrative burdens on trustees and additional costs on beneficiaries, 
requiring beneficiaries to seek independent advice provides a reasonable balance 
between both parties’ interests.   
 
Furthermore, remedial measures should be introduced to allow affected 
beneficiaries to seek recourse where the quality of their consent to the transfer of 
their contributions was unacceptably impaired.  It is probably unfair to hold 
trustees liable for implementing the scheme as the legislature intended them to.  
Liability should fall on the wrongdoer, or where there is no wrongdoer, on the 
unjustly enriched receiving spouse – unless the receiving spouse has a good 
defence.   
 
Therefore, it is submitted that the superannuation contributions splitting scheme 
should be amended to require that an applicant first obtains independent advice 
about the implications and advisability of splitting their contributions with their 
spouse.  The legislation should also permit trustees to obey a direction of the 
beneficiary to split their contributions.  The legislation should also be amended to 
prevent contributions splitting in circumstances where the receiving spouse has a 
higher income than the splitting spouse.  Finally, the legislation should be 
amended to provide beneficiaries with a statutory mechanism by which they can 





This thesis examined the dangerous deficiencies of the superannuation 
contributions splitting scheme.  As matters stand, spouses can be coerced, 
pressured and misled to confer most, if not all of their superannuation 
contributions to their spouse.  Further, it is has been recognised in the case law 
that financial dealings between spouses carry a higher risk of impaired consent 
and the very well-known dangers of psychological and financial abuse as 
manifestations of intimate partner abuse.  Thus, a scheme that was intended to 
improve the position of women with respect to superannuation savings can in fact 
be used as a weapon to strip women of their financial independence.  
 
Yet, there are currently no safeguards in place to protect vulnerable individuals in 
the contributions splitting scheme.  Furthermore, the manner in which the scheme 
was implemented creates a dissociation between the decision to split 
superannuation contributions, which is, as a matter of practice, made by the 
splitting spouse, and the decision to accept the application and transfer the 
contributions to the receiving spouse, which is, as a matter of law, made by the 
superannuation trustee.  As a result, splitting spouses do not have a clear right to 
recourse under the scheme where their consent to make an application was 
impaired. 
 
Moreover, the delayed impact of the contributions splitting scheme means that 
spouses will not realise the damage caused until decades later.  At that point, it 
will be too late for victims to recover financially.  Given the importance of 
superannuation in providing individuals with income in retirement, these issues 
under the contributions splitting scheme must be addressed.  This is particularly as 
traditional trust laws are unlikely to provided victims with a right to recourse 
under the contributions splitting scheme.  This thesis has proposed potential 
solutions to reduce the risk of harm to spouses and provide them with a right to 
recover contributions that were improperly split. 
 
Until these legal issues are addressed, there is a risk that low-income and 
non-working spouses, and women in particular, will be left in a worse financial 
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position under the contributions splitting scheme.  If these issues are not resolved, 
the community will ultimately bear the burden of providing welfare to the victims 
left with insufficient superannuation savings through the age pension.  Women are 
already retiring with insufficient superannuation savings and there is also an 
increasing number of older women becoming homeless as a result of insufficient 
superannuation savings.  Thus, there is a risk that this situation will worsen if left 
unchanged. 
 
However, the legal issues underlying the superannuation contributions splitting 
scheme form only a small part of a much larger problem.  Ultimately, the issues 
concerning the contributions splitting scheme stem from the incongruence 
between the superannuation system and certain aspects of traditional trust law.  
Trust law plays a complex role in the superannuation system,324 which is made all 
the more complex by the lack of clarity as to the extent to which trust law applies 
to and is modified by the superannuation system.  Further research will be 
necessary to fully understand the role trust law plays in the contributions splitting 
scheme and, more generally, the superannuation system in order to resolve these 
underlying issues.  
                                                
324 See Scott Donald, The Role of Trust Law in the Superannuation System, above n 5 for a 
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B De-identified Summary of Submissions Made to the 2002 Consultation Provided by the Treasury 
Commenting Entity KEY POINTS/PROPOSALS AND MAIN LINE OF QUESTIONING 
1 • To provide for maximum flexibility, all of the splitting options should be available with spouses choosing the most 
appropriate one for them – to avoid disputes if they have different views. 
• Exclude Superannuation fund where there has been a Court approved settlement.  
- The settlement approved by the Family Court allocates the payment of a portion of superannuation by way of 
periodic payment to one party.  In this case, splitting of payment from fund can be allowable? 
- Splitting superannuation contributions could last many years and consequently create significant trauma 
where the cases have been settled and people have moved on in their lives. 
2 • Where a Self Managed Superannuation Fund (SMSF) or Small APRA Fund (SAF) accepts a spouse member, the 
status of the fund (as determined by the number of members) may change. 
- There will be provisions to allow the fund to retain its status under certain conditions)? or 
- A fund will be expected to adjusted to this change in status? 
• Would be opposed to a policy which brought about a change in the status of a significant number of funds. 
• One of the main factors that enable funds to offer low cost insurance to members is the homogenous nature of the 
pool of fund members, eg particular occupation, similar work conditions, healthy enough to work etc.  Opening 




could result in an increase in the cost of insurance to all members. 
• Where salary sacrifice amounts over and above those remitted to the Defined Benefit fund, the employee could pay 
pre-tax salary into an accumulation fund, then split it with spouse.  This would avoid FBT of the employer 
contributing for an associate. 
• It is important that sufficient lead time is allowed for systems and controls to be in place to account for the splits 
and take on extra members. 
3 • It convinced that Government lost sight to the major reason for having superannuation, that is to provide the 
highest level of superannuation entitlements for the member of the fund.  This policy is pursuing because there was 
an election commitment. 
• The estimate cost to taxation revenue, $11 million as stated in the consultation paper in Section 2 “key features”, 
must reflect costs of about $70 million coming mostly from members accounts. 
• Comment in Section 3 - “Given the Government election commitment that the administration burden will not fall 
on employers, this paper does not canvass options that involve the employer”  - is wrong.   
- In the case of Corporate Funds, who are run for the benefit of members with the sponsoring company 
covering some or all of the administration costs, administration burden will fall on employers. 
• To maximise the Superannuation benefits for members and their spoused, the only way is to allow the splitting of 
superannuation entitlements at retirement because it will not generate additional costs to members. 
• Given the flexible nature of the workforce and the recent changes to Family Law legislation relative to 




- It is wrong word to use if “irrevocable” in the paper means that once contributions have been transferred into 
the spouse account they cannot be transferred back to the member account. 
• All split superannuation accounts at the benefit payment stage (after preservation age).  This could also apply 
easily to defined benefit plans therefore avoiding the problems of having different rates for different types of 
policies. 
4 • Option 1 is preferred. 
- It easy to handle changing circumstances and reduce administration. 
- It would be an ongoing arrangement for each pay period. 
- The spouse’s share although treated as employer (deducted) contribution should not be allowed to affect the 
spouse’s eligibility to claim a tax deduction for super contributions as a self-employed person. 
5 • The resulting administration complexities and additional costs generated by the options have not been adequately 
discussed by the Paper. 
- Split contributions would create an enormous administration burden and consequently create additional costs 
to members. 
- Superannuation funds are required to provide offer the splitting options to all members, thus could create a 
cost explosion because  funds need to update systems and processes. 
• Suggestion – The ability for providers to ‘opt in or out’: 




and thus make an informed decision. 
- Provide fund members with the ability to select a provider based on their required ‘bells and whistles’, 
similar to the choice of fund regime. 
• In relation to ‘Prospective Split’ and ‘Annual Split’ there would be an ability for fund members to decide which 
account the split contributions are sent. 
- Enormous administration/compliance burden would be created for superannuation fund as effectively rollovers 
will be required each time a split is requested.  
- From experience, an increase in fees of 0.5% of the fund balance would be created. 
- Suggestion: only allow fund members to split contributions into an account within the splitting spouse’s 
fund, ie. The receiving spouse would be required to become a member of the splitting spouse’s fund. 
• Allow members to retrospectively advise their superannuation provider of the splitting beteen 1 July and 31 
January under Annual split option would make problems with superannuation providers in completing year end 
accounts/report given a fund’s requirements for accounts/reports as at 30 June each year. 
• Annual Split suggests that fund members would have 7 months from year end to election, but most superannuation 
funds are required to lodge their returns within 4 months of year end. 
• Suggestions: Fund members who were looking for flexibility each year in relation to their splitting requirements 
could use the Retrospective Split option at the end of every year. Alternatively fund members who chose to fall 
under Splitting Flag option would have a flag attached to their fund account at all times and be able to have their 
desired splitting requirements in place going forward. 




flag the member’s account with these requirements.  The flag would only be able to be revoked or amended 
by the splitting spouse’s request. In terms of timing, the Splitting Flag should be provided at least quarterly 
to allow funds and members to monitor the splitting of contributions. 
- Retrospective Split: the ‘window of opportunity’ for fund members to retrospectively split be only available 
for 1 month after year end. Retrospective Split option would be able to be offered on an annual basis.  
However, fund members would be able to review the split when they receive their annual report and member 
statements later that year. 
• The Paper’s option 3 seems workable but need further information to make comments. 
• Remove the statement that a member who has satisfied a condition of release would not be eligible to receive 
splittable contributions, and replaced with the current spouse contribution eligibility, ie. Less than 65. 
• 50% restriction is sufficient deterrent for potential schemes that look to influence the ‘spirit’ of the splitting option 
proposal. 
• The  Paper advises that a fund member who is in a pension account in their fund would not be eligible.  The issue 
arises here with a fund that offers fund members the ability to run an accumulation account and a pension account 
within the same fund.  This is particularly prevalent in SMSFs and small APRA funds. 
• The Paper discusses that eligibility to participate will be restricted to fund members who are ‘regular’ contributors.  
‘Regular’ should be defined as at least annually. 
6 • Option only allow people to split contributions which made after 2003.  It would not work effective and attractive 




• Option is not equitable to self-funded retirees – still heavy tax burden. 
7 • Strong support the concept of allowing couples to split their superannuation. 
• Allowing benefits to be split rather than contributions can achieve desired objectives.  It also will only involve one 
transaction per member.  Little action is required until a benefit become payable in cash.  The split will occur at the 
time as the member’s benefit is being processed and amounts available to be split can be readily calculated using a 
proportionate method. 
• The cost involved with contribution splitting will unnecessarily erode the retirement savings unless an appropriate 
alternative, eg based on splitting a proportion of benefit, is developed. 
• With Family Law improvement and Choice of Fund implements, immediately control of superannuation will not 
be a significant flaw. 
• Use through splitting options by non-earning spouses to access cost effective death and disability cover in 
justifying contribution splitting is tenuous. 
• At the splitting stage, the individual will not have the ability to access the superannuation benefit and may not have 
other monies to pay for a proper advice. 
• Prospective Split Option generates too many transactions and creates high cost in trust deeds amendments, 
communication material to member, amending system, modify existing audit controls and costs associate with 
compliance issues. 





• With ‘Annual Split’, complexities will arise if a member transfers to a new fund in a particular year.  The new fund 
will not be beware of the contributions made during the year to the member’s previous year. 
• ‘Joint Account’ Option does not include pre 1 July 2003 balances would result in many couples needing to have at 
least 3 accounts (one for each for pre July 2003 contributions and a joint account). 
• It is doubt that 50% limitation will result in the earlier establishment of superannuation accounts for spouses. 
• If a maximum of 50% is to apply, it should be based on a percentage of the actual contributions received, including 
irregular contributions. 
• The maximum amounts should not be adjusted to allow for taxed, fees and interest etc that have been charged or 
credited to the original member’s account. 
• No need for a different maximum applying to undeducted contributions.  The same percentage should apply to all 
contributions. 
• The Proposal 
- Discriminates against older people, particularly older females; 
- Is inconsistent with the new provisions of the Family Law Act where there are no age barriers to splitting; 
- Will be difficult to administer as the original fund will generally not know the age details of the receiving 
spouse.  This will lead to further costs as the receiving fund may need to return the amount to the original 
fund with further procession costs involved. 




• Where a defined benefit member also has an account to which contributions are being made solely for the purpose 
of providing accumulation benefits, then splitting of the accumulation part should be allowed. 
• Have a concern with the proposal that self employed members will not be able to lodge or vary an election to claim 
a tax deduction after a contribution has been split. 
• The approach proposed in the Paper, that eligible service period of the original member would not transfer across 
to the receiving spouse, is consistent with the approach adopted under Family Law. 
• It is inappropriate to force funds to split contributions for members who only have an accumulation interest in the 
fund.  It would be preferable if trustees, acting in the best interest of their members, could determine whether or 
not to make the arrangement available. 
• Recommend that Trustee be given the option of only allowing contributions splitting where the money remains in 
the same fund, ie the spouse also becomes a member of the fund. 
• Alternative approaches have been provided in Appendix 2. 
8 • To ensure a more simplistic mechanism and to minimise costs, splitting should occur at the benefit end.  It would 
provide a fairer splitting mechanism for all Australians including those with defined benefits and those who are 
approaching retirement and would be easier for funds to administer. 
• The link between employment and superannuation should be comprehensively reviewed as it is not in keeping with 
the changes in working arrangements and demographic patterns. 
- The employment link should be removed for Australians under 65 with a simplified employment test 




- This would also reflect the many recent changes made to superannuation such as spouse contributions and 
child contributions that do not require the employment test to be passed. 
• The terminology used in the discussion is very loose and confusing. 
- The use of the term ‘spouse contributions’ as outlined in the paper could potentially give rise to confusion 
with the current spouse contributions. 
- Should provide for a unique identifier, such as ‘split contributions’. 
• It should be made clear what contributions are captured under the term ‘deductible contributions’.  All employer 
contributions should be included in this term. 
• No similar initiatives and taxation concessions have been considered in respect of same sex partners. 
• The self employed are not in the position to take full advantage of the splitting arrangements. 
• The options outlined provide more favourable arrangements for those people with multiple funds rather than one 
fund because of the rule allowing only deducted contributions to be split where a member has both deducted and 
undeducted contributions paid into the same fund. 
• Fees levied by the funds should represent the actual cost associated with providing the service and not the costs of 
implementing the splitting regime. 
• It is noted that the transfer of any contributions to a spouse account will be treated as an Eligible Termination 
Payment (ETP) roll-over.  Clarification is needed as to what this will involve in terms of process and associated 
documentation. 




included in the adjusted taxable income calculations of the splitting spouse. 
• With proposal, once the contribution has been split, a self employed person would not be able to make a new 
election to claim a deduction or amend an existing election in respect of a split amount.  The rule should be 
reconsidered to ensure self-employed persons are not presented with arrangement that are overly restrictive. 
• System changes and reporting arrangements are required to ensure that the surcharge liability is not attached to 
those contributions that have been transferred to the receiving spouse.  As a further point, the fund will be required 
to report their contributions for the year to the ATO. 
• There are issues in terms of the timing of member benefit statements with the splitting of contribution.  The option 
that is ultimately used should limit confusion to members and complaints to funds where members do not 
understand how the splitting regime impacts the reports of their benefits and the timing of the contribution 
splitting. 
• It is unclear how death and disability insurance will be provided to the splitting spouse. 
• Further guidance is required in relation to the requirement that the receiving spouse should not be able to take the 
split contributions in cash immediately and to ensure consistency with the current preservation rules. 
• Alternative Option: 
- Consideration should be given to adopting a hybrid approach based on options 1 and 2.  That is, the member 
must lodge a prospective nomination of their intention to split before 30 June.  The fund should determine 
the frequency of the split.  The effective date of the split will be 30 June. 
- Self employed person should be given the option of providing a notice of intention to claim a ta deduction 




notice prior to the splitting of the contributions should be removed as the member is unable to control when 
the fund will split the contributions. 
• Does not favour Option 3 – Joint account because it would give rise to administrative complexities. 
9 • The 50% maximum is adding another arbitrary element to the superannuation environment and adding to the 
complexity of superannuation.   
• Change the legislation, so that ATO can follow the split funds if there are not enough funds in the splitting 
spouse’s account, or get rid of surcharge to allow people make additional contributions to split with their spouse 
and build spouse’s superannuation. 
10 • The proposed arrangement only apply to new contributions made after 1 July 2003, thus it will take years to before 
any spouses can gain any benefit sufficient enough to assist their future retirement. 
• In single income families, the single income earners will continue to pay the higher tax on their superannuation 
contributions and also be limited by the ETP and RBL whilst supporting their family. 
• Since the proposed arrangements only apply to ‘accumulation funds’, members of a ‘defined benefit scheme’ will 
be prevented from sharing their superannuation benefits with their spouse. 
• The proposed arrangements do not meet the objectives identified in Senator Coonan’s forward. 
11 • Have no objection so long as the costs can be recovered in service fees. 




12  • The exclusion of accumulation benefits of defined benefit members from the splitting measure in inconsistent with 
the Government’s policy and sends a confused message to members who have both defined benefits and 
accumulation benefits. 
• Flexibility of the splitting measure particularly will be needed by non-working spouses, who for some reason have 
limited superannuation.  It is not clear why the contribution splitting measure should not be available to spouses 
over age 65. 
- enabling couples in this category to access  the measure promotes the Government’s policy of encouraging 
self-reliance in retirement without offending other principles of retirement-income policy. 
• Prospective split: 
- It seems relates to periodic or regular contributions.  It could exclude ‘one-off’ or irregular contributions 
from a decision to split or members elect to split the ‘one-off’ but without election applying to 
regular/periodic contributions. 
- If the quarterly splitting option is adopted, the ownership of the split contributions prior to the split actually 
being made the superannuation provider would need to be clear, eg in the event that a benefit becomes 
payable, or bankruptcy intervenes etc.  Presumable, the ownership to contributions to be split would be in the 
same proportion as the member’s election. 
- Presumably, members will be able to revoke a contributions splitting election prospectively in respect of 
contributions made after the revocation is given to the superannuation provider (subject to any cap on the 
number of revocations which may be made within a given period imposed by a superannuation provider for 
administrative reasons). 




- the ownership of the contributions to be split prior to the split being effected would need to be made clear. 
- A distinction would need to be made for this purpose between prospective and retrospective decisions to split 
contributions (given that split contributions subject to a prospective election is capable of being effective as 
soon as the split contributions are received by the fund even though the actual contributions split by the fund 
may not occur at that time). 
- Consideration should be given to whether there are circumstances which should disentitle a member from 
making a retrospective election to split contributions, eg a self-employed member sho has a RBL issue 
becomes bankrupt after making super contributions to the fund. 
13 • Remains concerned that the consultation paper was released before the Government had made a decision on the 
legal advice they received with regard to Option 3.  Cannot make extensive comment on the viability of the option.  
Therefore will maintain in this submission that Option 2, at this stage, seems to be the preferred option. 
• Option 2 is the most effective option, requiring less administrative change than Option 1.  
• There has been no commitment to an education program.  The starting date of 1 July 2003 is supported, however, 
an extensive education program associated with this policy initiative will be required. 
• It will be difficult to ensure that the costs of administration change are borne only by those who elect to utilise 
superannuation splitting.  Increased costs will be corned by all fund members. 
• Although the Paper states that it is not mandatory for fund to accept contributions on behalf of the receiving 
spouse, because of market competition super funds will have no choice, but to accept payments to continue to 
attract clients and maintain the competitive edge. 




receiving spouse can have a completely different super fund to their splitting spouse? 
• Member benefit protection should warrant greater thought. 
- the policy initiative would include a clause to the effect that super funds trustees have the ability to set 
minimum amounts, that must be  in the super funds before splitting can occur. 
- Proposal should have indication on type of disclosure super funds are required to provide to both the splitting 
spouse and receiving spouse, ie. To provide members of the community with prospectuses and key feature 
statements. 
• Policy options that flow on from splitting of super contributions: 
- the next natural policy direction is to allow single-unemployed people to gain access to contributing to 
superannuation. 
- The Policy intent of the splitting of super accounts is to treat the individual as part of the family unit for 
taxation purpose.  Would like to work with Tsy to explore the possibilities of broadening this outcome to the 
wider Income Tax regime. 
14 • The most practical option would be to allow a person to split their benefit at retirement. 
• Splitting during the contribution phase may result in an imbalance in the final benefits wit hone partner still having 
benefits in excess of ET and RBL thresholds whilst the other partner is well below the thresholds. 
• Splitting during the growth phase will not result in any tax advantages.  The only time the couples will receive tax 




• If the cost of implementing and administering splitting was only passed on to those who take advantage of this 
proposal then the cost would be prohibitive.  Funds will only be able to implement this proposal by passing the 
cost on to all members, for the advantage of a few. 
• opposed to extending contribution splitting to defined benefit funds since that would result in a reduced benefit 
accrual and lower death and temporary or total disablement benefits for the member. 
• does not believe that contribution splitting should be mandatory for all funds. 
• The proposed implementation date does not allow funds enough time to implement system and procedural 
changes.  2004 commencement date would be more realistic. 
• The Government should assess alternative options within the current eligible spouse contribution regime. 
• Require that the spouse account must be in the same fund as the member account will streamline administrative 
requirements and reduce costs. 
15 • Instead of couples who have share one earning spouse’s superannuation over extended periods of time having 
access to two RBL, They should qualify for one and a half or another discounted rate – just as married couples do 
not receive two full age pensions. 
• Capping of the amount able to be split could be considered, or means testing could be applied so that only those 
earning less than a certain amount (eg three time Average Weekly Earnings) could split.  How much this would 
contain the cost to taxation revenue would also be worth examining. 
• The Government’s intention, that the administrative burden not fall upon employers, is supported. 




eliminate some of the timing and ongoing communications issues raised under Option 2. 
• For spouse who has a superannuation account from their previously work and has no intention of returning to 
work, the option of transferring her super assets into her husband’s fund in a separate account, to facilitate splitting 
and reduce the administrative cost may be attractive. 
• Option1: 
- It believes any service fee levied to effect the split should be minimal since the actual split between the two 
accounts would be a simple process for the administrators and that he administration costs would not 
increase significantly as a result of running two separate accounts for the working and non-working spouse. 
• Option 2: rather than make a yearly request, one notification should be sufficient and splitting should proceed until 
the member notifies otherwise. 
• Option 3: Do not favour join accounts believing that this could cause complication with death and disability 
insurance.  It also will have extra administrative costs in relating to maintaining a third account. 
• The model adopted is not as important to them proceeding to implement this ground breaking pre election promise 
for women and in what is found to be the most practical manner possible, imposing the least administration costs 
and being most acceptable to the various stakeholders. 
• Other comments: 
- the new arrangement should signal a move away from women having to sacrifice their rightful retirement 
income in order to secure a roof over the heads of themselves and their children after divorce. 




- An obligation should be placed on providers to make clear statement on costs. 
• A sub account of the wage earner’s fund might also be favoured for death/disability cover.  The inclusion of 
non-industrial participants may have the effect of lowering the average risk profile. 
16 • Favours the annual split method. 
• Advantages of the annual split: 
- It is the most administratively simple to implement and cost effective method.  It also requires minor 
wording changes to the Member’s Benefit Statements. 
- The split for the first year after commencement would take place after 1 July 2004 leaving more time for 
implementation. 
- The Annual Report to members to be issued after the 30 June 2003 year end would provide the opportunity 
to notify members of superannuation splitting to commence from 1 July 2003 with the first split being 
require after 1 July 2004l 
• Issues relating to the annual split: 
- It would be preferable for there to be minimum annual level of contributions before a split can occur. 
- Where a receiving spouse prefer s the contributions split to go to another fund there needs to be consistent 
policy concerning acceptance of that contribution as some funds may be willing to accept the contribution 
and some funds not. 




allow splitting fees to be charged where a member is a protected member of alternatively require a minimum 
account balance for splitting (ie above $1,000 after the split). 
- Legislation would need to reflect the possible situation where the member exits the fund after a splitting 
order has been provided but before the splitting actually has been taken.  In this case splitting order should be 
void. 
- Although it is clear that any surcharge liability remains with the splitting spouse after a split of contributions, 
there will need to be a “notional” contribution picked up for the reporting of surchargeable contributions 
after year end via the Member Contribution Statement. 
- For Risk only superannuation policies where there is no investment balance (ie the full contribution provides 
for insurance benefits) there is a problem with the debiting of any later surcharge liability. 
• Disadvantages of the prospective split option: 
- This option would require wholesale changes to the Section 82AAT notice process as the Section 
82AAT(1A) notice is required to be submitted to the superannuation fund before the split of a contribution 
occurs. The Norwich Union 82AAT process is a year end process rather than during the year. 
- A high volume of transactions would be expected to occur. 
- Contact would need to be made with the other fund to ensure the contribution would be accepted by that fund 
and the process of transferring funds out, thus significant extra administrative costs will be created. 
- This would require system changes to cater for an automatic split from the splitting member’s account. 




- Increased monitoring of age 65 limit to splitting contributions and increased monitoring for the other 
conditions of release (eg retirement) extending now to the status of spouses over their preservation age (this 
would apply to all options). 
• Disadvantages of the joint account option: 
- Complex changes to superannuation legislation to account for joint accounts whereas current superannuation 
legislation is drafted based on individual beneficiaries.  
- Unlikely to result in a 50/50 interest between two spouses as the splitting spouse would incur transaction 
costs (such as contribution tax on deductible contributions), 
- Possibly higher fees if both splitting spouse and receiving spouse have superannuation accounts outside the 
new joint account. 
- Substantial changes to disclosure documents and attached application forms to account for joint accounts. 
- Complexity and uncertainty as to whether binding nominations are allowed in relation to a joint account. 
- Changes required to Trust Deeds (this would apply to all options) to allow splitting of contributions. 
- Very onerous systems development effectively requiring another systems overlay, 
- Inability to accept rollovers compromises the encouragement of consolidating superannuation and will result 
in many policies becoming mere holding accounts (ie inactive accounts). 
- Significant hindrance on employers as the joint account could not be held within the standard employer 
sponsored plan if both spouses were receiving Superannuation Guarantee contributions from 2 different 





• Alternative options to those offered by the Government: 
- Only provide for splitting of employer contributions and deductible personal contributions. The disadvantage 
of this method is that retirement savings for the spouse would grow to a larger amount with the inclusion of 
undeducted contributions. 
Introduce a combined couples Reasonable Benefit Limit (RBL) to be twice the size of the current individual limits and a 
combined couple ETP low rate threshold. Where a valid spouse relationship exists benefits splitting at retirement or 
attaining age 65 would result in the couple being assessed against a higher RBL and a higher ETP low rate threshold. 
17 • The restriction of the proposed contributions splitting to accumulation fund members however is discriminatory 
and denies a large proportion of Australians the benefits it is designed to provide. 
• The proposed income splitting arrangements therefore discriminate markedly against those Australians who must 
compulsorily contribute to their retirement incomes compared to those who have no such requirement. 
• those public sector employees not in schemes such as the CSS and PSS are not compelled to make superannuation 
contributions but nevertheless, stand to enjoy the benefits this proposal offers. 
• Historically, many women have been disadvantaged through their inability to make superannuation savings while 
they are rearing families, however, that recent amendments to relevant legislation will empower the Family Law 
Court to direct a proportion of a superannuation entitlement to a former spouse. 
• Discussion paper mentions under its objectives, page 3, second dot point, that contributions splitting will provide 




income in retirement.  That is a commendable feature of this proposal. 
• it discriminates against defined benefit fund members whose superannuation pension is paid to one member of a 
couple, denying the opportunity to split their superannuation pension for tax planning purposes. 
• The proposed limitations on the proportion of contributions splitting appear to be a little inflexible, 
notwithstanding the need to ensure that sufficient funds exist to meet a member’s surcharge liability. 
- Is it possible to permit a higher ratio, based for example on the likely maximum or median superannuation 
surcharge liability? 
- Alternatively, if a higher percentage of splitting was permitted, it could be on the condition that where 
insufficient funds existed in the transferring member’s account to meet surcharge liability, then that liability 
could be deducted from the spouse’s account. 
• There are arguments why the restriction should be based on preservation age, but splitting should surely be 
permissible where the spouse works a pre-determined minimum number of hours per week after reaching 
preservation age.  That would be consistent with the Government’s recognition of the desire of some older 
Australians to work beyond “normal” retirement age when it increased the limit from 70 to 75 years for personal 
contributions to superannuation in the last Budget. 
18 • Possible Alternative – Splitting the Final Benefit. 
• As the difference between any revenue generated from fees imposed upon the splitting parties and the costs 
incurred will be borne by the membership as a whole, this will effectively result in splitting spouses being cross 





• It is difficulty to reconcile the comment that “the general link between paid employment and the ability to 
contribute to superannuation will be maintained” with the “introduc[tion of] a number of measures that have 
broadened the accessibility of superannuation to individuals who are outside of the workforce”.   
- The introduction of accessibility to superannuation for non working spouses, children and persons in receipt 
of a baby bonus means that the “link between paid employment and the ability to contribute to 
superannuation” has been well and truly broken? 
• The retention of the occupational nexus, especially with respect to those members aged over 65, only serves to 
create considerable confusion and costs and, accordingly, the link with employment should be removed.  Instead, 
persons should be able to contribute until the age of 70 (or possibly 75) at which point the contributions must cease 
and the benefit must be paid. 
• The reference to “personal” contributions has caused considerable confusion amongst the superannuation industry 
and considered there is no need to facilitate the splitting of personal contributions. 
- As personal contributions are made after tax and can be split before it reach the super funds.  They would be 
treated as undeducted contributions on receipt as an Eligible Termination Payment they would be tax-free 
and would not count towards either the low-rate threshold or the Reasonable Benefit Limit. 
• Option 1 should not be implemented due to the significant cost and administrative works would involve.  The 
timing of the split and any potential loss of investment earnings and or insurance cover will also be a significant 
issue. 
• Option 2 is the preferable option because it is considerably easier than splitting contributions on an on-going basis. 
- One point to note is that not all funds report on a 30 June year and it may be easier for such fund to 




a 30 June year. 
- Alternative option could be: after splitting member advises intention to split a specified proportion to a 
specified account, funds advise members their “standing” arrangement on their annual member statement. 
Then member has specified period after receipt of statement to revoke or amend the split (say 60 days). If no 
revocation or amendment is received then the superannuation provider effects split within a further 60 days. 
- That consideration is given to a variation to Option 2 whereby an annual in arrears ‘standing arrangement’ is 
effected. 
• Questions in relating to option 3: 
- how directions as to investment choice can be given; 
-  what would occur in the event of the death of the splitting member or the receiving spouse; 
- what would occur in the event of the separation of the spouses; and 
- who is to receive member statements; annual reports and other information disclosure. 
• Option 3 should not be implemented. 
• Participation Restrictions: Given that the trustee may not be aware of the age of the receiving spouse and is 
generally unaware of their employment status, the only feasible method by which this requirement can be imposed 
would be to impose an obligation upon the splitting member.  The splitting member could be required to provide 
the receiving spouse’s age and to notify the fund once the receiving spouse is no longer eligible to receive split 
contributions. 




Payment to the receiving spouse. 
19 • Support the proposals to allow members of accumulation funds to split both personal and employer contributions 
made after 1 July 2003 with their spouse. 
• It is unclear how the splitting proposal interact with the new superannuation and family law requirement (i.e. super 
on divorce) and with spouse contributions. 
20 • In terms of overall maximising retirement savings, equitable distribution of assets, cost effectiveness and 
simplicity could be achieved by permitting the splitting of superannuation benefits at the point of retirement of 
either spouse. 
• The proposal does not extend to a defined benefit interest. 
• The stated restriction on splitting deductible contributions is governed by taxation issues relating to both 
contributions tax and the superannuation contributions surcharge. 
• Early response from members suggests that it could be taken by fund members who are currently married and 
approaching retirement.  However, there could be a low initial take-up rate by younger couples, which would 
reduce the value of the currently proposed options. 
• Brief analysis of the potential changes to administration processes has been undertaken.  The extensive changes 
required suggest that both set up and ongoing costs will not be insignificant.  Increase administration cost will have 
an impact on member account balances. 
• A single income family would be required to hod a minimum of two accounts, thus doubling current 




• It is important to weigh up the issue of control of the savings during accumulation against the goal of maximising 
retirement income for the couple. 
- Option 1 & 2 support the government’s objective to give the non-working spouse a separate account during 
the accumulation phase thus providing an opportunity for that spouse to make nay decision in relation to any 
investment options offered by the fund.  Option 3 departs from this objective. 
• Insurance would probably not be offered to a non-employee spouse in a fund that was not public offer. 
• For employers who currently meet all or part of the administration costs of their sponsored funds, the options 
would result in an increase in employment costs. 
• The Consultation Paper is silent on the issue of whether split deductible contributions, once rolled over, are to be 
treated as mandated contributions and subject to member protection. 
• The ‘anti-detriment’ provisions of the Income Tax Assessment Act may require review due to the use of a current 
account balance to calculate the anti-detriment credit.  The “rollover” of substantial contributions may skew the 
calculation result. 
• Requirement, that receiving spouse has not meet a condition of release, is beyond practical administration where 
the spouse account is in another Fund. 
• Option 1 is expensive to administer and requires and additional account  being set up for the member if non 
already exist. 
- Superannuation funds whose administration systems are highly automated and readily adaptable to new 




• Annual split will require essentially the same changes as the prospective split option. 
- funds with legacy administration systems preferred this option to options 1 and 3 since it is better suited to 
‘batch’ processing. 
• Joint accounts Option 
- A joint account would avoid the need for the automatic triggered ‘rollover’ requirements of the other 
proposals, many of the other changes identified for those proposals may still be necessary. 
- For a dual income couple where each wished to split part of their superannuation contributions, it could 
require the family operating four accounts – two individual and two joint. 
- This option has not been supported by their membership. 
• An alternative proposal – a ‘split at end’ approach. 
• Consideration should be given to developing an additional proposal: 
- at a nominated start date record the quantum of a member’s personal undeducted, deducted, and total 
contributions. 
- When either partner first satisfied an aged-retirement associated condition of release permit the partners to 
elect to transfer all or part of wither partner’s deducted or personal undeducted contributions accumulated 
after the start date and any earnings accumulated since the start date to their spouse. 





21 • Alternatives to achieve objectives: 
- Splitting of end benefits – this would occur at the time a benefit is payable to the member at retirement or 
earlier change of employment and would operate in a similar manner to the benefit split which can occur on 
divorce. 
- Removal of the employment nexus – this would enable contributions to be accepted from all Australians of 
working age. 
• The implementation of this measure will simplest for self managed superannuation funds and small APRA funds. 
However there is a risk of leakage in relation surcharge payments if reporting requirements are unclear and the 
contribution flows are not appropriately reported. 
• Some small funds may require to be split to enable spouses to receive contributions from their contributing partner. 
This will arise in funds made up of 3 or 4 business partners. This is considered to be a minor impact to funds 
• There are some instances where an employer contribution is not deductible, eg where the payment is made as a 
result of the application of the superannuation guarantee charge, an employer contributes more than the deductible 
amount or a contribution is credited to SHAR.  
- It needs to be made clear in any legislation what contributions can be split. 
• Prospective Split 
- the capture and reporting of additional information will be both required by super funds and ATO thus create 
significant costs. 




- The recommendation in relation to S82AAT notices will prevent self employed persons using this option. 
• Annual Split 
- where implementing a split a significant time after the year end, the funds have to reissue members 
statements or to issue interim statements after a split has occurred to reduce the incidence of complaints to 
funds. 
- The provision of multiple statements will result in an increase in administration costs associated with the 
splitting process. 
- the member would be taking any investment risk associated with the contribution for a significant period of 
time up to 18 months under the proposal outlined. this could have a detrimental impact on the contributors 
retirement savings in the current environment. Ideally the contributions would be split on a more frequent 
basis to enable this risk to be shared. 
- The delay in splitting contributions proposed will also make the reconciliation of taxation movements a more 
complex matter. 
• Joint account: 
- It is likely to be significant development costs to implement. 
- This option leads to addition complexity in relation to the taxation of superannuation benefits and when 
benefits become payable. 




• Preferred Option 
- A combination of prospective split and the annual split. Those in a position to nominate a split prior to 
making contributions able to make a split on a prospective basis. 
- The split would ideally be effected on a quarterly basis to enable the investment risks to be shared. 
- Those which are not aware of the deductibility of the contribution until a section 82 AAT notice is prepared 
at year end should be given the option to elect when giving this notice for the contributions to be split in 
arrears. The split could then be effected at the end of the next quarterly splitting cycle for the fund. 
22 • The paper is discrimination against older people and members of defined benefit funds. 
• Each superannuation fund should be given flexibility on how it implements splitting arrangement. 
• Members of defined benefits funds at least should be allowed to split their own personal contributions. 
• 50% restriction is too restrictive.  It would be sufficient to require that he part of member’s account balance 
required to satisfy any surcharge liability cannot be split. 
• Disagree with Option 1 because it involves unnecessary complex transfers and significant administrative costs. 
• The proposal that contributions be split at least quarterly will involve difficulties for trustees and is inconsistent 
with the proposal for investment choice. 
- difficulties can avoid by paying the split contributions directly into the spouse’s account rather than must 




• Option 2 will giving rise timing problems relating to reports to members and administrative work in redeeming and 
issuing units. 
• Member should not be allowed to split a contribution where the account balance will be reduced below the 
required protection level for small accounts. 
• Option 3 could affect member’s investment choice and it would involve voting right issue in relation to the 
appointment of member representatives to the trust board. 
• Option 3 would be preferable if the trustees were given flexibility as to the form of the splitting of contributions 
that they will permit. 
• There is not sufficient justification to impose age limit on splitting. 
• There should not be restriction on splitting of contributions where the spouse has satisfied a condition of release. 
• The deadline of 31 January in relation to the Annual split method is not appropriate since members not required to 
be sent any reports would miss the opportunity to split contributions. 
• Both internal or external splits would have issue arise respect to the impact of surcharge. 
• In the Paper, the statement on page 5 under heading 2 ‘Key Features’ is inconsistent with the statement on page 12 
under heading 4.1 ‘ Limitations on Proportion of Splitting’. 
• ‘regular contributions’ need to be clarified. 




spouse, still be regarded as a mandated employer contribution. 
• It is not clear whether the amount to be split at the end of  year under the Annual Split method is just the amount 
that is the desired proportion of the number of dollars as actually contributed in respect of the member, or that 
amount after the investment return is credited to or debited to that amount. 
• No indication is given as to the timing of splits under the Prospective Split method. 
• A period of 90 days is suggest for the Annual Split method.  Cost and fee issues will be significantly influenced by 
this. 
23 • More costs to funds thus more fees to members. 
• Regarding to non-earning spouses get access to cost effective death and disability cover, private cover has already 
been available. 
• The proposal will not really lower superannuation tax. 
24 • Support the proposal for splitting. 
• Concern about the potential misuse of taxation concessions as the access to two low-rate ETP threshold and RBL. 
• Flexibility should be given to super funds to accept/retain splitting spouse contributions. 
• Superannuation funds should be allowed to levy a fee either on the spouse, the splitting spouse etc in order recoup 




25 • Couples may have up to 3 superannuation accounts thus extra cost will be created. 
• Issues might arise where non-working spouse’s exiting super fund lies dormant then start up another fund. 
• The issue in relation to Option 3 is that the earner member of the couple could reach benefit age before a 
non-earner. 
• In long run, the splitting would create more costs and more paper work. 
• Members in defined benefit fund are discriminated. 
• Access to death and disability insurance cover need more clarification. 
• Super splitting should be mandatory, using income threstholds. 
• What happens when one partner has more than one super fund? 
• Can middle to high income earner split off their super into a children’s fund? 
26 • Exclude contributions made before 1 July 2003 discriminates old people. 
• Deadline of industry submission gives insufficient time to do justice to such an important subject. 
27 • Supports the general principle that members should have the facility to split their contributions with their spouses. 





• 50% limit should be removed. 
• Option 1 involves a stream of multiple transactions thus high costs. 
- The proposal aims young couples but most of them would not be planning that far ahead. 
- It discriminates members in Defined Benefit Fund and should be available for couples in same sex 
relationships. 
- Funds should be given choice to allow a member to split. 
- The Paper has no mention on whether the split will apply to all member’s accounts and no mention is made 
of the timing a super fund would need to adhere to for passing the split contributions to the spouse’s account. 
- Member Protection issue should be addressed. 
- Systems would need to be enhanced to reflect the contribution being transferred to the spouse’s account as 
separate transactions on the member’s account. 
- Will ETP rollover paperwork need to be produced? 
- Will members be able to split employer contributions that are subject to a vesting scale 
• Option 2 would be less awkward and costly for funds but timing issues would arise. 
- More flexibility should be vested to members. 




• Option 3 would reduce the number of accounts required in respect of each couple but members requiring to 
transfer less than 50% of their contributions to a spouse would still end up with at least two family accounts, with 
resulting additional costs. 
• Under Option 3, difficulties would arise to track the entitlement and interests and also it would the significant 
potential legal complexity in arranging to establish joint accounts. 
- Start date as 1/7/2003 is not appropriate. 
- Joint account is not effective and efficient way for people. 
- Will member have the option to decide not to continue the splitting? 
- It would cause management complexity. 
- It will have reporting implications. 
- Difficulties would arise when different investment strategies adopted by members. 
- Should members benefit protection rules apply to couples separately? 
- Would need to consider members’ details to be kept separetly? 
• Election of splitting should be revocable. 
• Preferred option would be the Prospective Split. 




• The Government should ensure that rules about ESPs for non-working spouses are made clear. 
28 • It raises complexities and potential costs of the same order of the splitting of superannuation on family breakdown. 
• A considerable lead time should be given for any consideration of the matter. 
• It discriminates members in Defined Benefits Funds. 
29 • The proposal has discrimination against couples under current system where the primary bread winner is 
significantly younger than their partner. 
• Superannuation splitting should be considered in respect of existing unpreserved amounts in addition future 
contributions. 
- should one of the couple leave their current employment, they will be able to “cash in” their unpreserved 
benefits and apply them to a spouse account, effectively splitting them. 
• Rather than restrict to 50/50 splits, Joint accounts should be allowed to split in nominated proportion either 
prospective or retrospectively. 
• The proposed 50% splitting limit on deducted contributions appear unnecessary. 
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